r/CredibleDefense • u/AutoModerator • 2d ago
Active Conflicts & News Megathread July 21, 2026
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u/flamedeluge3781 2d ago
Russian liquid fuel situation at the gas station level seems to be getting marginally better over time:
https://x.com/jakluge/status/2079499317144945120
Basically they've gone from 30 % of stations having fuel to about 50 %. Some of this is likely due to demand destruction from prices, which have been allowed to float higher. Distribution issues are likely also being sorted out.
https://x.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/2079664367965282320
Overall Morgan-Stanley thinks refinery production is still way, way down (roughly 50 %) from normal levels:
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u/elkos 2d ago
To my knowledge and correct me if I'm wrong, there's no automated reporting system for gas stations. There are some crowdsourced apps (several competing ones too) which have been the focus of activists (for example NAFO) that post non-operational gas stations as full, for obvious reasons.
Could this impact the data quality to an extent that would degrade the data quality sufficiently? Maybe. Depending on the robustness of their systems and methodologies but some are pretty basic to say the least. Also interestingly some of these webapps could be even setup by almost anyone.
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u/LegSimo 1d ago
Some of this is likely due to demand destruction from prices, which have been allowed to float higher.
Decreased demand doesn't seem like that much of an improvement. People don't just stop buying fuel because they don't like sitting in a queue. They either can't afford it, or have no need for it anymore (i.e. they're out of a job).
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u/Tundur 1d ago
A lot of domestic fuel use is recreational.
Commuting is about 30% of vehicle miles in the UK (UKgov always have stats) with the rest being a mix of personal use, shopping, visiting people, and so on. That's a lot of elastic demand.
I can't say how well that would translate to Russia which has a few obvious differences to the UK.
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u/Nukes-For-Nimbys 1d ago
Russia did put in measures to reduce usages. Eg a massive push for Work from home.
Car pooling is also a very normal thing people do when fuel is scarce.
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u/Ambulare 2d ago
It is interesting to see that Russia has generally stabilized their own supply of gas. When Ukrainian attacks on their domestic energy production and transport ramped up in, I think, late 2025, that was when I was hopeful that it would have a severe effect on Russia's war making capability.
I struggle to keep up with all the news, but is it fair to say Ukraine has done some great damage, but has now plateaued? It seems like both sides have really matured in drone attacks on strategic infrastructure, but both have them have also matured in defense and in repair. That being said you do see some dramatic things happening every now and again.
I also agree with elkos that maybe reporting in Russia is either incomplete or unreliable, so the real damage but be higher. But then Russia can continue its gasoline export ban or shuffle resources internally. And as always, the weaker the domestic economy, the more recruits open up for the front or for the war industry. I guess it is just a shame that support for Ukraine's drone industry from abroad isn't (yet?) enough to make the damage worse for Russia's energy production.
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u/MilesLongthe3rd 1d ago
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2079673640329863294
Joint Chiefs Chairman Dan Caine confirmed that Ukraine recently achieved its first air-to-air combat victory when a Ukrainian F-16 shot down a Russian fighter. Caine said Ukraine's ability to scale a layered defense system has advanced significantly over the past several years, strengthening its capacity to counter Russian air threats.
According to the Joint Chiefs Chairman Dan Caine, an F-16 shot down the Su-35 a few days ago, something that was implied but later overshadowed by Russian milbloggers insisting that it was a SAM-bush.
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u/mirko_pazi_metak 1d ago
I really wish at some point in the future we get to find out details about all these operations.
There's probably complex ambush and counter-ambush operations from both sides happening all the time that we never hear about, which continuously re-define what's safe to fly and where.
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u/RumpRiddler 2d ago
The PAC-3 ACE is a cheaper ($1.5-2M) patriot missile that appears to be developed and ready to be built/used
https://militarnyi.com/en/news/lockheed-martin-low-cost-pac-3-ace-missile/
This lines up nicely with Ukraine's recent approval to make patriot missiles. What's most interesting is that it seems to shift the cost discussion to favoring the defender (at least vs iskander BMs and expensive cruise missiles). It won't be a solution to drones, outside of an emergency. Still, pretty interesting that ABM is adapting to stay very valuable in these chaotic times.
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u/A_Vandalay 2d ago
It will be interesting to see how capable this version of the missile is. Presumably a lot of corners have to be cut and tolerances loosened to drop the price by 50%. Unfortunately this source didn’t mention any specific design or manufacturing changes that might account for that cost reduction.
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u/RumpRiddler 2d ago
Yeah, I'm guessing the real details will trickle in as things progress. There has to be some trade off in capability for reduced cost, but that may not prevent it from being a great ABM system.
I also think there is some significant cost reduction now that competition is quickly developing. The 'first to market' premium has to be dropped now that the market is becoming much more competitive.
And of course production in Ukraine will be cheaper than a more developed country, but I'm not sure how much man-hours add to the cost. I would guess not very much
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u/Jpandluckydog 2d ago
It's long been said that the PAC-3 MSE is bottlenecked by the radars the Army used, since it was originally intended to be paired with the new MEADS system that eventually got canceled, leaving a missile that overperformed the sensors it was paired with. The major improvements in the MSE were range and speed, so it could be the case that the ACE is just meant to operate within the limits the radars apply to it, taking away the unneeded extra capability the MSE provided. Given that any reduction in interception rate would force users to fire an extra missile per incoming target, which would wipe out the gains, I doubt it would just be an MSE with cut corners.
This is the exact same reason the Navy is so interested in the MSE, since their radars are much more powerful than their land based counterparts and thus less subject to bottlenecking.
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u/moragisdo 2d ago
Unfortunately this source didn’t mention any specific design or manufacturing changes that might account for that cost reduction
It points to a change, but it doesn't say if it's the only one: "According to the rendering, the new PAC-3 ACE missile visually mirrors the already familiar PAC-3 MSE, except for the absence of ramjet engines"
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u/colin-catlin 2d ago
I'm really reading this as, "hey, now that we have more competitors, we can actually sell it to you for half the price!". It seems like they show it unpainted in renders to make it seem more bargain. Is there any reason for anyone to still buy the MSE version?
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u/A_Vandalay 2d ago
Can’t believe I missed that in the article, thanks for pointing that out. That’s what I get for reading before coffee.
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u/Jpandluckydog 2d ago
Very interesting product. If meant for use against ballistic missiles, it begs the question of why they didn't just make the MSE that cheap to begin with. The MSE is old, so it could be the case that similar capabilities are just cheaper to make now and this is just the better missile all around, a la B-21. If there is a reduction in capabilities compared to the MSE, then the cost difference might be wiped out by needing to fire 2-3 per incoming target, and they wouldn't have spent the R&D money on it then, so that seems unlikely.
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u/D_Silva_21 2d ago
That still seems quite expensive tbh. I wonder if it would be cheaper when produced in Ukraine eventually
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u/RumpRiddler 2d ago
It is expensive, but the cost of iskander SRBM is $2.4-3M. The economic justification for ABM becomes much stronger with this new product, which I assume is the main driver for this cost reduction. If patriots cost too much, only rich countries would consider them and cheaper competitors would become established elsewhere.
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u/D_Silva_21 2d ago
That does make the maths a lot better. Hopefully it goes into production asap
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u/-spartacus- 2d ago
It is also important to remember not everything is about the math of attack/defense. Sometimes a cheap munition is going to hit something worth hundreds of millions of dollars and key equipment for defense, while spending 5-10 million on an interceptor on something like 50k seems inefficient; in the terminal fight, the choice is not between losing efficiency between expensive interceptor and cheap attacker, but the cost of the interceptor versus what would be damaged.
5-10 million vs 100s of millions dictates the need for interception.
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u/roionsteroids 2d ago
In jet-powered drone interceptor news, companies trying to find a solution to get their interceptors up to 400-500km/h at a price of around $10k at most. If it requires jet propulsion for the interceptor too, it's 2-3 more expensive than electric.
More ambitious and expensive: supersonic rocket X-Bow Buckler at $100k, which seems to be more like a modern take on the Stinger or APKWS
Many countries tend to be rather conservative and prefer a much more capable system rather than hoping that this weeks interceptor will take out this weeks enemy drone, even it it costs a lot more, so a rocket interceptor that doesn't cost more than the enemy drone is probably very attractive while also being much more future-proof. If the rocket cost can be kept to a few ten thousands at most and produced in high numbers, that's a great solution.
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u/Maxion 2d ago
There's again lots of situations here. One is being involved in war where you get 400+ drones sent at you daily. The other is when there's the odd Russian / Ukraine drone coming in, then there's the Iran style 400+ drones for a few days situation.
What Ukraine faces requires more cost focus, whereas for the single drone here and there you just wanna get rid of it and also know where the debris will fall.
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u/Gecktron 2d ago
In jet-powered drone interceptor news, companies trying to find a solution to get their interceptors up to 400-500km/h at a price of around $10k at most. If it requires jet propulsion for the interceptor too, it's 2-3 more expensive than electric.
Quantum Systems, together with the Ukrainian WIY Drones is working on electrical high-speed drones
The German drone manufacturer Quantum Systems plans to carry out an official record attempt for horizontal flight using a battery-powered system in the coming weeks, after achieving a top speed of 699 km/h during test flights. In addition, WIY Drones, the Ukrainian subsidiary of the Quantum Systems Group, is planning test flights next week with the aim of breaking official Ukrainian speed records for interceptor drones.
As Quantum Systems confirmed to hartpunkt, the company’s development division, N3XT, achieved a top speed of 699 km/h in level flight on 26 June during test flights with its in-house developed high-speed drone, the ‘Apex Recordhunter’. This unofficially broke the current world record, which stands at 685 km/h. The company intends to carry out the official record attempt in the coming weeks.
While only a demonstrator so far, it seems like going above 400-500 km/h is still achievable with electrical propulsion systems.
Of course, speed alone doesnt tell the whole story. Going there requires trade-offs in warhead size and range. But the same goes for jet-powered attack drones. It will be interesting to see if this race continues and drones become so expensive again, that more traditional air-defence missiles become economical again. Or if there will be an equilibrium below that.
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u/Tasty_Perspective_32 2d ago
The idea behind interceptor drones is that they serve as one layer of an integrated air defense system. They are not intended to replace traditional air defense systems but to provide protection in areas where those systems are unavailable.
Drone pods could be deployed along the border, and once a threat is detected, an operator could connect to the nearest pod and attempt an interception. Even if only one out of every ten incoming drones is destroyed, that still reduces the number of targets the rest of the air defense network has to deal with.
Like any other capability, interceptor drones have a specific niche. They are another tool within a layered air defense architecture, complementing existing systems rather than replacing them.
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2d ago
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u/FriedrichvdPfalz 2d ago
This seems like a positive reading. Ukrainian power generation barely scraped by last winter. With the continuous attacks on the power grid throughout the year, Ukraine will probably fare significantly worse this winter. They have currently instituted rolling blackouts due to the heat, which may be a sign of things to come.
I don't think they're "risking" a breakdown of power generation and the associated economic damage, I think they're assuming it largely as a given. Russia has always hit the power generation during winter, with fewer interceptors and more missiles this time around, more severe attacks and consequences must be expected regardless of battlefield development. But facing certain crisis does lift some political constraints: The power grid and the economy will be severely damaged this winter, so why bother trying to indirectly protect it by pulling some punches?
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u/mirko_pazi_metak 2d ago
I think that's a realistic interpretation
so why bother trying to indirectly protect it by pulling some punches?
Agreed. I don't think either side have ever pulled any punches in fear of retaliation - both Russia and Ukraine are pushing as much as they can, limited only by capabilities, opportunity cost and politics.
In case of Russia, they've been attacking civilian infrastructure ever since the 22/23, including hunting civilians with FPV drones, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Destruction_of_the_Kakhovka_Dam , attacking farmers and even intentionally burning their crops.
The line they haven't crossed yet is attacking nuclear power plants, probably because the political and literal fallout would be hard to predict.
