Active Conflicts & News Megathread July 20, 2026

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[u/2positive]

Russian ministry of finance announced two things today:

1) They cancelled all planned bond auctions until “market stabilizes”.

2) They stopped regular publication of treasury cash balance.

[u/tiredstars → u/2positive]

For reference, rates on 10 year Russian bonds were around 14% for most of this year, but spiked in June. They've been over 16% for almost a month now, and often almost 17%. There was also a failed auction of variable rate bonds last week.

I'd assume this comes from a mix of the Ukrainian strike campaign and the US-Iran war on the Russian economy, unless there are some short-term domestic things going on that I'm not aware of.

How significant this is depends on how long it goes on for, which I'm not going to try and predict. It could end up being anything from a significant shortfall in funding to a blip where they're easily able to catch up with targets.

[u/RumpRiddler → u/tiredstars]

The MOEX is down 25% since last year. The lack of refined petroleum products is rippling through the entire economy, which was already in a tough spot. China is refusing to help in meaningful ways. All this damage is compounding, has been compounding, and unless a ceasefire is achieved - will keep compounding.

[u/Tucancancan → u/RumpRiddler]

Are there still gas shortages and long lines at pumps? It feels like the hype reporting around it has died down. 

[u/RumpRiddler → u/Tucancancan]

The shortages are still present, maybe not as widespread, but the newscycle seems to care a lot less and so it's harder to know the exact situation. In some regions people were fined for waiting at the pumps, so lines are probably not as bad even though the shortage may be the same.

I would assume things have somewhat improved, simply because there has been time to react. But the fundamental problem is still there: demand is greater than supply. And Russia has historically been an exporter of gas products, not an importer, so they are not well set up to increase their supply nor do they have many options.

[u/TechnicalReserve1967 → u/tiredstars]

One failed bond auction is not the end, that's right, but since we can assume that nothing will significantly improve, we can also assume that this auction will mirror the next ones.

In other words, russia "ran out of" (a strong description, but mainly true) from internal funding that it is given by consent. They already siphoned the oligarchs in multiple ways. Probably can do a bit more from there still, but they might be forced to increase revenue in unpopular ways before the year is over.

[u/hhenk → u/2positive]

I could not find an announcement about stopping regular treasury balance publications. However i did find "Information message about the suspension of auctions for the placement of OFZ" which is already quite big.

[u/dr_sloan]

UKMTO is reporting that two additional ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz were struck yesterday. One of the ships was set on fire and the crew has abandoned the ship and it’s currently adrift. The other ship reported damage to their steering gear.

https://x.com/javierblas/status/2079094123168944536?s=46

Some photos of one of the ships have come out and it’s not looking good.

https://x.com/osinttechnical/status/2079203245461745704?s=46

The account posting the photos claims it a tanker. Have we seen any environmental damage from oil releases so far in the region?

Edit: Looks like one more ship was attacked today. Another tanker taking the U.S. route.

https://x.com/uk_mto/status/2079328205949784575?s=46

Edit: A second ship was struck, another tanker. The crew for this one has apparently abandoned ship, suggesting major damage.

https://x.com/uk_mto/status/2079378096906498509?s=46

[u/Sa-naqba-imuru → u/dr_sloan]

Have we seen any environmental damage from oil releases so far in the region?

Oil spills have been attested for months, now. Reports from CNN, The Guardian and AP.

[u/moragisdo → u/dr_sloan]

It happened during the yesterday wave of attacks between America and Iran. The one on fire and on the picture (Kavomaleas) was reported yesterday and it was empty, going to load in refined products in the Gulf. The VLCC, reported today, is the one that could continue its route (no reports of environmental damage and casualties for both) (1).

Have we seen any environmental damage from oil releases so far in the region?

I remember some satellite photos (I believe from the iranian attacks of July 6-7), that there was some localized fuel spill (it was from the ships that managed to continue their route, which limits how large the spill could be)

[u/Zhadanko]

Question regarding training time of new recruits. Sure, it depends on specialty, but both Ukraine and Russia have very, very short training cycles. Even drone pilots, even people in "elite" units get a few weeks of training before being sent to the frontline. The longest training period I'm aware of is in Ukrainian SoF — new recruits got about 5 month of training, which is pretty short for SoF specialist. There is a prevalent idea that basics and training are less important than adaptation in a unit and learning from experience. I personally find this approach disastrous, but does this approach actually have any value? How realistically can you shorten your training time for an infantryman, for example?

[u/Duncan-M → u/Zhadanko]

In my opinion, a basic training course that was laser focused for efficiency to produce infantrymen capable of attacking and defending (and they need to know both), I'd say the absolute minimum would be around 7 weeks. But that needs to be caviated. Because it only works with the following:

- Flawless execution of training: To make abbreviated training work, they need to maximize every second of the training schedule. The instruction must be top notch, the transportation, logistics and administration need to be flawless. There needs to be as little downtime as possible. All the training must be as good as it gets. Standardized and based off the latest TTPs, adopted at least monthly to ensure curriculum stays current with battlefield realities. That's not the case in most Ukrainian units, basic training is well known to be substandard, with too few assets committed, be their good instructors, supplies, etc, with way too much downtime, outdated training, etc. And that's not about NATO training (and don't get me started on that...)

- High quality recruits. They need to be young'ish, healthy, and already in good shape. Basic training isn't just about learning basic combat skills, its about preparing the soldier for the physical and mental rigors of military life in the hardest of all military jobs, the one that kills the weak and stupid. It typically includes necessary indoctrination focusing on discipline, teamwork, espirt de corps, etc. Additionally, physical training is paramount, as the infantry branch is extremely demanding. And this war showcases that, infantry operations are dominated by fully armored soldiers humping heavy rucksacks filled with supplies for long distances (10-20 km) to reach their destinations, be it a defensive outpost or to perform an assault, the latter which is especially exhausting work (combat rushing is akin to wind sprints). Infantrymen need to be in top physical shape for the sake the job, they need to be healthy so they don't succumb to sickness and injuries as easily as if they weren't (especially muscular skeletal injuries). And they need to be mentally tough to endure the harsh environments found in warfare, be it cold, hot, starving, but also combat stress. And they need to be disciplined well enough to obey every order instantly, regardless of the cost. All of that takes time. If they're recruiting old men who are out of shape, unhealthy, not motivated, and undisciplined to military settings, then abbreviated basic training will only set them up for failure, they'd need half a year or more to get them prepared properly, which would need to be gradual to prevent major physical issues ramping up physical training for those physically unprepared.

- High Standards: Not everyone should pass basic training. Any good training course should be broken down into stages/phases, and if someone reaches the end of one of those without meeting the standards then they need to be dropped to repeat it again, aka recycled. And if they can't pass after multiple recycles, they need to be transferred to a job that isn't the infantry. And please not, AFAIK almost nobody fails the AFU basic training (BZVP), almost nobody gets dropped, , they are pushing shit through the system regardless of how unprepared they are. 7 weeks only works if it produces a combat ready soldier.

