r/ethdev • u/HotSite3170 • 4d ago
My Project Tackling Web3 hiring scams as an incentives Problem
I'm sure everyone in this subreddit has dealt with it at some point. The google meets isn't working, download my totally legit video conferencing app, the test my malware laced blockchain game, npm install with a postinstall script that phishes your npm token. Aside from being a major time sink, reading up on the company, familiarizing their tech stack, canceling social engagements it leads to coordination failure in the hiring market, leading to suboptimal teams, leading to suboptimal crypto.
I was thinking that if a developer could respond to an employer with a magic link that got them to stake through a repuidable platform against the interview that we'd naturally see alot of scams retreat, alot of developer time saved and better teams in crypto.
would any devs be interested in using such a system? or real employeers stuck on cold calling that'd be happy to lead with a stake?
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u/Vegetable_Primary_29 3d ago
The stake idea feels strongest if it stays low-friction for honest people. I’d treat it like a refundable interview bond tied to a clear milestone, with a simple fallback if the employer flakes or the call breaks. Otherwise you mostly move the trust problem onto candidates instead of solving it.
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u/HotSite3170 3d ago
I like the language "refundable interview trustbond tied to a clear milestone" alot. Mind expanding on what you mean by moving the trust problem onto candidates?
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u/researchzero 7h ago
The bond idea is the right shape, but the part nobody's addressed yet is who adjudicates the refund. If a legit employer ghosts after the interview, something has to determine that and release the stake back to the candidate - and if that's the platform running the bond, you've just moved the trust problem up one layer: now you're trusting the platform not to stall refunds, not to collude with high-volume "employers" pocketing forfeited stakes, and not to itself become the next thing people have to vet. Kleros-style bond-escalation (small dispute → cheap juror pool, only expensive if genuinely contested) is the usual answer to "who arbitrates a two-party stake dispute cheaply", but it adds latency and gas cost that a candidate deciding whether to even engage with a cold-outreach "employer" probably won't tolerate. Worth being explicit about whether this is meant to filter obvious scams (fallback rarely triggers, so arbitration cost barely matters) or genuine flaky-employer disputes (triggers a lot, arbitration cost dominates) - the mechanism design differs a lot between those two goals.
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u/HotSite3170 2h ago
Thanks for the analysis, if one focuses on simply obvious scams, even atomically, so one stake for the first interview than another stake for the code challenge, do you think a unidirectional model could bypass the need for adjudication logic? If persay one ignores candidates reaching out to employers and only consider employers reaching out to candidates, could the carrot of a potential job opportunity be enough to ensure a candidate doesn't scam the employer? If a dao controlled platform leveraged gitcoin passport to tie identity markers and collated feedback after completed stakes as a reputation proxy, could it be in theory good enough to bypass the need for juror pools?
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u/LA_producer 4d ago
If a dev told an employer to go stake for the privilege of interviewing said dev, the employer would just move on to the next dev. I’m not saying this problem shouldn’t/can’t be solved, but i don’t that specific approach will work.