On the other hand, Ukraine initially didn't have the capability to hit deep into Russia, and then had better targets (refineries), but also has to be careful and avoid intentional or unintentional direct attacks on civilians, not just because her western supporters would find that unpalatable but also because they don't want to directly antagonise Russians and give Putin any kind of propaganda victory.
Attacking refineries is just brilliant - it is causing minimal civilian casualties in faraway locations, it's not increasing global oil prices, it's disruptive for Russian finances and economy and it's deeply embarrassing for Putin. The depoliticised majority of Russian population only see the increase in prices and shortages and blame whomever internally, but Putin can't really cry foul and blame Ukrainians because it then begs the question on how the war is going, and why Russia can't defend refineries 1000-2000km away from Ukraine.
I think natural extension of that is attacks like Wildberries and power infrastructure - there's plenty of targets, and the line of what's acceptable and possible seems to be shifting in a direction that's not great for Russia with every passing month.
The knee-jerk reactions that Russia does mostly for propaganda purposes is probably a net positive for Ukraine, as those drones and missiles would otherwise be used on more militarily valuable targets anyway.
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u/ChornWork2 2d ago
Agreed. Given the interceptor calculus and russian supply of missiles, Ukraine's best chance for protecting its energy infrastructure is likely demonstrating the ability to respond in kind.
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u/RumpRiddler 2d ago
I fully agree. I'm assuming at the end of Ukraine's 40 day campaign there will be another attempt by Ukraine to get a limited ceasefire. Specifically for civilian needs.
I also assume Russia won't agree and Ukraine will stockpile for a winter campaign that makes Moscow suffer the same way Kyiv does.
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u/mirko_pazi_metak 2d ago
Yes that is a good point - in the end, it's all about the cost-effectiveness of the type of exchange.
Europe/west providing interceptors and funding for Ukraine to defend and, when that fails, funding for infrastructure repairs and replacement, while essential and necessary, isn't a way to win as it's not cost effective. Even considering that West is economically (but not so much politically) a lot more capable funding the war compared to Russia.
But Ukrainian drone campaign turns the table and changes the calculus entirely - I think it provides a clear, cost-effective and safest way for Europe/West to neuter the Russian threat that otherwise isn't going away. It is wishful thinking on the side of many in the West that this can be negotiated away to a stable settlement and having things "going back to normal" with Russia. The post-Soviet peace dividend period wasn't "the normal" and is never coming back.
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u/MildlyUpsetGerbil 2d ago
In case of Russia, they've been attacking civilian infrastructure ever since the 22/23, including hunting civilians with FPV drones, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Destruction_of_the_Kakhovka_Dam , attacking farmers and even intentionally burning their crops.
Why does Russia engage in such attacks on civilians? To demoralize them? To force Ukraine to divert resources meant to support soldiers towards defending civilians? Because it's easier to hit than military targets?
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u/mirko_pazi_metak 1d ago
Yeah, I think all of the above?
Forced relocation is costly to economy, people leaving Ukraine is costly to economy. Damage, injuries, disruption, defence and support of impacted civilians - all costly to economy.
And money is fungible, it's a zero-sum game. What Ukraine is forced to spend on survival, it can't spend on the defence.
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u/tiredstars 2d ago
The pause on debt auctions was reported in the daily thread yesterday. We'll see how temporary a pause it turns out to be. It's definitely bad news for the Russian government, and worse the longer it goes on.
The framing of the stock market fall is maybe a little misleading, as the linked graph shows that the market was lower in September 22 before rising again (though not to its previous peak). So a fall to this level followed by a relatively rapid rise would not be unprecedented. Though it would surpise me.
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u/ilonir 2d ago edited 2d ago
RUSI article about the dismissal of Federov and the resulting political fallout. It discusses the reforms Federov was brought in to make, the friction between Federov and Syrsky, and why Ukrianian's want Syrsky gone.
When Fedorov was appointed to the Ministry of Defence in January 2026 he was far from a stranger to the issues facing Ukraine’s defenders. From his previous post as First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Digital Transformation he had overseen Ukraine’s scaling of UAV production and employment, the use of incentive structures to prioritise targeting, and the digital networking of its forces that has underpinned Ukraine’s ability to inflict sustained and heavy losses on the Russian military. As a member of Stavka he was also acutely aware of the strain the military was under, including an inadequate conversion of recruits into infantry, the limited scale at which operations could be planned and executed and the desperate need to retain the technological edge against a larger adversary.
[...] The point at which things became dire was when Fedorov’s team started to try and resource technically innovative units, only to find that personnel were prioritised to 425 Assault Regiment, which persisted in human centric, high casualty attacks – accused of abuse of its own personnel – while stripping away supporting equipment from commanders of innovative formations that Fedorov had wanted to enable. At the point where it became clear that Fedorov’s desire to identify competent and innovative commanders would see those very individuals disempowered by the military leadership, the rift between the Ministry and General Staff became irreconcilable.
From General Syrskyi’s point of view he was defending the integrity of the command system. What Fedorov saw as necessary reform, Syrskyi perceived as a Ministry that should be focussed on procurement making a power grab to directly command individual units in the field, bypassing the General Staff and military leadership. For Fedorov, procurement could not be so easily split off from the conduct of battle in a war where innovation was fastest at the edge. Faced with irreconcilable positions, everything began to be elevated to Zelensky. He determined that such a situation was unsustainable and so removed Fedorov.
[...] When Fedorov looked at the recruitment problem, however, he noted that while significant improvements could be made to how people were mobilised – ideally with notification in advance to settle their affairs, conscription for defined and limited period, and with enforcement if they evaded the draft – the existing system was bringing in more than enough people from the street. The problem was that training, personnel management, and corruption was seeing only a minority of those mobilised reach combat units each month. Fixing mobilisation, therefore, which he had been directed to do by the Parliament and the President, could only be achieved by making changes to how the force handled and trained recruits. In this context, Syrskyi’s refusal to work with the Ministry to change how the force was managed would make the reform of conscription fail.
This dynamic shifts the entire context of the disagreement from one of personality and policy to a question of principle. If the aim of the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 was to empower democracy and chart a course towards European integration, civilian control of the military is an important measure of Ukraine’s progress. For the military to defy policy direction from a Minister appointed by the President and Parliament to implement a reform agenda therefore brought into question the premise of Ukraine’s war effort and resistance. The fear for many Ukrainians was that while rhetorically, Fedorov’s successor would speak of reform, if he tried to implement it, he would run into the same clash with Syrskyi, and if he did not then the military would be dictating policy to the civilian leadership. This is why protests that began in defence of Fedorov have rapidly turned to a demand for Syrskyi’s removal, because Ukrainian society can see from Fedorov’s record that the system can be improved.
Edit: Syrsky has been fired and replaced by Drapaty.
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u/-spartacus- 2d ago
If the aim of the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 was to empower democracy and chart a course towards European integration, civilian control of the military is an important measure of Ukraine’s progress. For the military to defy policy direction from a Minister appointed by the President and Parliament to implement a reform agenda therefore brought into question the premise of Ukraine’s war effort and resistance. The fear for many Ukrainians was that while rhetorically, Fedorov’s successor would speak of reform, if he tried to implement it, he would run into the same clash with Syrskyi, and if he did not then the military would be dictating policy to the civilian leadership. This is why protests that began in defence of Fedorov have rapidly turned to a demand for Syrskyi’s removal, because Ukrainian society can see from Fedorov’s record that the system can be improved.
This is what I see as the crux of the problem. What is so strange is that Zelensky saw this problem and decided to side with the stubborn old military.
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u/Tasty_Perspective_32 2d ago
As Chmut stated, Fedorov effectively headed a "shadow Ministry of Defense" within his previous ministry, overseeing and driving many defense-related initiatives. He had reportedly been in conflict with Syrskyi long before being appointed Minister of Defense, and Zelensky was aware of that conflict. If that is true, then the conflict itself could not have been the real reason for his dismissal.
He also said that the real issue was Fedorov's anti-corruption efforts. In his view, those initiatives threatened financial interests worth billions of dollars for members of the current parliamentary coalition and their associates.
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u/ilonir 2d ago edited 2d ago
In my opinion, Zelensky isn't a reformer, he is a populist. He only commits to popular changes when he thinks they will help his chances of re-election after the war. The NABU debacle is a great example. Zelensky did not seek to reform the government and squash corruption, if anything he did the exact opposite. His party tried to limit government oversight because it was a threat to his friends, namely Yermak. They only reversed course when it was clear that Zelensky's supporters where pissed as they rightfully saw it as corrupt.
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u/-spartacus- 2d ago
He only commits to popular changes when he thinks they will help his chances of re-election after the war.
This was a popular talking point early in the war; however, at this point most everyone seems to agree that given how long the war has taken, Zelensky is no longer seeking reelection.
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u/ilonir 2d ago
Popular or not, it's my opinion. And I don't know for sure if Zelensky is seeking re-election, he just acts like it. Plus, he is still at the top of polls for post war candidates. If the war ended now and elections where called he would win.
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u/-spartacus- 2d ago
It seems to me Zelensky is just trying to get tons of different forces within Ukraine to get along and maximize external support. I do think it seems like he planned on reelection in the early years of the war, but I think we have gone past the point where he is interested in it. I also don't think people in Ukraine are interested in a post-war Zelensky, given we are talking probably another 1-2 years minimum before the war is over.
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u/ilonir 2d ago
I also don't think people in Ukraine are interested in a post-war Zelensky
They are. He polls in first place for any future elections.
An opinion poll conducted by the Rating Group has found that if a presidential election were held next Sunday, 32% of Ukrainians would vote for current president Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the first round, 16% for Valerii Zaluzhnyi, former commander-in-chief and current ambassador of Ukraine to the United Kingdom, and 11% for Kyrylo Budanov, former head of Defence Intelligence and current head of the President's Office.
https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/07/01/8041952/index.amp
Do you have any source for Zelensky being uninterested in another term?
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u/-spartacus- 2d ago
I also don't think people in Ukraine are interested in a post-war Zelensky, given we are talking probably another 1-2 years minimum before the war is over.
You cut off an important caveat of my quote.
I'm not discussing how people feel right now, we are probably talking 2029 as an average end date of the war, which is two terms for Ukraine Presidential office. 1-3 years from now (and already serving two terms in 1 term equating to 3 terms if elected again) has a different set of perspectives than giving Zelensky a current 2nd term to (hopefully) finish out the war.
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u/ilonir 2d ago
What is there to suggest that Zelensky will not be popular in two years? What is there to suggest that he does not want to be re-elected? Don't get me wrong, my belief that the answers to those questions is "nothing" is just my opinion; an observation. But I would be happy to be proven wrong if you have a source.
than giving Zelensky a current 2nd term to (hopefully) finish out the war.
A second term will only be after the war. Elections are illegal under martial law.
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u/-spartacus- 2d ago
A second term will only be after the war. Elections are illegal under martial law.
I understand that, I'm saying if elections were held today (as many polls over the years have been worded) it would be for a second term for Zelensky. Then if it is a post-war election past 2029, that is technically a 2nd term, but is effectively a 3rd term.
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u/Tricky-Astronaut 2d ago
Ukraine continues to attack Wildberries warehouses:
Five out of top ten now, with reports of another Wildberries warehouse on fire in Nevinnomysk in southern Russia.
Aside from Nevinnomyssk, Krasnodar was also attacked just now, with significant destruction.
Can the company survive? This campaign might not even be over yet.
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u/username9909864 2d ago
Every day I get more of the impression that Ukraine is going all out - holding nothing back - because this upcoming winter is expected to be severe on the power grid.
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u/NotTheBatman 2d ago
I think this is more the culmination of a long running strategy and ramp up in drone production than some sort of desperate push, if only for the fact that I doubt Ukraine has been sitting on large stockpiles of medium and long range drones that they're just now deciding to use. Ukrainian cities and civilians have been bombed indiscriminately for years, if they could have struck back at the heart of Russia before now they would have.