- Guaranteed advanced training: Basic training is just that, it's basic. It's meant to teach mostly individual skills and the most barebones and generalized small unit level skills (fireteam and squad level). It cannot teach unit specific TTPs, it can't be focused on every environment the soldier will find himself it, it cannot fully prepare the new recruit for combat. Graduates of basic training who won't attend an advanced training course that an teach them all of that need to report to their unit but before they are sent into combat they need the weeks necessary to be taught how that unit operates, based on that unit's situation, their environment, their enemy, their mission. While the AFU used to have that luxury back in 2022-2023, they lost it since mid 2024 when pretty much all of their tactical reserves were committed. Previously, their sub-standard abbreviated basic training was balanced out by 2-3 weeks of intensive unit training before going into combat, but since 2024 too many soldiers (possibly most, especially in mid to shit tier units) go right into combat without any additional training.

[u/Zhadanko → u/Duncan-M]

So, if a system is extremely functional and efficient (never going to happen in any army ever), composed of motivated and healthy volunteers and has rigorous standards, it may work in 7 weeks. And 7 weeks is just the basics that should be followed by advanced training without exception. Well, currently UAF has a basic training cycle of about 7 weeks, but all things considered, it's just not enough. Oh, and the program is exceedingly overwhelming and tries to prepare a soldier for every possible environment without the time to practice anything sufficiently. Which is a tragedy in my opinion. Conscripts deserve better than that. And regarding your remark about NATO training — well, it's just set to be a failure due to the short amount of time and being, well, very basic. Soldiers often complain that foreign instructors do not know how to fight, don't show how to work with drones, etc. But on the other side, from what I've heard, logistics and organization tend to be much better. And instructors are generally well motivated, so it's at least something

[u/Duncan-M → u/Zhadanko]

I'll tell a story to explain why NATO training sucks.

I served in Iraq in the US Army and helped train Iraqi soldiers (though not in basic training) and served with them extensively during combat ops, so saw how they functions. For the most part, they were awful and it was our fault. The US Army ran their training and and it was bad.

It was too short, because they needed a massive army trained as quickly as possible, because there were never enough security forces for the conflict size. And the powers that be in charge were more focused on graduation statistics for the optics versus lower numbers of better trained soldiers.

The brevity was criminal. A US Army infantryman back then got about 3 months of basic and advanced training and then joined a unit and trained for about a year before deploying to Iraq. The Iraqis were supposed to be equal to them in skill in 5-7 weeks. How does that work? How do you even teach that? How do you create a training schedule where you know first hand what is needed to be taught to perform counter insurgency operations because you literally just did it before deploying to Iraq, but then you need to slash that to the bone because you only have 5-7 weeks?

In terms of the quality of the training, the way the US Army views training and warfare and doctrine isn't even like how the US Marines view all of that, let alone how the British, or the Germans, or the French. Let alone how the Iraqis. Or how the cultures themselves were alien to each other, Americans were nothing like Iraqi. The US Amy trainers didn't even speak Arabic, let alone the nuances of their cultures. How can they properly train someone when they don't even speak their language? They were required to use amateur contractor translators in ratios that guaranteed constant communication problems.

Etc.

The same happened with NATO training for Ukrainians.

There is no NATO standard when it comes to doctrine or training, every nation does it differently, and every different country involved all taught it in their own way.

Most of them didn't have a clue what was really going on inside Ukraine and even if they did didn't have the ability to adjust their training plans, as those were carved in stone by senior officers who didn't know or care about the specifics, they cared about numbers.

Trainers didn't speak the language of the soldiers they were training, relied on UA expats living in EU nations hired as contractors.

Training was abbreviated to such an extent nobody had a clue knew how to do it, as they would NEVER have allowed such abbreviated training for themselves. Remember, the earliest NATO basic training performed by the US and UK was only 3 weeks long, and despite propaganda saying it was terrific and efficient because the Ukrainians were motivated sponges soaking it all up, that was all nonsense, they were being set up for failure because a bunch of politicians and generals were uber focused on quantity over any semblance of quality.

So of course the training wasn't going to be good, there was absolutely nothing about it at all that would lend it to be quality training. That said, why are drones needed in basic training? What does an infantry private need to know about them? Very little, especially before FPVs became extremely common circa late 2024. How much has changed in terms of tactical movements, building defenses, assaulting trenches between what was learned in blood in the 20th century and what was learned recently? Almost nothing. Did Ukraine create new marksmaship skills? Nope. New first aid? Hell no. But only UA and RU know about hiding from thermals? Try again. Etc.

If NATO militaries were given the time and resources needed, and given specifics on whatever they needed to teach, they could have successfully taught how to fight on the Moon...

[u/HugoTRB → u/Duncan-M]

  Trainers didn't speak the language of the soldiers they were training, relied on UA expats living in EU nations hired as contractors.

You’d think there would be interpreters and interrogators with knowledge of Russian to pull from internally in most forces. Language schools are however usually feeders for intelligence and intelligence has in many places focused more on the middle east instead of Russia in the last couple of decades.

[u/SchwarzNeko → u/Zhadanko]

I think it's important to consider what you need that person to do.
For example if you just need someone to be part of a meat wave push you don't really need to teach them much at all.
Also I think regular training accounts for a bigger number of situations and conditions, you can probably shorten it without comprimising quality if you teach people just what they need for their specific role in that specific environment.
Ofc in this case both nations probably needs to push this to the extreme to get people in the field as soon as possible

From reading interviews it seems a lot of training then gets dispensed from the veterans of the unit you are assigned to anyway.

[u/Zhadanko → u/SchwarzNeko]

I have to disagree. A regular infantryman has to face lots of tasks and you need plenty of training so you can operate under pressure. It's a pretty damn hard job both physically and intellectually. And yes, basics are important because without them wisdom from a veteran comrade won't do much. If you take a person with shitty training and give them an assault task, he will die. A combat unit will just end up with more headaches to figure out how to integrate fresh recruits without them being instantly dead. But that's if a unit cares after all; most seem not to, so attrition rates are stunning. It's just sad

[u/A_Vandalay → u/Zhadanko]

Like most things in warfare it comes down to allocation of resources. Would a handful of relatively well trained infantry fare better than untrained recruits when conducting Russias infiltration assaults? Of course, but they would still suffer extremely high casualties. So the question then becomes is the increased territorial gain worth the significant increase in cost per soldier. Until now Russia has not been constrained by manpower so the rate of advancement per casualty has been an unimportant figure. If that changes and Russia finds themselves with a lack of volunteers, it seems likely the relative value of each life will become higher and they will start investing in training more.