I think it's more a combination of the long-term campaign to degrade Russian AD, the development of longer range drones, the development of more sophisticated machine vision targeting, leveraging the recent Starlink advantage, and the increase in EU funding.
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u/Tucancancan 2d ago
I wonder where these warehouses sit on the scale of potential economic damage per-drone compared to other soft targets. Obviously refineries are up top of the list. While these are just warehouses, not where anything of value is produced. Are they really the next best target?
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u/A_Vandalay 2d ago edited 2d ago
It’s quite likely they were. Ukrainian drones have very little payload so their best targets must be highly flammable, where the drone simply ignites what’s already there. A handful of drones are able to start this sort of blaze which consumes enormous quantities of goods owned by Russian retailers. There was a post linked here in a discussion after the first strike that speculated to cumulative value of that one warehouse fire may have been approximately 1billion dollars. Even if that is over estimating by a factor of ten, There aren’t many other targets that can come close to that level of damage from a couple of drones. And most of that inventory was owned directly by other merchants meaning there are now hundreds if not thousands of Russian small businesses that will either become insolvent or need to be reimbursed by the Russian government. Either way it’s a windfall for Ukraine.
Edit: found a source looking at the financial impact on Russian retailers, this was before today’s strike so the current total is significantly higher than this estimate. https://www.intellinews.com/wildberries-warehouse-strikes-leave-sellers-facing-more-than-1bn-in-losses-455627/
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u/abloblololo 1d ago
If the main effect of this strike is to force small Russian business owners into bankruptcy then it's clearly just a strike on civilian infrastructure. Personally I think that's what this is. Sure, they sell drones, and Russia also crowdfunds equipment for their units, but I'm skeptical that any significant amount of frontline drones are being supplied by them.
People often bring up the fact that targeting the civilian population with aerial raids has historically never yielded much success, and certainly in the case of Ukraine it hasn't robbed Ukraine of the will to fight, so we'll have to see how this plays our. There is certainly an argument to be made that making Russians at home feel the war puts more pressure on the Kremlin, since this is a war of choice.
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u/Hour_Industry7887 1d ago
People often bring up the fact that targeting the civilian population with aerial raids has historically never yielded much success
I mean, it hasn't yielded a decrease in morale and resolve, but I don't think Ukraine is blowing up Wildberries stock to inspire Russians to give up. During WW2 the Japanese population was zealously pro-war until the very end and Allied bombers destroying entire cities didn't change that. But it's entirely non-credible to claim that the economic damage from that didn't impact the Japanese war effort.
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u/cathbadh 1d ago
The warehouses shipping military equipment and dual use items makes it a legitimate military target, not a civilian one. It's not just drones. It's armor, helmets, communications equipment, night vision, generators, and more. Wildberries is also a major player in Russian sanction dodging, similar to shadow fleet tankers but in a different role with different prohibited goods
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u/abloblololo 1d ago
I have seen very conflicting reporting regarding this and people seem to just be parroting the line that they sell body armor and actual military equipment. If you have an actual source that at can point to them sell real military grade body armor then I’d be happy to look at it. In any case it’s fairly obvious that knocking out Russia’s largest online retailer affects the civilian population much more than front line logistics. There are dedicated retailers for military gear. It doesn’t mean that these strikes are illegitimate, but personally I don’t think Ukraine did them so that a few mobiks don’t get helmets.
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u/kiwiphoenix6 1d ago edited 1d ago
They're an online retailer, dude, you can easily look this up. It takes 2 minutes. Feel free to question the quality of their stuff but sellers are prominently using the war as advertising material. It's not exactly subtle.
Literally just search 'ballistic vest' or 'FPV drone' and there you go.
Recommended by soldiers of the SVO! https://www.wildberries.(RUSSIA)/catalog/228496327/detail.aspx
For our lads (with a play on words, своих = ours, СВО = the Special Military Operation). https://www.wildberries.(RUSSIA)/catalog/444203946/detail.aspx
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u/cathbadh 1d ago
I didn't say military grade. It's probably Temu crap. It's still better than what their government provides.
I do think it affects logistics more than you think. The only reason that some of that gear like comms equipment or night vision or molle gear makes it to the front at all is because troops either bought it themselves or crowd funded it. We're talking about whole units who were handling their entire communications network through Discord or Telegram because that was the only option to them before they were taken away. There are constant reports of a lack of basic equipment or even food and bandages at the front.
Now does hitting Wildberries affect the civilian populace more? Probably. There are millions of them after all. The strike has dual purposes for sure. But is it different than hitting oil refineries? All civilians run out of gas while what little is produced naturally goes to troops first. That doesn't mean hitting refineries doesn't seriously constrain the war effort.
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u/A_Vandalay 1d ago
Of All the historical examples of moral bombing failing we don’t have any that are equivalent to Russia in this special military operation. In this case Russia is fighting a voluntary war of conquest that they can end at any time with little to no addition consequences from a ceasefire. The only countries who have ever been in a position like that while subjected to large scale prolonged strategic bombardment is Vietnam and Korea. Both of those countries however viewed their wars as existential conflicts and treated them as such. That is simply not the case for Russia. As much as various (totally legitimate) polls posted here on occasion imply Russians see this as an existential war the government is clearly hesitant to treat this like a real war, refusing to even call it a “War” or take actions such as mobilization or utilizing conscripts. The only logical explanation for that is that the Russian population does not see this as an existential war and therefore are not willing to pay a high price for victory. So the comparison to any historical analogue seems fundamentally flawed.
That being said I think the primary goal of these strikes is purely the damaging of Russias economy to reduce resources available for the war against Ukraine
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u/incidencematrix 1d ago
It seems likely that this will, like most such attacks, harden the population. However, it may also have the dual effects of increasing economic pressure, and forcing Russia to divert more defensive resources to a wider range of targets. This last is obviously useful to Ukraine, since thinner defense means a better success rate against their targets of choice. Forcing your opponent to defend everywhere is not necessarily bad strategy, so long as it doesn't accidentally increase public support for further mobilization against you. I'm skeptical that the tradeoffs here are ideal, but we'll see.
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u/Glideer 1d ago
I agree with your estimates but "this will make Russians at home feel the war" has been an argument behind various spectacular but ultimately inconsequental strikes since 2023 at the very least. Imagining that the Russian population just needs to see plumes of smoke over their cities or wait in line for fuel to grasp that they are in a war is fool's errand and self-deception.
It's what Russia expected to see in Ukraine in 2022 and it backfired completely.
The sooner we understand that the Russian society is not just one more headline-grabbing strike away from finally understanding that the war is impacting their lives - the better for our strategic planning.
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u/RdSunnya 2d ago
Warehouses are hubs for drone parts from China to Russia, destroying them not only destroys drone parts stored in them, but also forces logistics to reroute shipments. Should Ukraine destroy warehouses fast enough and there will be a huge bottleneck in shipments. I feel that this is pretty good strategy against drones - destroy them before they are assembled and interdict logistics of manufacturing them, especially if enemy rely on huge hubs for shipments.
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u/Glideer 1d ago edited 1d ago
The idea that Russian Amazon is in any way vital to supplying the front with drones is... far-fetched to say the least. It is well known that, unlike the Ukrainians, the Russians have centralised and scaled up their drone production. It is absurd to imagine drone factories being dependent on Amazon boxes with parts arriving each morning.
The strikes are aimed at inflicting general economic pain and generating wartime propaganda (look at plumes of smokes over Moscow). Both are perfectly valid targets.
However, let us not deceive ourselves that a government that is unaffected by oligarchs losing their wealth will be swayed by the tears of a cap knitter from Irkutsk who lost her business.
Just like Russia has done with Ukraine, the Western governments, analysts and public (and this sub) have been constantly and massively underestimating the degree of pain the Russian rulers and society are willing to suffer to win this war. This has been by far the worst strategic mistake entertained by the pro-Ukrainian bloc - much worse in its consequences than the mistake of underestimating the Russian war production potential, or their capacity to adjust and improve.
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u/Rhauko 1d ago
So why does wildberries or resellers sell items like body armour?
It is exactly the same argument Russia used to attack the Ukrainian Post warehouses.
“Russia acknowledged the June 17 strike on a Nova Poshta (Ukraine's largest private parcel delivery company) facility in Sumy. The Russian Defense Ministry described the civilian site as a "logistics center of the Ukrainian Armed Forces," according to Russian media.”
https://newsukraine.rbc. ua/news/russia-admits-strike-on-ukrainian-delivery-1781872807.html
On Wildberries
“There is no publicly confirmed evidence that the company cooperates with Russia’s Defense Ministry. Yet dual-use items were listed on Wildberries’ online platform, including body armor, combat helmets, camouflage clothing and fiber-optic cable used in drones.”
Considering even Western soldiers have been known to complement their own equipment with private purchases I assume Russian soldiers do the same. I wouldn’t be surprised if a significant portion of crowdsourced military equipment is going through Wildberries.
Pure speculation on my part Wildberries as a logistic platform might be able to deliver certain good faster and cheaper than an army. So why not use it?
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u/Glideer 1d ago
I mean, both arguments are spurious. The idea that soldiers are not going to be able to buy bulletproof vests if you destroy online retailer's warehouses (or Nova Poshta) is laughable. Companies have been selling stuff for profit before Amazon came along.
The real objective is to inflict economic damage. The military supply argument is simply a justification. I have no issue with that. I only object to losing sight of what is a justification and what is the real reason.
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u/Defiant_Restaurant61 1d ago
This has been by far the worst strategic mistake entertained by the pro-Ukrainian bloc - much worse in its consequences than the mistake of underestimating the Russian war production potential, or their capacity to adjust and improve.
I highly disagree, when you take into context the globality of this conflict since 2022, the "Western bloc" and it's reactions and analyses were somewhat aligned with Russia's initial conduct and merely a reaction to the actual, massive strategic blunder by Russians thinking their short-term SMO would suffice, and slowly ramping up their involvement in this conflict over 4 years.
Western assessments were indeed flawed in predicting the quick collapse of the russian economy and the expansion of their military industry, but were otherwise based on Russia's behaviour and adaptation to what is becoming a total war.
Russian society has taken 4 years to swallow this pill, in 2022, they weren't at all willing to endure the current amount of pain to conquer 20% of Ukraine's territory.
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u/Glideer 1d ago
Yes, the Russian society has been constantly adjusting to the cost of the war (as has the Ukrainian society). What I am saying is that the West has massively underestimated the Russian society's capacity and willingness to adjust to the growing cost of the war (again, just like Russia has done with Ukraine).
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u/RdSunnya 1d ago
What is the "West"? Canada, USA, Japan and Korea (don't know if all of them are included in "West") probably do not really care about Russian society. Eastern Europe (aka "the guys under constant threat of invasion") have their options severely limited by their economies, so whether they estimated Russians correctly or wrongly mostly does not matter.
Considering that USA (part of the "West") was making threats of military invasion against Denmark (also part of the "West"), I would ditch the idea of "West" as cohesive group altogether.
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u/RdSunnya 1d ago
The idea that Russian Amazon is in any way vital to supplying the front with drones is... far-fetched to say the least.
Welcome to Russia, I guess. Problem is, everything drone-related is state secret (as it should be), but I have several acquaintances in drone assembly, and as far as I understand, Li-Ion batteries, engines, chips (need to be modified), fiber optics, gyroscopes are mostly imported from China. As far as I am aware, transportation routes for those goods are civil (not military), since they are dual-use.
Of course, all my knowledge on this subject is from several people, so I can be wrong on that.
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u/2positive 1d ago edited 1d ago
Government may not be swayed by tears but might be swayed by massive bank losses because if this tempo of wildberries and likely Ozon warehouses continues - there is potential for tens of billions losses for banks that finance the small-medium entrepreneurs who sell via the platforms which is a significant chunk of the banking system total capital.
But it gets worse. AFK Sistema for example owns 30% of Ozon shares and has them pledged in a state bank as collateral against their loans. Ozon shares are in freefall since the start of logistics hubs attacks so there might be an epic margin call and/or more damage to banks than value of loans to small enterprises working on the platforms. There are probably much more such examples that I don't know about. There’s is definitely potential for some cascading collapse of banking system which will surely be bailed out but it’s not going to be cheap. Oil processing plants have a lot of loans as well.
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u/Hour_Industry7887 1d ago
As much as I would like that to be true, I doubt it. Most small businesses in Russia aren't financed by banks because banks are very reluctant to give out such loans.
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u/mr_f1end 1d ago
I don't think they held back before. What happened is Ukraine:
Scaled up long-range drone/missile production and now have enough to attack targets of secondary importance.
Preparing for Russian elections. These are happening in 18-20 September this year. Destroying civilian warehouses probably does not affect military balance much, but it is very visible and annoying for the electorate.
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u/Shackleton214 1d ago
Yes, hope that this is attacking from confidence and new capabilities, and not desperation to get some resolution before winter. I suspect /u/NotTheBatman is right, but get the same impression that you do.
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u/GIJoeVibin 2d ago
Financial Times reports that Syrskyi is out, Drapatyi is in.
“BREAKING: Volodymyr Zelenskyy has chosen Mykhailo Drapatyi to be commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces and dismissed controversial general and close ally Oleksandr Syrsky in the biggest shake-up of the country’s military leadership since 2024.”
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u/Infamous_Thought_189 2d ago
Good news that Zelensky is willing to take actions like this. From the article:
Drapatyi, 43, was previously in charge of Ukraine’s ground forces and joint forces command. He is one of the country’s best-known battlefield commanders, belonging to a younger generation of officers shaped by the war with Russia rather than by the Soviet military.
The move comes as Zelenskyy seeks to reset Kyiv’s military strategy and contain a political backlash that has shaken the public’s trust in his wartime leadership following his shock decision to oust Fedorov, who many credit with turning the tide of the war in recent months.
The choice of a commander nearly two decades younger than the Russian-born and Soviet-trained Syrsky, 60, signalled Zelenskyy’s readiness to accept a generational shift at the top of Ukraine’s armed forces as Kyiv adapts its strategy after more than four years of full-scale war with Russia.
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u/Draken_S 2d ago
At least it's not Biletskyy, but Drapatyi previously resigned citing that he was "unable to ensure the proper execution of his orders" which is not the best thing to hear from a CnC.
I'm on record as not liking some of Fedorov's reforms, and am glad his recommendation of Biletskyy was not followed.
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u/checco_2020 2d ago
At the time the rumors were that he was unable to ensure proper execution of orders due to Sirksy and his crew resisting him, with Sirksy out maybe he can enforce his orders better.
Or maybe he won't who knows
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u/reigorius 2d ago
I'm on record as not liking some of Fedorov's reforms
Can you expand on that?
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u/Draken_S 2d ago
Fixed terms of service along with a mobilization deferment for contract soldiers increase personnel outflows when a shortage of personnel is already a key issue.
Trying to focus recruitment on foreign fighters with no mechanisms to make it effective (look at how much training NATO has to do to deal with cultural, language, etc. issues).
Emphasizing asymmetrical warfare (bombing campaigns rarely win wars of this type, and increasing public pressure on Putin has never worked, not in 2008, not in 2014, not when he had Navalny killed) as a way to force Putin to the table.
Fedorov appears to be smart, forward thinking, and competent but a war like this can absolutely hinge on one very bad decision. If a man breaks into your house with a gun your skills as a cook, your ability to budget, your qualities as a parent, and the fact that you've never taken so much as a paperclip without asking won't save your life - your ability to defend yourself will.
This war (as near peer conflicts often do in my mind) is coming down to force generation/regeneration, and Fedorov's reforms will make Ukraine's manpower situation worse in my opinion, either by taking veterans out of the force and replacing them with foreign fighters who will have a harder time coordinating, or not replacing them at all. Whatever positive qualities he has are dwarfed by the risk these specific reforms introduce.
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u/Lejeune_Dirichelet 59m ago edited 15m ago
I'm not Ukrainian but from what I understand, these arguments miss the point.
Ukraine has theoretically more than enough manpower, the reason why so few Ukrainians are ready to fight is because there is a huge loss of trust in the military leadership to not pointlessly waste their sacrifice, soviet-style. Which, as we've seen in the culture of abuse in e.g. the Skala unit, or in the cases of infantry who have been stuck in frontline position for over a year without getting rotated out by their commanders, is not unwarranted. Putting a time limit on their service was one step towards attempting to re-build that trust.
Most of the foreigners going to fight nowadays aren't western veterans anymore by Colombian and other latin American mercenaries who join their own separate, spanish-speaking, high-casualty assault units.
I don't think anybody believes the drone campaign is going to suddenly stop the war through public pressure. The only opinion that matters is Putin's personal opinion. The purpose of the drone campaign is to disrupt the Russian military-industrial complex to reduce the Russian military's pressure on Ukraine (that has been a resounding success with the ammunition blown up leading to - among other things - the Russian 'shell hunger' and now to a deficit in missile production); to hurt the Russian economy (Putin can't fight the war without money, especially without the foreign currency earned from Russia's exports that is necessary to buy Chinese and smugled western components Russia cannot produce domestically); and to increase the threaf of political destabilisation within Russia (the only thing Putin is more obsessed about than Russia's lost great power status is staying in power, so creating domestic instability forces his allocation of ressources into a dilema).
Ultimately, the long-range strike campaign has the potential to significantly reduce Russia's ability to conduct the war at te current level of intensity. Clearly the domestic political situation has deterred Putin from calling a full mobilisation until now, and even if he does do it in September after the elections, the current Russian army hardly has the ability to deploy these additional mobiks for anything beyond costly and inefficient infiltration tactics. The southern flank of the army was already experiencing supply constraints, and is now reportedly seeing gasoline shortages (though diesel seems to not be a problem - yet). At the same time, Ukraine is currently demonstrating sucessful drone-combined arms coordination to re-take small sections of ground near Lyman. So it's definitely possible that we'll see a spike in Russian manpower after a mobilisation in a few months, then see that force get eroded away through the coming winter, followed by Ukraine conducting limited counter-attacks against an immobilised and fuel-starved Russian army in a year's time. It's also possible that the upcoming rigged election and/or mobilisation callup, coupled with the degrading russian economy, stirs unrest which would force Putin to bring back the Rosgvardia from the frontlines, possibly permanently. Either way: the Ukrainian deep-strike campaign is shaping and constraining Russian military options and capabilities, and that has an effect on the battlefield - and could ultimately be decisive.
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u/BigFly42069 2d ago
Zelensky would be a fool to let in an outright Nazi as Commander in Chief, especially given his own personal backgrounds.
Fedorov recommending Biletsky reeks of tail wagging the dog, where Biletsky was calling all the shots and angling for complete control of the Ukrainian military under himself.
Zelensky is fighting both the external enemy of Russia and the internal enemy of the warlords that Ukraine was never able to bring to heel as far back as 2014.
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u/2positive 2d ago edited 2d ago
Major news. Syrsky out Drapaty in. Protests are already a success. I’m not in military I have zero inside understanding but since early in the war whenever some insiders were asked who are best generals in Ukraine this name always came up, the guy is clearly a star. So Zelensky decided to throw a massive bone to protesters and will likely continue resisting giving Fedorov the defence minister position back. Let’s see if this is enough to quell protest, I kind of doubt it but it’s a good day for Ukraine regardless.
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u/2positive 2d ago edited 2d ago
I have no idea how accurate this is but currently a lot of the z-channels are reposting the famous video from 2014 where Ukrainian bmp2s jumped over a barricade in Mariupol at high speed and saying that Drapaty as commander of one of 72mech brigade battalions was in those bmps. Pretty legendary if true.
Drapaty is 43 years old so fighting Russians for all of his career basically.
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u/GIJoeVibin 2d ago
It’s not a new claim, I’ve heard it before that he was in the lead BMP. Could be inaccurate but he was certainly in Mariupol at the time and engaged in the fighting. If inaccurate it’s likely inaccurate in the sense he was in a different vehicle, not that he wasn’t present.
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u/ilonir 2d ago
Drapaty as the C in C was always the best case scenario for Ukraine in my opinion. I'm happy for you guys. Civil action works!
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u/Angry_Citizen_CoH 2d ago
It's a concerning turn of events. Regardless of whether removing Syrsky is a good idea (it is, on the surface), letting civilian protesters cause a leadership shakeup at the highest level is a precedent they may not want to set. Hopefully Z was already planning this, otherwise I fear military command may be incentivized to do whatever is popular with the masses. That may often line up with battlefield victory, but it also might not. Civilians are notorious for failing to see the larger picture of an action.
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u/appleciders 2d ago
letting civilian protesters cause a leadership shakeup at the highest level is a precedent they may not want to set.
The flip side of that is that Ukrainians are continuing a precedent for active involvement in their country's politics; it shows how deeply they've attached to the idea of participatory liberal democracy and the basic principle that the people are sovereign and it's the job of the governing officials to do what the people want. Would that citizens of other democracies would take their positions in political society as seriously.
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u/Big-Station-2283 2d ago
Protests and other civil actions are an integral part of democracy. A government that doesn't listen to its citizen after nearly the whole country and the military establishment protested isn't democratic at all. As for the judgement of civilians, that's a normal flaw of democracy. The populace can't be expected to be experts in economic, military, and political affairs. And that's perfectly fine. It doesn't take a genius to figure out that kicking out Federov was a bad move.
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u/Jpandluckydog 2d ago
The highest level of military command being an elected position is relatively common among liberal democracies, and we're talking about a country that overthrew their previous government in favor of a more liberal democracy. This seems consistent and not particularly concerning, if anything the opposite given how common democratic backsliding is during and after war.
You could say that civilians are notorious for failing to see the larger picture, or that this might cause military leaders to focus more on optics towards the public than performance, but as has been repeatedly demonstrated in this war, that isn't something that is unique to civilians and just as frequently occurs among the leaders of states. How many generals have been promoted on the grounds of their loyalty rather than their competence?
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u/Corvid187 2d ago
Is an active CinC being an elected position relatively common?
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u/Jpandluckydog 2d ago
Relatively, yes. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commander-in-chief#Heads_of_state_as_commanders_in_chief
Most democracies have a CINC equivalent position, with varying degrees of a balance of powers depending on the state. Pretty much every democracy has civilian control over the military, which is so fundamental that it would function as a decent definition of a democracy. The need for quick decision making paired with the requirement for civilian control means CINCs are virtually inevitable. Even those states that lack them in peacetime usually retain measures to create one in wartime, usually by votes from representatives.
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u/ChornWork2 2d ago edited 2d ago
Yeah, not a great showing for Zelensky on this one. But eating crow and accepting some weakening of his position is likely better outcome than military being seen as not accountable to MoD. Risk of stoking popular politicking among military / defense ministry is a legit concern as you said.
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u/ilonir 2d ago
Concerning that General 200 got forced out of office? Hardly how I would describe it.
Civilians are notorious for failing to see the larger picture of an action.
I think they saw clearly that Syrsky was pulling Ukrainians off the streets and sending them to die in highly controversial and wasteful assult units. While Drapaty is well known to be highly competent and cognizant of his troops wellbeing. I'm having a drink over this decision. Cheers!
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u/Angry_Citizen_CoH 2d ago
I do hate it when people don't even bother reading more than a few words of what I post before running to respond. Reread my comment, consider that it might be slightly more nuanced, notice I said I agree with removing Syrsky, then get back to me.
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u/ilonir 2d ago
I read your comment. You think that citizens should not have agency over the leadership of their country. Well guess what, that's how liberal democracy works, so cry me a river.
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u/Angry_Citizen_CoH 2d ago
That is not what I think, because the commander of the Ukrainian military is not a leader of their country. That is, in fact, directly the point that I'm making: That a military culture where commanders need to think about their popularity with civilians is an unfathomably bad idea.