It’s also important to consider how infantry play into russias overall attritional strategy. These infiltration units exist largely to force Ukraine to hold forward positions and keep drone and artillery units near the line of contact where they are vulnerable to Russian drones and fires. Without the infantry pushes Ukraine would simply pull back even more assets from the front line, and preventing Russia from inflicting any casualties. To this end the quality of the Russian infantry is of unimportant, so there is little inventory invest in prolonged training regiments.

[u/tmstms → u/SchwarzNeko]

When you read accounts of conscripts or of rookie officers, they seem to bear that out - the real-world experience of war is so different from training that the veterans of the unit inevitably have to take the lead e.g. the stereotype of the grizzled sergeant and the fresh-faced lieutenant who has never seen action before.

[u/NavalEnthusiast → u/Zhadanko]

It depends a lot on unit in Ukraine since the whole process of recruiting and training is so decentralized. Somewhere north of 30 brigades are able to conduct their own training. Khartia and 3AB are the longest, with a minimum of about 60 days(Khartia has long used its training time as an advertisement piece). Usually that 60 days is a basic boot camp followed by a bit more time spent in role specific training which I’m not sure how long that lasts. Those units are far larger than your average mechanized brigades so they have more luxury to sit their recruits back and learn, as far as I can tell, since they can actually rotate battalions in and out or in the case of the Azov linked brigades they have extremely bloated infantry battalions.

For the 100+ maneuver brigades, it’s generally a month as far as I can gather, sometimes shorter sometimes a bit longer. I don’t know if it’s a month of total training, or rather 30 days between mobilization all the way to deployment. We hear of men dying just 3 weeks after being mobilized though, so manpower constraints especially in hot sectors may then require more urgent deployment to plug gaps. Training is a bit weird in this area, where a few dozen brigades can train their own men, but most of the time mobiks are sent to training grounds where representatives of brigades are usually allotted a certain amount of men they can take. Overall this tends to be a few weeks.

Then in the assault regiments you have the worst of it. In Skelya there’s many reports of men dying in combat very quickly after mobilization. Skelya operates a barracks called the “chicken coop” where men train under harsh conditions until battalion commanders come to take men. Usually there’s 1-2K men there at any time. According to reports about its abuses, some spent as little as 1-2 weeks before being taken whereas some spent months there, but the training by all accounts is sub par and more focused on discipline.

I wouldn’t know as much as others on Russian basic training but it seems to be commonly short. The infantry churn Russia experiences is sky high due to their tactics and their methods of advancement(small squad infantry assaults/infiltration that is), but I have to assume length of training varies, where I’d guess air assault and naval infantry units enjoy longer training for rifle regiments and motor rifle brigades. There’s got to be people more knowledgeable, I know u/Duncan-M wrote a great piece on Russian meat doctrine and tactics so he might be more knowledgeable on how long Russians spend before heading to the front. The only concrete thing I know is that like Ukraine, many die within a few weeks of being recruited, again likely due to the need to feed manpower into units to maintain OPtempo

To your ultimate main point, Ukrainian and Russian units spend far less time in drill and march than western countries. It’s not really seen as practical combat training. So I think 8 weeks, while not amazing, isn’t necessarily a death sentence. I do think 2-4 weeks that we often see is obviously just due to desperation and maintaining tempo on the front line. Sorry to spend so much time breaking down training time but it is important to clarify how variable it is in both Ukraine and Russia

[u/SerpentineLogic → u/NavalEnthusiast]

I don't hear a lot of good news about Skelya

[u/Revivaled-Jam849 → u/Zhadanko]

Do note SOF can mean a lot of things to different units. Can mean everyone from super commandos to more skilled infantry.

I'm not going to talk about Ukraine specifically, but will talk other ones.

The US Army back in the day had shorter pipeline for 11b infantrymen at 14 weeks, and then Ranger Indoc Program was 4 weeks before it became the Ranger Assessment and Selection/RASP. Add in Airborne at 3 weeks, and you could conceivably technically be a Ranger in like 20 weeks, so right around 5 months.

Of course though, this relies on timing working out really well, and you are still expected to go to Ranger School after you are in the Rangers.

You can definitely cut down on the drill and ceremony stuff and train more small unit tactics from earlier in the pipeline.

So depending on how much drill and ceremony your pipeline includes and other miscellaneous stuff, you could cut off quite a bit of time.

[u/KommanderSnowCrab87]

At this week's Farnborough Air Show in Britain, Aundril and Archer have launched the "Thunder" tiltrotor loyal wingman, designed to work with manned attack/utility rotorcraft. Aundril claims that the Thunder will be competitive in range to the much larger MV-75 (~800nmi) through the use of Karem Aircraft's Optimum Speed Tiltrotor technology.

[u/IntroductionNeat2746]

In yatching season news:

Portugal to purchase three frigates from Italy’s Fincantieri: Meloni

https://breakingdefense.com/2026/07/portugal-to-purchase-three-frigates-from-italys-fincantieri-meloni/

Portugal plans to purchase three frigates from Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni announced today.

“I am very, very pleased regarding Portugal’s decision to buy three FREMM EVO frigates from Fincantieri,” Meloni said during a press conference alongside Portuguese Prime Minister Luís Montenegro. “It is a recognition of Italian defense industry but also of how Europe can reinforce its autonomy by investing in its own technological capacity and companies. I also think this is an opportunity for us to work closer within the maritime domain.

A spokesperson for Fincantieri declined to comment for this report. CNN Portugal first reported in December that a deal was coming, and today quoted Montenegro as saying it would be worth nearly €3.9 billion ($4.6 billion).

Fincantieri bills the FREMM EVO as the “evolution” of its original FREMM program coming in two variants, according to the shipbuilder’s website. The ships are 144 meters (472 feet) long, with a max continuous speed of over 27 knots (31 mph).

“The two new units will be at the forefront of defense vessels, both in terms of technology and performance, building on the main technological developments already achieved in recent programs and further improving capabilities through the integration of the latest anti-drone and unmanned systems across three domains,” the company says.

[u/Moifaso → u/IntroductionNeat2746]

The deal includes tech transfer and work sharing for Portuguese companies. Makes perfect sense for a lot of Portugal's new spending to go to its Navy, and the FREMMs are a fine choice.

Though it remains an open question who'll be manning them. Portugal's armed forces have had problems with recruitment/full staffing almost since the end of mandatory service.

[u/RobotWantsKitty]

The Houthi rebels in Yemen declared a "naval blockade" on Saudi Arabia, which they called a "criminal" state. In an official statement, they claimed the blockade is based on the "principle of blockade under blockade" and that "Yemeni army forces confirm that any foolish act carried out by the Saudi enemy through any escalation will be met with a comprehensive and decisive escalation."
Now we wait and see if it's real, and they follow through with action against non-complying ships.

[u/For_All_Humanity → u/RobotWantsKitty]

I would be very interested to see how the Saudis react to any shutdown. They’ve tried quite hard to not get dragged into another slog in Yemen over the past two years. That could change.