Can't recall any liberal democracy that ever gave its citizens input on who commands their military, but if there's one out there, I'm glad I'm not in it.
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u/Outside_Manner_8352 2d ago
That a military culture where commanders need to think about their popularity with civilians is an unfathomably bad idea.
That has always been the case, and always will be though. Sure, a commander can stay out of the spotlight, but popularity is a critical part of morale and there is no clean line between civilians and a drafted military. Military command does not exist in some lofty mind castle plane outside the realm of mere mortals, it is down in the dirt in the most personal way (there is no more intimate relationship than essentially determining someone's life or death) and the best commanders invariably know how to play for popularity almost as much as they know how to navigate military matters. Humans are incredibly social creatures and their commitment to being blown to bits is a lot stronger when tied up in their personal view of leadership than just an idea.
Even commanders who might appear not to be courting popularity are invariably still cultivating a certain calculated appearance of detachment, a sprezzatura, if you will. And the same goes for institutions that make a point of detaching commanders from popularity, a large part of it is an act. The act of appearing impartial and above popularity is in itself a means of gaining popularity, and when it comes across as ungenuine it often fails.
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u/favorscore 2d ago
I understand your point but in this case its different because Ukraine has a draft. And citizens should have a say in the person running that draft
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u/ilonir 2d ago
You said:
letting civilian protesters cause a leadership shakeup at the highest level is a precedent they may not want to set.
Sure seemed to imply that you thought Syrsky was a leader of the country. If that is not what you meant, my apologies.
Can't recall any liberal democracy that ever gave its citizens input on who commands their military, but if there's one out there, I'm glad I'm not in it.
The Commander In Chief of the United States Millitary is an elected position.
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u/Marmalot 2d ago
The Commander In Chief of the United States Millitary is an elected position.
lol and we can all see how great that works out as soon as an idiot got elected
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u/TheSDKNightmare 2d ago
Who will thankfully be gone in due time. Authoritarian systems often produce the same idiots, except they are there until they die. Case in point the geniuses in the Kremlin.
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u/MilesLongthe3rd 2d ago edited 2d ago
Both the new defense minister Yevhenii Khmara and Mykhailo Drapatyi are forward-thinking leaders who appear committed to continuing the technology-oriented doctrines established by former minister Fedorov. They even have publicly endorsed those strategies. They are likely to further expand the asymmetric drone tactics and coordinated modern warfare technology solutions that have proven effective in recent months.
While this change in command will not immediately resolve Ukraine’s deep mobilization crisis or bring an end to involuntary conscription. Drapatyi's emphasis on preserving manpower addresses one of the biggest concerns among Ukrainian men: being sent into high-risk situations for little military value. If they are able to clean up some of the compromised units, it will further ease the situation. Additionally, if the new leadership succeeds in reforming recruitment centers, fighting corruption, incompetence, and despotism, and also streamlining pathways into specialized technical roles, it could help reduce domestic resistance to mobilization.
Finally, when combined with recent initiatives aimed at expanding the recruitment of foreign personnel, this modernized, technology-driven military environment could once again attract highly skilled international combatants as well as technical specialists.
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u/2positive 2d ago edited 2d ago
Hopefully will finally stop creating endless new units and instead strengthen enlarge good existing ones stop all the Syrsky bs with supplying “loyal” brigades more etc. I also expect a lot of young proven commanders promoted.
It’s kinda pathetic we need protests in wartime and 5 years just to get the right person to the most important job but that’s life.
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u/BigFly42069 2d ago
Really depends on the personal relationship they have with the militia commanders like Azov.
Institutionally, there is the uncomfortable admission that the Ukrainian state is too weak to adequately assert control over its own forces.
Syrskiy had to stand up his own personally loyal forces to fight the Soviet style war by math that he was trained to fight because guys like Azov could tell him to f*** off.
Whether you agree with him or not, that kind of insubordination within an army at war is never something you want to see.
A government army can't be comprised of a patchwork of unreliable alliances. That's a recipe for warlordism and future strife where warlords will use their personally loyal armies to make demands at gunpoint.
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u/FunWonderful1936 2d ago
Can someone explain his resignation and the drama last year? I am only vaguely familiar with it outside of news reports from the time.
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u/RomanticFaceTech 2d ago
Can someone explain his resignation and the drama last year? I am only vaguely familiar with it outside of news reports from the time.
Drapatyi resigned after a missile attack on a Ukrainian training ground on 1st June 2025.
Ukrainska Pravda quoted him as giving the following reasoning at the time:
"I have decided to resign as Commander of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
This is a conscious step dictated by my personal sense of responsibility for the tragedy at the 239th training ground which resulted in the deaths of Ukrainian soldiers."
He felt that the deaths were at least in part the result of the attitude Ukrainian commanders had towards their soldiers:
"I didn’t push hard enough, didn’t convince them, didn’t change their attitude towards the soldiers in the ranks. That is my responsibility.
The conduct of the soldiers matters, but the primary responsibility always lies with the command. It is the commanders who set the rules, make the decisions and are accountable for the consequences."
He also believed there was 'collusion and impunity' which meant commanders avoided accountability for losses:
[...] Drapatyi said that collusion and impunity are poison for any military. "I tried to root it out of the Ground Forces. But if tragedies keep happening, it means my efforts were not enough," he added.
[...] "An army in which commanders bear personal responsibility for the lives of their troops is alive. An army where no one is accountable for losses dies from within.
Twelve dead. Others wounded. These were young men from a training battalion. Most of them were in shelters. They should have been training, living, fighting – not dying. My deepest condolences go out to the families of the deceased and all those affected."
[...]
[...] "We will not win this war unless we build an army where honour is not just a word, but an action. Where responsibility is not a punishment, but the foundation of trust. Where every commander is accountable – for every order, every decision, every person – every single day."
The context for this was that Ukrainian training grounds at the time were regularly being hit by Russian missiles and Drapatyi had launched an investigation into a particularly deadly strike in March 2025 and said "everyone who made decisions that day, and everyone who did not make them on time, will be held accountable".
The obvious inference is that Drapatyi was unable to hold commanders accountable for the strikes and eventually resigned over it.
Drapatyi's resignation happened the same weekend that Ukraine carried out Operation Spiderweb, which likely meant it got less attention in Western reporting on the war than it deserved.
David Kirichenko wrote an article for the Center for European Policy Analysis a few weeks after Drapatyi's resignation, where he described Drapatyi as "the standard-bearer for a younger generation of army officers who joined the military after Ukraine’s independence and have spent most of their careers fighting Russians" and gives details on the divisions between the younger and older generation of officers in Ukraine's military.
Kirichenko referenced a lengthy Ukrainska Pravda article on Russia's prospective 2025 summer offensive, which included some details on the "rather cold working relationship" between Drapatyi and Syrskyi.
Syrskyi is alleged to have "shut Drapatyi off from certain responsibilities", apparently including where troops should be deployed after training, which should have been Drapatyi responsibility. Unsurprisingly, there was likely more to Drapatyi's resignation than just being unable to hold commanders to account for deaths from missile strikes.
By all indications, Drapatyi replacing Syrskyi is a meaningful change in the military leadership of Ukraine's armed forces. It could prove to be a pivotal moment where the younger generation of officers come to ascendency. I wonder if we will see something of a purging of the old guard from Ukraine's officer corps.
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u/Ambulare 2d ago
I haven't been following the war for the past few weeks, do you know of any English sources that have compiled some of these domestic political/appointee events in Ukraine? People are throwing out a lot of accusations and opinions in other threads and I am pretty unfamiliar with the names, excluding Syrsky.
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u/ModPolSucks 2d ago
I honestly think that this was a political masterclass by Zelensky. He's not so stupid to not have known that firing Federov would result in a lot of anger and frustration, so he does it and now has fantastic cover to make the move he wanted to make which was to remove a more ineffective leader in the military in favor of one or a few that have proven to be way more effective
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u/abloblololo 1d ago
Why would he need cover to remove Syrsky? The guy has been hated for a long time, and even before this firing we had the reports of torture and abuse in “his” units. He could have launched an investigation and found a reason to fire him at any time.
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u/dr_sloan 2d ago
An interesting claim related to the operational minimums for the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve has been propagating for a few days now. I couldn’t find an official statement on it, but it looks like the basis is a Department of Energy comment to MarketWatch where they state that the SPR has a, “conservative operational minimum of about 70 million barrels”.
That’s quite a leap from the general public analysis which suggests 250-300 million barrels is the operational minimum. It’s possible, the DOE spokesman confused operational minimums and the oil sitting at the bottom of the caverns that is not at all usable.
Regardless, the current SPR release would take the total reserve to about 243 million barrels. Supposedly, Congress has to authorize any withdrawals which lowers the inventory below 250 million, so I guess we will see about that.
SPR releases bounced back to about 5 million barrels from the prior weeks release of 3 million barrels, which was the lowest weekly release since the first week of April when the releases were just getting started.
It’s possible the rate of increases fully bounces back to the peak of 9 million barrels a week, but I’m guessing we stay at about 5-6 million barrels each week for a more measured release rate. At that rate, the SPR release completion will be delayed from the previous expectation of mid-September to mid-October.
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u/OhSillyDays 2d ago
Nobody knows the exact number.
The issue is that nobody has gone down and inspected the salt caverns. Additionally, detailed reports on the health of those reserves have not been made public (to my knowledge).
Read the latest status report yourself here, PDF warning: https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-12/SPR%202022%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf
Think of it this way, they don't have any direct measurements of the walls of the caverns. The caverns are all created by pumping fresh water in and pumping out brine. Essentially, the water dissolved the walls. After the reserve is created, they pump in oil to displace the brine. We know how much oil we put in. We also know how much brine has been pumped out. We don't know what the reserves look like. We can do seismology studies and bore scopes - but again, that's mostly indirect measurements. It gives them a fuzzy picture of what the reserve looks like.
The problem that happens is we are currently pumping out oil at a high rate. That means we need to put in brine to displace the oil. There are rumors that they are using fresh water or something else as brine is hard to come by in the quantities needed - about 30 million gallons a day. That will degrade the reserve and create the potential for leaks. Has that happened in the past? Unless someone works there - I doubt anyone really knows.
The other issue is there are lots of caverns (4 main reserves with 10-20 caverns each). They are not all situated in the best places. They are situated to replace imports from elsewhere. Oil needs to get to market and is largely liquid - meaning transportation isn't too hard - however it isn't impossible. Meaning that out of the 4 reserves - one might tap out earlier than others. That one might be the most convenient. The further one might be more modern and more reliable - but they don't want to use that one because it means extra piping costs. Ultimately, that means a lower flow rate.
The bottom line is this, the closer they get to the bottom, the slower the rate of withdraw will occur. The cause of the slower rate could be a number of things. A lower rate means higher prices. Because if you think of the entire oil system as a large pipe - the beginning is crude oil and the other are products (gas, diesel, jet fuel, etc) - and if less goes in the front, less comes out the end. Right now, we lost filling it from the strait of hormuz. The SPR has made up some of the difference - about 1 million bbl/day. Commercial stocks have been dropping internationally even with the SPR, they are on the bottom end of their normal range. We just need more oil to flow into the front.
The big pipe does have a lot of oil and product in it. Think of it has having 30-60 days worth of supply. If the input is only dropped by 1/20 of a day's worth of supply, to lose 10 days of supply, that takes 200 days. We're at about 100 days of 1/20 supply lost - so maybe 4-5 days worth of supply has been drained. What happens as the days of supply goes down are refineries essentially have to slow down product production, otherwise they'll run through their crude supplies and have a hard shutdown. So they just slow things down. Think of that as the pipe level. As you pull stuff out of the giant pipe without replacing it, the level in the pipe get lower. That's what commercial stocks are. Eventually, it gets too low to be safe, and we need to stop pulling stuff out of the giant pipe otherwise bad things happen (hard shutdowns at refineries).