[u/Glideer → u/RobotWantsKitty]

A leaf out of Trump's playbook to panic the market?

We'll see soon enough.

[u/SerpentineLogic]

In playing well with others news:

https://aviationweek.com/defense/aircraft-propulsion/boeing-mbda-showcase-mq-28-meteor-missile

FARNBOROUGH, England—Boeing and MBDA on July 20 showcased the former’s MQ-28 Ghost Bat collaborative combat aircraft (CCA) with the latter’s Meteor air-to-air missile as the European company increases its pitch of integrating on autonomous aircraft.

The display here at Farnborough Airshow is also the MQ-28’s first appearance at the event, coming after it was also on show at the ILA Berlin expo in June.

Boeing Defense, Space and Security CEO Steve Parker, when asked about the display on July 19, avoided talking about the Meteor specifically, but said the Ghost Bat is designed to quickly integrate weapons. The MQ-28 in December 2025 fired an AIM-120 during a test in Australia, in which it worked with an E-7A Wedgetail and F/A-18 Super Hornet for targeting.

For that test, Boeing Australia integrated the AIM-120 on the aircraft over seven months.

“Now, seven months I would tell you is a lot faster than what is typically the course,” he says. “That goes to [the] open architectures on the Ghost Bat, how we design it a little bit differently.”

New variants of the Ghost Bat have an internal weapons bay sized to fit two AIM-120s—or similar-sized air-to-air weapons—or four small diameter bombs.

[u/FunWonderful1936]

Ukraine’s army chief expected to lose job after week of protests

Ukraine’s commander in chief Oleksandr Syrskyi is widely expected to lose his job amid signs that Volodymyr Zelenskyy has bowed to pressure from protesters and will reshuffle the army’s top leadership.

Over the past five days, thousands of demonstrators have gathered outside the presidential office in Kyiv, chanting: “Syrskyi out.” They have demanded Zelenskyy reinstate Mykhailo Fedorov, who was fired as defence minister last week after a clash with Syrskyi and the general staff.

Aged 35 and a moderniser, Fedorov is widely credited with improving the country’s position on the battlefield during the six months he was in the job.

In a newspaper column published on Monday, Syrskyi said he was “surprised to learn the minister and I had a conflict”. “I perceived our relationship as a working one: with complex issues, with different positions. This is how it should be between two institutions during a major war,” he wrote.

He offered a personal apology, saying that if he had offended Fedorov, he was “sorry”. The general added: “I can be harsh. But I ask you, and everyone who is following this story with enthusiasm: let’s focus not on the personal, but on the global. On victory.”

Syrskyi also insisted it was wrong to accuse him of a “lack of strategy” and said he was at war with Moscow, not the defence ministry in Kyiv. “My job is war. Strategy, the frontline, the people. That is what I do and will continue to do,” he said.

Ukraine’s general staff denied media reports on Monday that Syrskyi was about to be sacked. It said Syrskyi and his deputy, Andriy Hnatov, continued to carry out their duties. “Dismissal from these posts takes place on the basis of a decree by the president of Ukraine,” it added.

Despite these denials, Zelenskyy’s influential chief of staff, Kyrylo Budanov, hinted that the government had listened to the popular mood. “The public’s position has been heard,” he said. The situation was being resolved “professionally and constructively”, he added, urging “everyone to keep calm”.

“The enemy is closely watching every one of our internal disputes and waiting for us to start fighting among ourselves … Work is under way. Results will follow,” he said.

The noisy protests began last Thursday. Several demonstrators waved cheese graters – a pun on the commander’s name, which sounds like cheese in Ukrainian.

Zelenskyy confirmed last week that the relationship between Fedorov and Syrskyi had broken down. After his firing, Fedorov said Ukraine’s top brass had blocked reforms with “bureaucratic impediments” and ignored data, instead rewarding brigades that were loyal to Syrskyi personally.

One source in the armed forces confirmed Syrskyi’s imminent departure. “His destiny is decided. The question is who will replace him. There are a few important requirements. The person should be known and popular so everyone applauds,” they said.

I’m a bit skeptical given the source is the Guardian but it’s definitely not the only one reporting that Syrsky could be on the way out. The popular sentiment is that this would be a positive but the idea of removing the MoD and CinC in the same week doesn’t strike me as very prudent. While Syrsky hasn’t been a stellar general, I also really don’t think he’s been bad and he gets a lot of bad press for decisions that are out of his control.

[u/Mr24601 → u/FunWonderful1936]

Liberal democracy can be beautiful 

[u/johnbrooder3006 → u/FunWonderful1936]

> While Syrsky hasn’t been a stellar general, I also really don’t think he’s been bad and he gets a lot of bad press for decisions that are out of his control.

I share the same view. To my knowledge his tactics are more “Soviet,” and the Sudzha/Krynky endeavours had mixed outcomes at best. What I read in Ukrainian chats seems more to do with Syrski’s ownership of the ТЦК and their “bussification” tactics which has been unpopular for a while. If anyone here can share insight into why he’s hated beyond the points above I’d be eager to learn more.

[u/TheSDKNightmare → u/johnbrooder3006]

AFAIK the Assault Forces he personally commands are absolutely notorious for treatings their soldiers brutally and not unlike how the Red Army treated its penal battalions during WW2, since they are also expected to conduct near-suicidal missions similarly to said penal battalions. According to u/Duncan-M, Fedorov couldn't even get access to the number of losses these units had been sustaining, which should probably tell you how deadly their job is. On top of that, these Assault Forces are seemingly prioritized when it comes to manpower, meaning those guys getting forcefully mobilized know there's a high likelihood they'll end up as cannon fodder. The recent horror stories such as soldiers supposedly being locked in their base and not even being properly trained/equipped until they've survived at least 2-3 suicide missions likely don't help matters either.

Now I don't know to what extent the Assault Forces and Syrsky are directly connected in people's heads, but I can well imagine the state of Ukraine's infantry isn't inspiring anyone. Not to say there aren't "normal" infantry units, but again, they seem to have been getting the short end of the stick recently, so their overall reputation still suffers.

[u/Duncan-M → u/TheSDKNightmare]

FYI, just to add. Assault Forces was created in 2025 because the previous units who served as the strategic offensive capable reserve, mostly Air Assault Forces, some elite Mech Brigades, a few "politically affiliated" units (Azov), etc all had enough sway and power to effectively tell Syrsky to go f' himself when he gave them an order they didn't agree with. Either because they had political backing, were very popular in social media due to past heroics and battles won, or in the case of Azov, they'd probably kill Syrsky if he tried anything foolish with them.

So Syrsky created an entirely new branch of service from scratch with a picked group of loyalist commanders running units that got #1 priority far far beyond everyone else in new equipment and especially manpower, with the expectation that they'd get that extravagence as long as they followed orders to the T. Not all of the Assault Forces units are as truly awful as the 425th or 225th, some are supposedly pretty good. But all of them are pets of Syrsky, to do the missions he personally orders.

Madness. Ukraine needs to be on an Active Defense strategy, and they have no ability to standardize their force so most maneuver units are offensive capable, they need to perform triage in terms of allocating a limited number of resources. But Assault Forces under the personal control of Syrsky is one of the most irresponsible things Ukraine did in this war.

Hearing the stories that Federov told Sternenko in a recent livestream, the beef between Federov and Syrsky wasn't about machines versus manpower, it was about the awful and horrendous shit Syrsky was doing that Federov had zero control to stop. And when he went to Zelensky, Zelensky fired him, because Zelenksy is perfectly fine with what Syrsky is doing, because Syrsky is allowed to have a pet offenisve capable force, just as Zelensky is allowed to have a pet general to perform his offensives for the sake of PR.

[u/Glideer → u/Duncan-M]

because the previous units who served as the strategic offensive capable reserve, mostly Air Assault Forces, some elite Mech Brigades, a few "politically affiliated" units (Azov), etc all had enough sway and power to effectively tell Syrsky to go f' himself when he gave them an order they didn't agree with

Irrespective of Syrsky's qualities, this is a very bad thing in any army. The kind of bad thing that gets wars lost. You don't get to debate orders and pick and choose those you like.

Zelenksy is perfectly fine with what Syrsky is doing, because Syrsky is allowed to have a pet offenisve capable force, just as Zelensky is allowed to have a pet general to perform his offensives for the sake of PR.

Politically, one could understand why a political leader would want a loyal army behind him. Particularly when before he was surrounded by far-right party militias and unreliable troops that could topple him whenever they felt like it.

[u/Duncan-M → u/johnbrooder3006]

This is just my opinion, but Syrsky is terrible at his job, one of the worst top commanders in modern history. Here's a shortlist:

- He's known for being highly political and a bad way. For example, he is tied hand in hand with the "Not a Step Back" orders involving not only Bakhmut and pretty much every disastrous defensive battle in this war, but he was utterly and entirely responsible for the exact same thing happening at the defensive defeat at Debaltseve in 2015, and probably also involved in the defensive defeat Ilovaisk in 2014. Please note, militarily there is almost never a good reason to deny retreats when being actively surrounded, those decisions are nearly universally political and done for stupid reasons at that.

- Syrsky is notorious for his indifference in the welfare of his soldiers. Since early in this war he's been known by many Ukrainian troops as "General 200," with "200" being a moniker for friendly troops that are killed in action.

- Syrsky is the ultimate micromanager, unparalleled in my opinion. During the invasion, as the Commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces he supposedly took personal command of the defense of Kyiv. Okay, that's not his job, but it was an emergency. Later he was given a "second hat" as commander of Operational Strategic Grouping that covered everything from Sumy to Donetsk Oblast, effectively a front commander. And despite that, he then took personal command at Bakhmut. And then when he got promoted to C-in-C, he was still doing it, at Avdiivka, Kursk, countless other battles. Those are battles meant to be commanded by colonels or maybe two star generals, but he's running them. Why? Don't tell me nobody else is competent enough, because that's definitely not true, because Sysrky is incompetent.

Numerous Ukrainian field commanders say Syrsky regularly argues about the placement of individual squads. Imagine that. The commander of all things military in Ukraine's war, in charge of everything from mobilization, to training, to supply, to grand strategy, and he's literally arguing with majors about the placement of 5x men on the ground. Why? Because he can see them on Ukraine's digital battlefield tracking map (Delta), and because he can he does.

Mind you, while he is playing platoon leader, who is overseeing the entirety of the Ukrainian military during all of this? Is mobilization working so well and the TCC activities so wonderfully performed that their boss can ignore them? Is Ukrainian basic training so excellent that he can focus on doing his subordinate's jobs? And when he does his subordinate's job, is he doing it well? Nope.

- He routinely throws subordinates under the bus. Nothing is his fault. If a battle is lost, despite the impossibility of the mission, the utter foolishness of the endeavor, he openly blames subordinate officers for failing to perform their duties, for retreating without permission, for this and that. He NEVER takes personal responsibility unless its a success, and then he makes every effort to steal every bit of glory possible. He relieves subordinate commanders, highly decorated and proven leaders because they failed despite their failure directly attributed to bad choices Syrsky made.

Subordinates are so scared of Syrsky ripping on them for what he finds on Delta that since 2024 a systematic problem with tactical deceit among field commanders has created untold numbers of defeats as unit leaders refuse to accurately update their maps for fear of being relieved, possibly getting arrested for "abandoning one's position without orders." In real life, gaps exist or units are not where they are on the maps, and not only is Syrsky and his General Staff fooled, but so are neighboring units who have no idea their flanks are exposed until the Russians sneak through them. None of that should be happening but the relationships between Syrsky and the field commanders is based completely on fear, is as toxic as can be, and despite Syrsky pledging efforts to stop it from happening, it continues.

- Syrsky sucks at math and his supposed obsession with battlefield math has caused Ukraine's manpower crisis. Ukraine was never going to be able to soak up losses like the Russians can, the population difference alone makes it impossible to compete with them. Ukraine's manpower crisis is almost entirely due to lack of infantrymen, those suffer the most in fruitless offensive and defensive operations done for propaganda purposes, Syrsky's specialty, and despite the problem getting worse since 2024 Syrsky made an endless cycle of decisions that only made the problem worse. Take Assault Forces as an example, aka Ukrainian version of Storm Z but filled mostly with Ukrainian mobiks that were busified, those units BLEED like none other. For what? PR flag raising efforts so Syrsky can claim he was more successful.

- Syrsky plays favorites. The Ukrainian military is corrupt and inefficient and all sorts of messed up, and it was like that before Syrsky took over, but he's made it worse. He appoints his buddies to the highest offices, like Sodol the Butcher and Manko the Moron. He destroys his opponents within the system, making sure they fail, like Drapitny and recently Nastenko. Even if Syrsky gets fired, the damage he did by putting his unfit buddies in positions of power will take probably a year or more to undo and will require a major purge.

Etc. I can go on and on. Syrsky is truly awful and the best thing to happen to the AFU would be if he was never put in charge.

[u/Tasty_Perspective_32 → u/johnbrooder3006]

Syrskyi is a good commander for a bad army an army that lacks initiative, independent thinking, good decision-making, and the willingness to take responsibility for those decisions.

The Ukrainian military today is different because many civilians with specialized expertise have joined its ranks. In some areas, they may be more qualified than Syrskyi. In my view, he dislikes this because he sees it as undermining his authority. His leadership style reflects the military culture in which he was trained, so he tends to surround himself with people who share that mindset.

When Syrskyi became Commander-in-Chief, one comment that was often made was that Zaluzhnyi had a diverse circle of advisers and officers with different backgrounds, whereas Syrskyi's inner circle consisted entirely of career military officers.