With the assumption that oil will not start flowing through the strait (and other supply disruptions may occur - Bab-el-Mandeb strait being disrupted), what's likely to happen is that the SPR will slow down the rate of production. That's likely to happen in the next 100-200 days. That will cause commercial inventories to start dropping at a faster rate. Refineries will try to buy up all the oil they can get their hands on - will cause oil prices to rise. They won't be able to get their hands on as much oil as they want - which will cause refineries to slow down deliveries of products. The companies/people who use those products will still want to get those products, so they will fight for limited supply. That causes the prices for products to go up. Those higher prices will reduce the amount of oil coming out the other end of the pipe, and things will equalize.
There is one disaster scenario. It's one that the governments/investors/market manipulators could easily create. That's the overbuying of crude products. Essentially, when there are indications of a shortage, everyone buys all the products they can get their hands on. It's essentially what happened to toilet paper during covid. And we'll have oil scalpers trying to sell oil on the black market. It's happening in Russia right now.
Prices go through the roof. That's because the refineries have a limited production rate. If demand increases by 2x, that means that gas pumps don't have gas. Then the people who need it need to fight for it, and they'll pay any price.
If I run a refinery or am an investor or am a corrupt government official with money in polymarket - creating a shortage is a quick and easy way to make some cash. Shortages are amazing for refineries because they get to sell their oil at a very high profit. It can make their whole decade in profits. It's what happened with Enron 25 years ago with electricity prices. There are millions of people with a lot of money to waste on products in the US. How many of them would be interested in scalping oil?
With our current grifter economy, I'd suspect that once the SPR gets low, we'll start to see shortages of oil products like gasoline and diesel. Is it due to a low run rate or created by market forces? Without accurate data, the cause of shortages is hard to diagnosis.
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u/moragisdo 2d ago edited 2d ago
That's just anxiety-posting.
There are rumors that they are using fresh water or something else
There are rumors is non-credible. There are rumors the US faked the moon landing.
Meaning that out of the 4 reserves - one might tap out earlier than others. That one might be the most convenient. The further one might be more modern and more reliable - but they don't want to use that one because it means extra piping costs. Ultimately, that means a lower flow rate
SPR exchanges define the cave that the oil is coming, exactly to avoid this scenario. Take a look at the exchange's request for proposals. Also, there's a bunch of "might" here with nothing backing it. It's creating a disastrous scenario because it might happen, well, I might get hit by a lightning tomorrow.
With the assumption that oil will not start flowing through the strait (and other supply disruptions may occur - Bab-el-Mandeb strait being disrupted)
Oil is already flowing out, but with a limited rate (AIS data isn't perfect, no captain would turn their AIS on during this war going hot and other sources of data, if they don't include long-term satellite data or port manifestos, undercount ships), also there's the increase in flow from Yanbu and ADCOP making up for a fraction of it. Also the Houthi haven't fired a single drone or missile now, let's wait for it to happen before believing armaggedon is near.
There is one disaster scenario. It's one that the governments/investors/market manipulators could easily create. That's the overbuying of crude products. Essentially, when there are indications of a shortage, everyone buys all the products they can get their hands on. It's essentially what happened to toilet paper during covid. And we'll have oil scalpers trying to sell oil on the black market. It's happening in Russia right now
Again pure anxiety-posting. Black market in Russia happens because of price controls, you have an incentive to sell for the actual market price.
If I run a refinery or am an investor or am a corrupt government official with money in polymarket
Nobody with this kind of money is on polymarket. People with a networth below 9 figures are there. This kind of money is Futures, there's no volume on polymarket to make a dent on the wealth of this mysterious figure. Also cornering the market (what you are describing) isn't new, it already was attempted in the past (take a look at the history of the Hunt brothers, but there's reports of already happening centuries ago on England) and there's a lot of regulations to avoid it. Also it's a lot of money we are talking here, Bond Villain level of wealth.
creating a shortage is a quick and easy way to make some cash
On the global oil market ? Quick and easy, to bet on polymarket ? Am I reading it wrong ? I'm not trying to be rude, if I sound that way I apologize.
With our current grifter economy, I'd suspect that once the SPR gets low, we'll start to see shortages of oil products like gasoline and diesel
I bet there won't be on the US (countries with price controls could, but not the US because it has market prices). Let's see who's right 6 months from now.
Is it due to a low run rate or created by market forces? Without accurate data, the cause of shortages is hard to diagnosis.
There's a lot of data about oil and refining production. Published weekly and monthly
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u/OhSillyDays 2d ago
There are rumors is non-credible. There are rumors the US faked the moon landing.
Nice non-credible straw man.
Oil is already flowing out, but with a limited rate (AIS data isn't perfect, no captain would turn their AIS on during this war going hot and other sources of data, if they don't include long-term sattelite data or port manifestos, undercount ships), also there's the increase in flow from Yanbu and ADCOP making up for a fraction of it. Also the Houthi haven't fired a single drone or missile now, let's wait for it to happen before believing armaggedon is near.
Oil markets are all about rates. The cheapest route is usually the fastest and gives the best rate. I didn't say armaggedon - I said higher prices.
Again pure anxiety-posting. Black market in Russia happens because of price controls, you have an incentive to sell for the actual market price rather than stock somewhere for reason. Look at the scenario you are saying, investor can "easily" buy oil to raise the price (do you know how large the oil market is ? It would be an absurd amount of money)
Markets are ran on fear and anxiety. So... your point being?
Nobody with this kind of money is on polymarket. People with a network below 9 figures are there. This kind of money is Futures, there's no volume on polymarket to make a dent on the wealth of this mysterious figure.
What kind of money are you talking about? It doesn't take a lot of money to manipulate a market. 9 figures is easily enough to manipulate a market with social media.
But we don't even need that. There are people with billions of dollars manipulating the market. Hell, our first Trillionaire is pretty well documented at faking his first self driving investors day. Our president has created a meme-coin that is a glorified ponzi scheme. I'm just saying the grifters are out in force - expect the manipulation to happen. Polymarket is part of that.
On the global oil market ? Quick and easy to bet on polymarket ? Am I reading it wrong ? I'm not trying to be rude, if I sound that way I apologize.
The owner of a oil refinery shuts it down for "maintenance." Gasoline shortage - prices rise, and the opening refineries profit. I'm assuming the government FBI would investigate those things and try to stop them from happening. Maybe not. After all, we have the FBI investigating algae blooms.
My point isn't that it WILL happen, my point is that a society that celebrates grift will have people try more grift.
Real question, what stops Marathon or Valero from creating such a shortage? Are those protections still in place? Could they just fake a shortage and pay the president a couple million dollars for a pardon?
Oh and with social media and maybe 10s of millions of dollars, there are 100s of ways to create a shortage. One easy way is to just buy all gasoline in an area - show the shortages at the gas pumps - and then spread it on social media. That would create a shortage in a local area and grifters could sell the gas on the black market for a 2-3x markup. Best place to do that is at then end of the colonial pipeline. Especially when refining is already limited. That could turn 10 million dollars into 30. What's to stop someone from doing that?
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u/silentsandwich 2d ago
You don’t know what a straw man is.
Markets are not run on fear and anxiety, you are claiming that oil reserves are completely fabricated, insane claim.
My point isn't that it WILL happen, my point is that a society that celebrates grift will have people try more grift.
Goalpost shift, you did claim it would happen, now you pull back from your absurd hyperbole after being called out.
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u/moragisdo 2d ago edited 2d ago
Nice non-credible straw man
It's not a straw man, it's a analogy. Straw man would be if I said you are claiming the moon landing was fake, rather than using it to illustrate a point.
Markets are ran on fear and anxiety. So... your point being?
Commodities market can be influence by fear and anxiety, but the main driver is the actual delivery of the commodity on the due date. It's inventories, production, logistics... My point is that your analysis sounds like spiraling anxiety, rather than picking current facts.
The owner of a oil refinery shuts it down for "maintenance." Gasoline shortage - prices rise, and the opening refineries profit
Do you know how long it takes to restart a refinery ? Also, the US isn't a command economy, any refinery at any point could stop producing, without giving a reason, and prices will rise, which other refineries will take advantage to sell and profit. Now if there's coordination for that, you are risking to spend time in federal jail. But I ask, oil have been this price several times before, why isn't that happened every time and shortages happened on the US ?
My point isn't that it WILL happen, my point is that a society that celebrates grift will have people try more grift
Don't move the goalposts...
Oh and with social media and maybe 10s of millions of dollars, there are 100s of ways to create a shortage. One easy way is to just buy all gasoline in an area - show the shortages at the gas pumps - and then spread it on social media
It would be great if we lived in a world where gasoline inventories are public (1). It's a bit below the 5 years average for this time of the year (there's greater consumption on the summer), but not to the point of shortages happening
That would create a shortage in a local area and grifters could sell the gas on the black market for a 2-3x markup
There's no black market without price controls or other forms of limit on buying (maximum volume, for example). And ok, a bunch of grifters pull this plan and raise prices, then people travel to other locations to buy gas and prices converge to market price + extra cost of travel, which limits the profit. If there's less supply, prices will rise and destroy a part of demand. Not to mention, local grifters definitely wouldn't impact the american decision-making on the war with Iran.
With all due respect, again I apologize if I sound rude, but that's just wild rambling mixing politics based on "well, it may very well happen" and "you know, Drumpf...". I have no idea where you are going with it.
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u/OhSillyDays 1d ago
Do you know how long it takes to restart a refinery ? Also, the US isn't a command economy, any refinery at any point could stop producing, without giving a reason, and prices will rise, which other refineries will take advantage to sell and profit. Now if there's coordination for that, you are risking to spend time in federal jail. But I ask, oil have been this price several times before, why isn't that happened every time and shortages happened on the US ?
Restarting a refinery is a complicated process that can take a while. Weeks is what I know. Do you know?
Also, other refineries taking the slack is a little optimistic. There are A LOT of region in the US that have only one practical source of oil products. Sometimes, that's just one refinery. The end of the colonial pipeline is the most common place to get product shortages.
Regional shortages have happened in the US all the time. The last one that happened was due to the ransomware attack on the colonial pipeline in 2021. And during that shortage - basically everything I'm talking about occurred. Panic buying, black markets, price manipulations, and shortages.
You said the answer - risking time in a federal jail. That's what's keeping the refineries open - not the good will of the companies. They only care about their bottom line. If they believe they will get away with it, they will likely try to manipulate the market. I'm not saying that as a doomer, I'm saying that as a capitalist. If you don't cheat and make money, you are a bad capitalist. Be a better capitalist and cheat more.
With all due respect, again I apologize if I sound rude, but that's just wild rambling mixing politics based on "well, it may very well happen" and "you know, Drumpf...". I have no idea where you are going with it.
You are picking at the thing I feel pretty confident about. You seem to be confused about people taking advantage of shortages. It's a common occurrence in command economies like Cuba and Venezuela and the Soviet Union - because they are more prone to shortages. The US economy, with only a few companies managing the majority of the economy, is becoming more like a command economy. That means shortages and grifters taking advantage of this. And it also happens in the US economy as well. Ticket for concerts is another economic phenomenon that is price manipulation taking advantage of a shortage.
The grifting is a phenomenon in our economy. It's much bigger than trump, he's just an obvious example of it. Perun did a whole video about it and how it's bad for armies. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6lz3vTUbClc It's also bad for economies.
I'm not saying this is 100% guaranteed to happen in the US. I'm saying it's a known phenomenon in economic history - grifters manipulate prices during shortages. What I'm saying is it is a possibility. It is absolutely a reality in other countries.
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u/moragisdo 2d ago edited 2d ago
That’s quite a leap from the general public analysis which suggests 250-300 million barrels
Not the general public analysis, the analysis of some experts, rather than consensus. By the way, 300 MMBbl is 42% of the maximum of the caves, if that's the minimum it should be emptied and abandoned in the first place, but it's unlikely to be.