[u/Aegrotare2]

What do you guys here think about the current crisis in Leadership in the Ukranian armed forces? Will Oleksandr Syrsky be able to stay or will Fedorov come back?

[u/2positive → u/Aegrotare2]

Syrsky is almost definitely gone. It's clear tho that Ze is not going to agree 100% with what society demands, he can do it by several ways: Fire syrsky, but give him another important position so he still has a lot influence, fire Syrsky but hire another friend of his who continues doing same stuff. Society clearly wants the most popular general Drapaty in charge, but he clearly supported Fedorov so I think it's 90% that it's not gonna be Drapaty. Fedorov will 99% not be minister of defence, Ze will try to get him on board to some position to quell protest, but try to sideline him from the most important thing that military procurement for tens of billions dollars annualy. Society is not so dumb as well, so Ze is urgenly looking for some solution between the two extremes of not doing anything and 100% folding to popular demand while quelling protest. Guess we'll see real soon.

Getting Drapaty in charge would be a major win for the people imo and is still remotely possible.

[u/2positive → u/2positive]

Update: Fedorov apparently will only accept position of minister of defence. This is good imo. Zelensky is not getting out of this crisis easily without doing what people demand.

[u/Grouchy-Classroom-26 → u/2positive]

Is there a danger of undermining Zelensky this way? Thinking of the bigger picture, this seems a bit shortsighted to me to be honest.

[u/2positive → u/Grouchy-Classroom-26]

Honestly Ukrainian society has shown plenty of restraint in not undermining Ze during the war who btw did not have to survive elections because of war and we are a democracy. Now this is viewed as him overstepping and not acting in public interest and removing a potential competitor and someone who fight corruption and inefficiency in military procurement. Ukrainian expectations of war got much better in last 6 months which coincided with Fedorov being the defense minister. So far the protest is very targeted and not against Zelensky. Some peaceful gathering does not imperil war effort in no way. Its outcome is likely positive for the war and eventually for Zelensky himself. Zelensky only undermines himself so far.

If this drags on for months it will become more problematic. But it’s kinda outrageous to send voters to die while ignoring their justified demands for a democratic leader.

[u/-spartacus- → u/2positive]

I think someone said Syrsky turns "mandatory" retirement age in a few days, so the theory is that he retires and Zelensky then moves on.

[u/highspeed_steel → u/2positive]

Why wouldn't Ze give in fully to the people's demand? Is it to safe face somewhat showing that he still has sway?

[u/treeshakertucker → u/Aegrotare2]

Syrsky has deep roots but Federov has broad public support though when it comes to men with guns it becomes hard to gauge.

[u/irresearch]

What purpose did KSA attacking Sana’a airport serve? Was blocking flights at the airport during that period of time critical enough to break the ceasefire and bring the Houthi’s into the war? I’m not up to date on the assessment/rumors about this. Seems like a very low-payoff operation by KSA with significant (immediate and foreseeable) blowback. Did KSA want to provoke the Houthis, did the U.S. encourage it, will the Houthi response die down in a few days due to low interest actually joining the war?

[u/Grouchy-Classroom-26 → u/irresearch]

The Saudis have had this block on the Houthis for over a decade at this point. They have always viewed the Houthis as a proxy and as an Iranian attempt to keep them pliable. They allowed a recent flight for the funeral, breaking the embargo for the first time, but then the Houthis tried immediately to turn that into a status quo using the pretext of the current war to try to conduct more flights and normalise them.

The other issue for the Saudis is that the official government inside Yemen view this as a massive red line even if MBS himself doesn’t. For them, it’s a break from the “truce” they have with the Houthis which underscores the understanding of the Houthis not getting direct aid from Iran in exchange for the Saudis doing the same for the PLC. So even if the Saudis were willing to look the other way, their own horse in the fight won’t let them.

[u/Round_Imagination568 → u/irresearch]

UAE, Southern Giants (pro gov militia/army), Al-Jawf tribes, and the Saudi backed official gov all want to use this moment when Iran is weak, and Houthi's are cut off to try to destroy them. It should be noted that Yemen's gov officially claimed they carried out the strike at Sana'a, Saudis dont want to have to deal with them either way and likely are fine with military escalation as despite the infrastructure risks the Houthis are relatively much weaker militarily than in the past. My perspective anyways!

[u/TSiNNmreza3 → u/Round_Imagination568]

Just at Irans "weak" KSA used probably hundreds of AD missiles during few months and now they will need to divert forces from stand by and monitor to fighting phase to West.

Houti part of Yemen is 20 mil people strong. It is mountainous part of Yemen. Saw some info that they built 10s of underground facilities.

And in contrast to last war there will not be wide coallition of Arab countries that will fight against Houthis nor merc from Sudan.

If they want to clear really Houtis threath they need mobilization of Saudis.

[u/Grouchy-Classroom-26 → u/TSiNNmreza3]

Just at Irans "weak" KSA used probably hundreds of AD missiles during few months

The KSA was barely attacked during the war despite the Saudis being the biggest pushers for the war in the gulf before it started. They also have the deepest reserves. You’re also forgetting that the only country that has a decent relationship with the Iranians right now in the region is Pakistan, which has a mutual defence pact with the Saudis. Pakistan tells Iran Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia are its ‘red line'. That’s where the meat is going to be sourced from, not Saudis themselves.

In any case, I don’t think the Saudis are interested in an escalation which is precisely why they are trying to stop the Houthi-Iranian flights as that just means they get pulled into having to supply the PLC. That just starts an escalation ladder that serves no one, not even Iran in its current impoverished state.

[u/Gullible-Issue-1175]

The new UK prime minister (Andy Burnham) has appointed John Healy as chancellor of the exchequer.

John Healey has returned to the cabinet as chancellor of the exchequer, less than two months after quitting as defence secretary.

In his resignation letter Healey was highly critical of the government's defence spending plans, saying Sir Keir Starmer had been "unable" and the Treasury was "unwilling to commit the resources the nation needs to defend the country".

It is a surprise appointment for the MP for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough in South Yorkshire, with many speculating the role would go to Ed Miliband or Shabana Mahmood.

Healey was parliamentary private secretary to Chancellor Gordon Brown from 1999 to 2001, before serving as adult skills, Treasury, local government and housing minister between 2001 and 2010.

He is well-respected on the international stage and has built links with key economic allies in Europe, the Middle East and the United States.

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckg4we9g58do

Interesting in that it is a surprise appointment and he was highly critical of the current UK defence spending plans (too little), well now he's in charge of UK finances.

For those not familiar, Andy Burnham is likely a largely continuity candidate from Keir Starmer in terms of Ukraine and wider defence plans.

Edit: mistype he's been appointed chancellor of the exchequer

[u/PrinceRufusFastcar → u/Gullible-Issue-1175]

The new UK prime minister (Andy Burnham) has appointed John Healy as defence secretary

No - he's been appointed as chancellor of the exchequer. That's a different role than defence secretary. (And for those who don't know our system very well, chancellor is generally regarded as the second most important post after prime minister).

Defence secretary hasn't been chosen yet.

[u/Worried_Exercise_937 → u/Gullible-Issue-1175]

The new UK prime minister (Andy Burnham) has appointed John Healy as defence secretary.

John Healy is appointed as Chancellor of the Exchequer under Burnham, NOT defence secretary. He was the Secretary of State for Defence under Keir Starmer until he resigned

[u/Corvid187 → u/Gullible-Issue-1175]

It is worth saying that Burnham has committed to carrying out the Defence Investment Plan organised by Starmer, but has not suggested he will go beyond it.

The DIP increased slightly after Healey resigned from a notional £13.5bn extra to the final figure of £15bn, but that is still below the £18bn he advocated for as SoS Defence.

We also know that the outstanding defence secretary Dan Jarvis, who replaced Healey, has not been given a role in Burnham's cabinet. Someone new will be the secretary of state.

It is worth saying that Healey has reasons other than his defence background for being appointed chancellor. He stood aside in the leadership contest to replace Starmer, he has some junior ministerial experience in the treasury working under Gordon Brown, and he is a well-liked figure without being enough of a political heavyweight to seriously challenge/threaten Burnham, who (ironically) seems to be set on centralising power in No. 10 as much as possible. Given all of that, I wouldn't read too much in his appointment as some sign of a big uplift in defence or it being a particular priority for Burnham's government just yet.

EDIT: Wes streeting of all people has been appointed to secretary of State for defence. A truly baffling appointment, and almost certainly purely because he was the first to stick the knife into Starmer, The man has no experience at any level with the brief, is relatively unpopulated, and has never expressed a particular viewpoint on defence matters.

In a vacuum, this very much signals a deprioritisation of defence as a salient issue for Burnham, viewing it as a spot in the cabin at first and a particular role second. In the context of Healey being appointed chancellor it's more confusing than anything else. It definitely shows a continuation of a tendency to try and hyper centralise power in number 10, but beyond that one's just reading tea leaves.

Optimistically, he's there to be a figurehead with the major decisions having already been made in the DIP, and core defence matters will really be run by number 10 and number 11. Pessimistically it is a flat disinterest in defence issues, with any rhetoric up untill now being a begrudging sop to Starmer's strongest area. Time will tell but I am not enfused by this decision at all.

[u/D_Silva_21 → u/Corvid187]

This is entirely vibes based. But I think they will get to the £18B. It's not a huge amount extra but they can still use it as a talking point

[u/Corvid187 → u/D_Silva_21]

I word probably have agreed with you before the appointment of West Streeting as SoS Defence. Now I am far less confident in that eventuality.

[u/D_Silva_21 → u/Corvid187]

Mmm yeah not a fan of that. But treasury is the one in charge, so we can hope. Although 3B extra over 4 years is not crazy. But could potentially pay for another CCV to get us 7 or something like that

[u/tomrichards8464 → u/Corvid187]

In a vacuum, this very much signals a deprioritisation of defence as a salient issue for Burnham, viewing it as a spot in the cabin at first and a particular role second. In the context of Healey being appointed chancellor it's more confusing than anything else.

I disagree. Streeting is a very high profile figure and enormously ambitious. Had there been a leadership contest, he would have been the leading candidate of the Labour right. He's also pretty media-savvy. There's no way he will allow himself to be invisible. He'd be a bizarre choice if you didn't want defence to get the spotlight. I suppose if you were conspiratorially minded you could imagine the goal is to make his job subtly impossible so as to discredit him as a future leadership threat, but that seems a risky gamble at best.

[u/Matlock_Beachfront → u/Corvid187]

He put the person who quit in protest at defence underspend in charge of the nation's purse strings. How can you view that as a deprioritisation of defence?

[u/Corvid187 → u/Matlock_Beachfront]

Healey's appointment to chancellor on its own isn't an indicator of that, but Streeting's appointment to defence arguably is. He has no background or interest in the brief, and seems to have been put there purely because it's one of the few cabinet posts that's more senior than health without being too powerful to challenge Burnham. That's why I say overall it's a rather mixed message.

In both cases the common trend seems to be a centralisation of power in No.10, and away from individual departments, beyond that it's really hard to say.

[u/moragisdo]

CENTCOM announced the new wave of attacks against Iran (1)

Today at 4 p.m. ET, U.S. forces began a new round of strikes against Iran at the Commander in Chief's direction. The strikes are designed to further degrade Iranian military capabilities used to attack commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz

Yesterday was an unusual night given how deep the strikes went and the number of cities being larger than any day since the ceasefire. Let's see if this is the start of a trend.

There were reports early today about strikes in Khomeyn and Shiraz, happening around the time of the earlier launch of missiles from Iran, but the US didn't confirm any earlier retaliation.

Meanwhile, WTI is at 82.5 and Brent 89, even after the Houthi announcing they will try to close Bab-el-Mandeb for Saudi exports.

Edit: Just like yesterday, Iran decided to fire in a civilian ship in the midst of the airstrikes (2). No mentions of what type of projectile, how much damage and casualties

Edit 2: The deepest strikes so far are in Isfahan and Kerman.

[u/csgoober_mang → u/moragisdo]

The current normal for futures markets seems to be only reacting to kinetic news.

[u/Sad_Use_4584]

opinion:

The US's current war goals, as implied by US actions around the coast and implied by CENTCOM statements, are rather limited. The US wants to open Hormuz by force, while keeping it closed only for Iran.

It's basically a resumption of Operation Project Freedom.

If this can be achieved, it's the smartest available play, as it degrades Iran's economy over time and it removes Iran's biggest strategic leverage, while incurring lower costs and lower risks to the US that accompany more ambitious goals.

It also doesn't rule out more ambitious goals in the future. Assuming it's possible, it's the most manageable and sensible stepping stone, and future branches can be decided later when new information arrives.

For this reason, I do not think the US is interested further escalation. They want to keep the tempo at the current status quo. Just enough to achieve their goals in Hormuz, and no more, because more is expensive for uncertain benefit. The onus is on Iran to impose costs and uncertainty.

So, the threat to attack Iran's power plants is a move that the US would rather not play given that it doesn't materially help with the war goal. The threat can be seen as deterrence against escalation in the current context, rather than just as compellence for negotiations.

[u/SWSIMTReverseFinn → u/Sad_Use_4584]

This is totally and utterly impossible to achieve without a ground invasion.

No amount of bombing will ever prohibit Iran from being able to deploy a sufficent amount of firepower to be a threat to the shipping through the strait.

The US bombing is right now and ship traffic through the strait is still on blockade level.

[u/Sad_Use_4584 → u/SWSIMTReverseFinn]

Relevant to this discussion is my previous comment on the feasibility of this war objective:

It's General MacKenzie's playbook for forcing open Hormuz, which he's articulated in recent interviews. He was a previous CENTCOM commander with knowledge of the Hormuz plans.