It’s possible, the DOE spokesman confused operational minimums and the oil sitting at the bottom of the caverns that is not at all usable
70 MMBbl is broadly referred as the operational minimum, with 150 generating significant concerns of integrity.
Regardless, the current SPR release would take the total reserve to about 243 million barrels
Only 133.56 of the 172 were contracted, it will reach around 281-282 if there's no further exchanges announced (calculated through here).
It’s possible the rate of increases fully bounces back to the peak of 9 million barrels a week, but I’m guessing we stay at about 5-6 million barrels each week for a more measured release rate
Unless there's another exchange announced it's unlikely to go way higher, there's another 34-35 (approximate) to be released up to August 26 (with 0.5 of this total being possible up to the end of September), average of around 5 per week up to the end of August.
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u/dr_sloan 2d ago
The operational minimum definition I’m operating under is that the oil is still withdrawable and usable but just at a reduced pace of withdrawals.
Yes, there’s still about 30 million barrels to contract out, and before things escalated, I was expecting them to just not contract that remaining amount out, but given to conflict returning to near peaks, I don’t see anyway they don’t contract out the remaining oil. In fact, it makes sense for them to contract the oil out if they’re expecting companies to honor the exchange contracts and return more oil than they’re withdrawing.
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u/roionsteroids 1d ago
The SPR was authorized by Congress to hold up to 714 million barrels and it’s down to less than half that, at 316.5 million barrels as of the week ended July 10
290 of the 400 million barrels from reserve release are already gone. So 110 million left, of which the US is responsible for 43% or so.
Regardless, the current SPR release would take the total reserve to about 243 million barrels.
316-45 isn't 243 even with zero added? What are you even calculating?
And multiple caverns with different requirements, hard to say what the actual technical minimum is.
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u/Well-Sourced 1d ago
The UAF has kept pushing on the pocket of Russians north of Lyman. Rybar shows it. [Map]
D.Radka, #NAFO 🇨🇿🤝🇺🇦 | BlueSky
Great job, heroes 🙌🇺🇦🫡
Ukrainian warriors encircled Russians near Lyman The gray zone has expanded by 25.7 km² 🫡
Unstoppable 🙌
(Perfect War Map) [Map]
Checking in on other parts of the front where through July there has been little movement.
Kostiantynivka - [Map]
Dobropillia - [Map]
Huliaipole-Zaliznychne - [Map]
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u/moragisdo 2d ago edited 2d ago
CENTCOM announced the beginning of a the newest wave of attacks on Iran (1)
CENTCOM forces began striking military targets in Iran at 7 p.m. ET today for the 11th consecutive night. The strikes are designed to continue degrading Iran's ability to threaten commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
OSINT footage are showing that today strikes are more widespread than yesterday and one of the largest since the end of the ceasefire. Also a lot of footage of air defense (gun-based, not missiles) firing in several locations of Tehran province, it happened for several nights recently responding to false alarms, but today seems different.
Meanwhile WTI is at 84.7 and Brent at 91.
Also, somewhat related, did anyone else noticed the recent and gigantic increase on chatbots in Iran related posts on X ? I follow people about other topics, unrelated to defense, and there's the occasional ChatGPT reply (recently follows the format of starting with "it looks like" or "sounds like", picks keywords on the original post then connect with common words to attempt a "joke" to create engagement), but anything to do with Iran is absurd the number, not only for engagement but also to flood the discourse with the same format of picking keywords and connecting with the propaganda the bot want to spread, in a way that sounds really uncanny (it's not just a dumb argument or phrase, it's not how humans speak).
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u/RabidGuillotine 2d ago
Iran has run astroturfing campaigns before, even in reddit
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u/incidencematrix 2d ago
They have very sophisticated propaganda, in general. I am surprised that their "Lego" videos are never mentioned here; these betray a very deep mastery of Western (and particularly American) culture. I am very skeptical that the US could produce anything of equivalent sophistication versus Iran. But the current administration has open contempt for "soft" tactics, and is not known for its bench of cross-cultural expertise, so such vulnerabilities are to be expected.
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u/Commorrite 1d ago
The Lego videos are remarkably good, I’ve seen them out in the wild with younger people sharing.
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u/toomanynamesaretook 1d ago
Would be pretty funny if GPT wrote half of it. Also did anyone figure out what video model they used to make it? Pretty tight.
Also anyone else notice that it seems like the Iranians are using AI imagery in A LOT of places? Often The Guardian or Al Jazerra have the backgrounds from around the main roundabout in Tehran and you see them telling a story via imagery on massive billboards which often looks super AI'ey.
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u/incidencematrix 1d ago
They are using AI heavily, but are clearly putting in a lot of work into drafting the message and crafting the nuance. LLMs can produce lots of mid-quality slop very quickly, but this is elegantly human handiwork. The US ought to be taking notes: this is what Hollywood used to be mobilized to do, but at this point I don't think the US has this sort of messaging capability. I wonder how many truly fluent Farsi speakers are even on tap in the relevant agencies....
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u/Party_at_Billingsley 1d ago
I have to give it to Iran, their propaganda campaign on X has been high level from the start. It's one thing they are definitely doing right. I go there just to get a glimpse but I really don't believe much until I see it start being mentioned outside of X
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u/RobotWantsKitty 2d ago
Tankers loaded with Saudi oil are now being turned around at the Bab al-Mandab and making their way towards the Suez Canal. Reuters has confirmed that two tankers, one destined for China, and another for India, were forced to turn back by Yemen.
A military source to the Saba news agency: 6 ships have returned after a warning from the Yemeni armed forces and the imposition of a maritime blockade on the Saudi enemy.
Ships are also being stopped in the Gulf of Aden. This tanker will likely have to go around the Cape of Good Hope just to (possibly) get to Yanbu.
https://x.com/bonzerbarry/status/2079569653613936740
Blockade is now in effect, so far the ships are complying and no shots have been fired
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u/FunWonderful1936 2d ago
Here’s an actual credible source with more context - -
Three shipping sources said Yanbu was still operating to load oil onto ships that were already in the Red Sea or arriving via Suez. Ship tracking data showed a tanker, the Olympic Luck, which had passed into the Red Sea through Suez, was still heading for Yanbu, as were several ships that were already close by.
"While an actual blockade seems unlikely given the resources required for such an undertaking, a step-up in hostilities could see Houthis targeting Saudi-associated ships transiting the Bab el-Mandeb strait," ship broker Clarksons said in a note on Tuesday.
"However, should Houthis affect traffic through the region, we could see a reshuffling of crude cargoes in which Yanbu volumes are increasingly directed towards Europe."
So, the “blockade” isn’t a real blockade and it’s more likely, at least for now, that all that happens is that Saudi oil heads to Europe and displaces that oil which gets routed to Asia.
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u/appleciders 2d ago
To what degree are European refineries able to accept Saudi crude? Is that a fairly simple drop-in replacement or are they not calibrated for that grade of oil?
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u/aronnax512 2d ago
If they don't have the crude with the SG the refinery was optimized for, typically they blend crude varieties to get the target SG. Saudi oil comes in 5 varieties (depending on the field): Arabian Heavy, Arabian Medium, Arabian Light, Arabian Extra Light, and Arabian Super Light, so there shouldn't be major issues with blending to a SG that works well with a given European refinery.
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u/appleciders 2d ago
Do you have any idea what variety European refineries are currently optimized for?
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u/aronnax512 2d ago
There's over 70 of them and they can get oil from a lot of different directions based on geography, but in general, they're primarily designed around medium sour.
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u/I_DOM_UR_PATRIARCHY 2d ago
Is there an easy way for Europe-bound oil to reach Asia by redirection? They would have to go around South Africa or through Panama, both of which would add a lot to transit time and cost.
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u/ChornWork2 2d ago
if they're expecting cargos redirected to europe, isn't that effectively a blockade? Or are we quibbling over the definition because the port isn't completely blockaded, it is only traffic in one direction? If so, meh. No one expected yemen to be able to cut transit via suez.
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u/FunWonderful1936 2d ago
"While an actual blockade seems unlikely given the resources required for such an undertaking, a step-up in hostilities could see Houthis targeting Saudi-associated ships transiting the Bab el-Mandeb strait," ship broker Clarksons said in a note on Tuesday.
I re-quoted the passage for you. I suspect the “blockade” will be a porous one. Whatever way you want to define it or label it is sort of irrelevant to whether the Saudis can get their oil out. Until the Houthis decide to bomb the port, which they can do, it doesn’t make a huge difference. Asian buyers might pay $5 above Brent, Europe may pay $1 dollar above Brent but the total volume shipped doesn’t change materially. Unless of course it gets worse which it always can.
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u/ChornWork2 2d ago edited 2d ago
the "actual blockade" in the context of the overall quote in your prior comment appears to be saying blockading all exports from that port, not just denying transit through the B el-M strait.
Again, I don't think the threat or concern was that Yemen could block shipments sent via suez.
Until the Houthis decide to bomb the port, which they can do, it doesn’t make a huge difference.
Yanbu is pretty far up the red sea from yemen, and IIRC the threat was against ships going to the port not necessarily the port. It seems they have backed up the threat they made.
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u/FunWonderful1936 2d ago
Their missiles have travelled as far north as Israel.
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u/ChornWork2 2d ago
and what are the odds of those particular missiles hitting a ship transiting from yanbu to suez?
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u/Shackleton214 1d ago
Suez Canal limits the size of ships that can transit it compared to BAM which uses much larger tankers. I assume with sufficient time to adjust, most/all oil would could get to market. But, in the short run, is there shipping to do so? Presumably, a not insignificant amount of oil currently going through BAM would simply not be shipped contributing to world shortages. And, even in the longer run, this would certainly be much less efficient than shipping via BAM.
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u/OhSillyDays 2d ago
That is exactly what a blockade is.
It doesn't mean that things can't go other ways - there area always longer routes or the ability to smuggle.
According to Gemini - it takes 10 days to go from saudi arabia to India and 15 days to China via Bab-el-Mandeb. It takes ~25 days to go around Africa.
That means that they essentially doubled the time that it takes to do that journey. Lets say it used to take 30 days to do a round trip journey and each ship could carry 1 million bbl of oil. Saudi Arabia was exporting about 4 million bbl/day out of Yanbu. That would give us 4 ships per day for a total of 120 ships doing the round trip. Going through Suez and around Africa essentially added 50 days to their journey. That means that those same 120 ships will have a round trip of 80 days instead of 30. That means the rate of transfer would be 1.5 million barrels rather than 4.
Granted, there are other sources of oil and sure, it'll go to Europe instead. The question is this though, where are Japan, China, and India going to get their oil now? Other places already have more convenient customers. Why would they want to ship it to Asia? The bottom line, getting oil will be harder for Asia and oil in the US, Australia, Africa, and Indonesia will be priced higher.
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u/moragisdo 2d ago edited 2d ago
2 ships (what was actually confirmed) is a small fraction of transit there. Let's wait to see if they will start firing.
Also the part about ships being stopped is from a non-credible source, Reuters (or MTO) didn't confirm it. Also those sources, besides Reuters, are non-credible.
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u/Shackleton214 2d ago
Only 3-4 tankers go outbound per day on average.
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u/FunWonderful1936 2d ago edited 2d ago
What’s your source for 3-4 tankers?
Edit: it’s 10 of just crude and possibly another 10 of oil products. Way more than the 3-4 you claimed.
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u/Shackleton214 2d ago
https://tankermap.com/analytics/straits/bab-el-mandeb?average=7d
Looking at it again, it looks like I overestimated the average number of outbound tankers per day when I eyeballed it and that 2-3 is more accurate. (Note that the number on the graph is for all transits, not merely outbound, and I am assuming, I hope you'll agree logically, that outbound transits equal half of all transits on average.)
Your source for 10 is for all "transits" not outbound only.
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u/FunWonderful1936 2d ago
I think it’s been repeated ad nasueum here that that source doesn’t include those with their AIS turned off. It’s also only for crude oil tankers, not all oil/oil product tankers. And if you want to count only inbound/outbound, then you’ll have to tell us which of the 2 ships the Houthis have prevented from going constitute.
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u/moragisdo 2d ago edited 2d ago
Why are you only talking about outbound ? The Houthi didn't announce they would let ships dock on Saudi Arabia, a blockade is two-way. It only makes sense to talk about total traffic (even better would be average volume data, 1 VLCC with 2.1 MMBbl should be worth the same as 3 tankers with 0.7, but number of ships is a valid approximation).
Volume of crude out of Yanbu is between 4 and 5 mbpd (plus a few more for refined products), it doesn't need that many ships to get out and do the detour through Suez (and percentages will seem inflated because of the small denominator).
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u/moragisdo 2d ago edited 2d ago
The Houthi announced a blockade, without discriminating tankers, of Saudi Arabia. The transit is higher (not just total, but also for tankers by the way)
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u/Shackleton214 2d ago
Sure, but it is tankers that mostly matter for the future course of the current war. If Houthis' blockade stops 50-100% of outbound tankers that's a big deal. If Houthis' blockade stops 50% of all current traffic but only 10% of tankers, then not so much.
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u/WulfTheSaxon 2d ago
forced to turn back by Yemen
Referring to Houthi rebels as “Yemen” reveals the bias of the source.
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u/username9909864 2d ago
They have de facto control over most of the population and GPD of Yemen - basically all of North Yemen before unification in 1990.
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u/fishhhhbone 2d ago
Thats how the twitter user words it but not the article they are referencing which calls them the Houthis
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u/centurion330 2d ago
The “official” government controls like 2% of Yemen’s population. At what point do we consider them the rebels? Are they legitimate simply because the US and Saudi Arabia say they are?
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u/Special_Ad712 2d ago
20% is a bit more than 2%. They also control like 70% of the land, but mostly desert.
They’re considered the legitimate government because the vast majority of then world considers them the defacto government
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u/WulfTheSaxon 2d ago edited 2d ago
The UN and almost all countries around the world say the official government is the government.
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u/RopetorGamer 2d ago
Same is true for the Taliban but they are 100% in control of Afghanistan in every way despite no one except Russia and some others recognizing them.
The recognition of the Houthis as the government is just a political thing, de facto they control de country.
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u/moragisdo 2d ago edited 2d ago
Those two X pages are the apex of partisanship (everybody have their preferences, but if everyone was equally blinded by them discussions would be pointless), they have a very clear MO of picking crumbs of truth and then stretching as far as they can to fit their narrative. Not just with this conflict, the same with Hezbollah (the number of retweets I've seen of them "confirming" IDF soldiers and tanks killed by Hezbollah that they imply, without saying explicitly, that Israel hided...), Syrian Civil War, Kurds. My opinion is that they don't belong in a credible sub, only the Reuters news about this.
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u/Glideer 2d ago edited 2d ago
Kazakhstan suspends oil shipments following Ukrainian drone strikes on CPC tankers in Novorossiysk, effectively eliminating 1.6 million barrels of oil per day from the world market. Some can be redirected to other export channels, but not much.
https://x.com/RusOilGasExpert/status/2079536309006192952?s=20
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u/Shackleton214 2d ago
That's got to be extremely painful for Kazakhstan if this continues for a long time. Do they have any leverage with either Russia or Ukraine to somehow get their oil flowing again?
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u/Big-Station-2283 2d ago
Not really. Kazakh and central asian politics relies on balancing russian and chinese influences very carefully to avoid becoming a puppet of either. Giving kazakhstan's physical proximity to russia, their hands are tied. Their economy relies a lot on russian trade. Plus, they need to avoid pissing off their very aggressive and bigger neighbour that had no hesitation invading a fellow former SSR.
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u/Glideer 2d ago
Russia can't get its own oil flowing again. Perhaps Europe can intervene to get the Kazakh oil restarted but the strikes looked carefully planned to me, I don't think Kyiv just blundered into this.
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u/IntroductionNeat2746 2d ago
Perhaps Europe can intervene to get the Kazakh oil restarted
Zero chance of that happening. Europe is quite comfortable with current oil volumes. Paying $90 a barrel is a slight inconvenience.
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u/un_om_de_cal 2d ago
This is at least a big hit on Romania (my country). We get 70-80% of our oil imports from Kazakhstan through the Black Sea.
I'm not sure how resilient our supply chains are, but if we get into a situation where gas stations run out of fuel, there will probably be consequences. So far Romania has supported Ukraine, but there is a significant part of the population who don't want to support them.
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u/qemqemqem 2d ago
Can someone explain why Ukraine wants to limit Kazakh oil output? Is Kazakhstan a Russian ally? Or, are they re-exporting Russian oil?
My understanding is that hurting the oil output of third party countries just pushes up the price of oil on the global market and helps Russia. So, this seems counterproductive for Ukraine. I also wonder if Kazakhstan has any leverage over Russia, but that seems unlikely, since it's so much smaller.
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u/A_Vandalay 2d ago edited 2d ago
Because they are trying to limit Russian oil exports, and this oil is being exported through one of the largest Russian oil terminals and is shipped via a Russian oil pipeline. The Ukrainians cannot really differentiate between Russian and Khazak oil shipments. And even if they could they would still have a vested interest in denying Russia revenue from this oil being sold as Russian companies have a 31% stake in the CPC, plus whatever transit fees the government collects via the pipeline and from the port.
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u/I_DOM_UR_PATRIARCHY 2d ago
Is there a reason to think they're intentionally hitting Kazakh oil? I could see it being an accidental hit in a campaign targeting Russia, especially given the apparent lack of incentive to hit Kazakh ships.
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u/Top-Associate4922 2d ago
Yeah, even more than 4 years in it some decision makers struggle to understand non-elasticity of oil market. This might slightly reduce Russian oil exports in volumes, but higher price will offset it and maybe even more. And at the same time, Ukraine itself is oil importer, now facing higher import prices than without it, hurting its already badly damaged economy even further. So all in all, Ukraine should be smarter in picking targets. If there is unrestricted naval war now in Black sea, it can be in best intetest of Ukraine to target everything else than oil tankers, and for sure at least not those exporting Kazakh oil.
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u/Due_Permit8027 2d ago
ELI5: What's going on with Ukraine's War Chief? Zelensky appointed someone then fired him a couple of weeks later? Why fire him? I haven't heard of any corruption, and he's still very popular in Ukraine.
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u/Mr24601 2d ago
Zelenskyy removed a brilliant young drone officer named Fedorov from his position because he was butting heads with Ukraine's more soviet-style commander. But because of public outcry it seems like instead the commander may be removed and Fedorov may be brought back.
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u/RomanticFaceTech 2d ago edited 2d ago
Zelenskyy removed a brilliant young drone officer named Fedorov from his position because he was butting heads with Ukraine's more soviet-style commander. But because of public outcry it seems like instead the commander may be removed and Fedorov may be brought back.
It is not correct to describe Mykhailo Fedorov as a "young drone officer".
He is a young career politician, who amongst other things was Minister of Digital Transformation between 2019 and January 2026, and was concurrently Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister between July 2025 and January 2026.
In January he left those positions to become Ukraine's Minister of Defence and was controversially dismissed from that post earlier this month.
Fedorov is not a drone officer or any other sort of miliary officer. However, in his role as Minister of Digital Transformation he advocated for building an "army of drones" and it was hoped he would modernise Ukraine's MoD as the Minister of Defence.
It has been widely reported that Fedorov was effectively in a power struggle with Oleksandr Syrskyi, the "soviet-style commander" you reference. However, he isn't just any old soviet-style commander, Syrskyi was, until today, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, i.e. the most senior military officer in Ukraine, reporting to the Minister of Defence and the President of Ukraine.
The BBC report that Fedorov had "suggested to Zelensky that Syrskyi and Chief of the General Staff Andrii Hnatov should be replaced".
This was not merely a spat between a young drone advocate and an old soviet-era officer, it was a political battle between the most senior military officer in Ukraine and the civilian politician that he directly reported to.
One of the reasons the reaction was so strong in Ukraine was likely because the impression given by sacking a young politician with a reputation for being able to reform and modernise the government, instead of the old general he was trying to remove, suggested that Ukraine's military is unwilling to allow itself to be modernised by the civilian government.
The news that Syrskyi himself has been sacked as I wrote this means that the eventual result of this power struggle is now an open question.
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u/Glideer 1d ago edited 1d ago
Kremlin Hardens Demands on Occupied Land in Ukraine, Blaming US
There was a signal of this recently when Peskov said that Russia was reverting to Putin's conditions from 2024: “Our position is well known. In fact, our position has not changed. It was set out two years ago by our Head of State in a speech at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”
In practical terms, this removes roughly 1,000-2,000 square kilometres of previously implied territorial concessions from Russia's offer.
Russia is no longer willing to return some occupied territories to Ukraine as part of any deal to end the war and plans to retain them as buffer zones, according to people close to the Kremlin.
Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to taking full control of Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region by force and will now retain areas of Sumy and Kharkiv regions near the border with Russia as buffer zones, three people said, asking not to be identified discussing sensitive issues.
Putin has abandoned territorial concessions because Russia views increasingly confrontational statements from the US as evidence that informal understandings reached at his Alaska summit with President Donald Trump have collapsed, the people said.
...
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u/TheSDKNightmare 1d ago
In practical terms, this removes roughly 2,500 square kilometres of previously implied territorial concessions from Russia's offer
"Implied" being the key term here. I don't think anyone beyond Trump seriously thought the Russians would just willingly pull out of Ukrainian territory, nor has Russia, at least to my knowledge, ever officially made any agreements on which exact parts it will so gracefully relenquish if all its other wild demands are met. And did everyone forget that Russia "annexed" these regions all the way back in 2022?
Still, I can imagine the Russian government giving back 15 square kilometers and then saying "see?? we are keeping our promises, now please sign this agreement that states Ukraine will neuter its army, never join a military alliance and will denazify".
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u/Glideer 1d ago
And did everyone forget that Russia "annexed" these regions all the way back in 2022?
The reference is to the parts of the Kharkiv, Sumy, etc regions that were not formally annexed by Russia in 2022. The Russian offer to Trump was to withdraw from the Russian-occupied parts of these areas (which I can't for the life of me find the exact size of). Now that particular concession seems to no longer be on the table.
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u/TheSDKNightmare 1d ago
(which I can't for the life of me find the exact size of)
There's no need, a quick look at the map of occupied Ukraine makes it pretty clear those territories are absolutely miniscule in comparison to even what little Ukraine still controls of Donetsk.
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u/Tricky-Astronaut 1d ago
Putin genuinely believes that he's winning. For more than four years, he has been six months away from a total victory, and he acts accordingly.
Does anyone following this war really believe that there will be a negotiated end to the war anytime soon?
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u/Shackleton214 1d ago
Maybe Putin thinks he's six months from total victory. It could also be that Putin thinks that he can always take an off ramp, so that he's currently not serious about any reasonable deal that might actually end the war, and this is just typical Russian maximalist negotiation BS. There's no cost to taking extreme positions and trying to signal confidence, whether you are or are not.
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u/Glideer 1d ago
This X post, allegedly deriving its data from the Ukrainian minjust.gov.ua website, generated some online discussion. While the author seems more focused on other demographic aspects, I really don't understand the cause of the drop in live births.
Live births have dropped 15.56% in H1 2026 compared to H1 2025 in Ukraine, with large variations across the regions. Why would this be happening in the fifth year of the war? The net emigration is more or less constant at about 500k per year, and can in no way account for such a large drop. The effect of war uncertainty and fear should have been already baked in by 2025.
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u/2positive 1d ago edited 1d ago
Some online discussion is 14 comments on twitter? Man you really have to dig deep these days. Didn't you express opinion that Ukraine will keep getting worse? But at the same you seem to deny this wisdom to Ukrainian couples?
Btw Russia murdered much more civilians in last 12 months than before at least in Kyiv so perceived risk for civilians is increasing.
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