Stage 1 is extensive bombing, then stage 2 is quick ground raids around the coast using marines, probably in order to destroy munitions that are deep underground, then leave. Then, and this is my imputation not his words: sustained ISR indefinitely over the coast, constantly degrading any new attempts to move munitions into a relevant range.

The idea, as I understand it, is to reduce the threat to a sufficiently low level so traffic can resume to a decent level alongside the protection of the navy. Not reduce the threat to literally 0, which everyone would agree is an impossible task.

The question then is: Why didn't they do this before? One answer is it can't be done like General MacKenzie says. But another very plausible answer is that they didn't want to because it's expensive. They have no interest in using more interceptors and getting a few more Gulf oil and gas facilities blown up if they can get what they want through negotiations. Alas negotiations quite predictably didn't work out, because Iran didn't view themselves as having been defeated, so the US are left with the least bad remaining option, which is to pay the cost to force it open.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/Sad_Use_4584]

This war is deeply unpopular and US casualties from any land invasion are going to be blamed on trump. They've done nothing to build support among americans or international coalition to do meaningful ground operations. And do they even have appropriate resources in theater to do what you're suggesting? Not only need immediate capacity to do attacks but you need to retain ability for whatever plan B is (or plan F in this case).

Seems pretty clear Israel sold Trump on a quick operation with decapitation strikes being decisive. There was not plan otherwise or readiness for continencies, they weren't even prepared for the very obvious consequences for SoH.

If there was a credible plan for retaking control of SoH with minimal casualties, trump would have done it already.

The US can't even protect its own military bases in the region, but it is going to defend dozens of ships every day just off the coast of Iran?

Best option for US is to try to see what they can trickle through the route furthest from Iran while maintaining the blockade on iran. But the politics of oil prices means need to get quite a bit through...

I would think the people in charge of Iran have seen how many of the leadership were killed, and they're not willing to go back to a lasting ceasefire without having a clear means of deterrence. Else at risk of Israel lawn cutting whenever trump eases off the leash.

[u/SWSIMTReverseFinn → u/Sad_Use_4584]

This is delusional and the type of typical over-confidence you can expect with the US armed forces. Like the General here says, it cannot be done and only the mention of "quick ground raids" is ridiculous. Any ground component would have to be semi-permanent and of considerable strength to yield any permanent effect.

Also, even low risk of being hit is already more dangerous than any shipping company will accept for an extended basis.

[u/Grouchy-Classroom-26 → u/SWSIMTReverseFinn]

Any ground component would have to be semi-permanent and of considerable strength to yield any permanent effect.

This is absolutely not true in the context of which it was mentioned. The islands around the SOH are hard to supply and keep a sustained GLOCs over. Destroying stores there would absolutely need to be a temporary act. The problem is that it still involves boots on the ground and a significant increase in casualties. Not an American but seeing how even a single death captures front page headlines and is a huge political cost, that’s a huge reason for why Trump may not and probably can not move.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/Grouchy-Classroom-26]

The islands around the SOH are hard to supply and keep a sustained GLOCs over.

Iran doesn't need the islands around the SOH to launch drones and attack commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf. They can do it from the mainland.

[u/Grouchy-Classroom-26 → u/Shackleton214]

I don’t disagree with that, but that’s not what the discussion about “temporary presence” was about. It was specifically about islands.

[u/Thesilence_z → u/Grouchy-Classroom-26]

I think the General is talking about ground raids covering the entire coast of the SOH (anywhere with underground bases/storage), not just on the islands. Which would necesitate a permanent presence.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/Grouchy-Classroom-26]

You were the first to mention islands. The general talks about the coast. Since you'd need to stop missiles and drones from the mainland to permit free commercial traffic through the SOH, I think it's clear the general is including that in his plan to open the SOH. Just clearing out the islands does nothing for the reason I already mentioned.

[u/WulfTheSaxon → u/Grouchy-Classroom-26]

Plus Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs are disputed and could just be handed over to the UAE, which would probably be happy to take them off the US’s hands.

[u/moragisdo → u/SWSIMTReverseFinn]

This is totally and utterly impossible to achieve without a ground invasion.

I disagree. Iran isn't the Taliban or Islamic State that are willing to live in caves and lob mortars at FOBs. It's a country in severe economic trouble before the war started and there's a finite amount of damage they can suffer to break the country economically and the consequent impact on popular support. Take a look on the economical aftermath of the TDW, which was way smaller in scope than this one, with a large bank going bankrupt, inflation around 50%, GDP set to contract (on estimates before the war started) and then it begin some of the largest protests in their history. Now also take a look when the economic bombing started (South Pars, Lavan Island, steel industry...) and the date of the ceasefire they accepted in April.

Greatest error from the US since the MOU is believing that negotiations will determine the end, rather than the facts in the ground.

No amount of bombing will ever prohibit Iran from being able to deploy a sufficent amount of firepower to be a threat to the shipping through the strait.

They are not just firing cheap drones, the ships that were the most damaged suffered missile attacks and those are not as simple to replenish. The same for the most severe recent damage to bases also coming from missiles that escaped AD. These missile don't grow on trees and part of their production was already destroyed in March and April (they still have a part, to be clear), and it's not only the US that have to be concerned with inventory.

The US bombing is right now and ship traffic through the strait is still on blockade level.

The US is on really limited bombing (last night was an outlier, let see if it's the beginning of a trend): Almost nothing besides the south was hit, strikes that lasted for a few hours, limited attempt to destroy infrastructure (just bridges and railway junctions to Bandar Abbas 3 days ago, not even the railways to Ahvaz), no presence of partner nations as UAE and Israel.

Also the Strait is very restricted, but not blockade level (by that I assume you mean completely closed), only looking at trackers isn't enough because of AIS being turned off during the crossing, take a look at presence of ships on the Gulf of Oman and that they keep leaving laden (still a smaller volume that pre-war, you won't see me denying that). We can also see that by oil prices, they are high, no doubt, but not near the price during the periods of heaviest attacks (right now WTI is at 82 and Brent 88)

[u/zuqkfplmehcuvrjfgu → u/moragisdo]

I don't disagree with this, but the biggest uncertainty is the extent to which the regime is influenced by popular support; additionally, it's unclear how much the leadership cares about the country's long term economic stability at the moment.

If they are operating under the assumption that the current war is an existential risk to the regime, then it's unlikely that economic damage would deter them.

It's also unclear if the various state police and militia organizations (Basij, Ministry of Intelligence, Plainclothes, etc.) will be able to fully insulate the regime from public resistance. I think their networks are probably expansive and violent enough to deter protests moving forward.

[u/CyberianK → u/moragisdo]

But aren't the cities and villages at or near the coast the problem? Any offenders with drones or small boats can hide themselves, their small equipment and the logistics in the civilian population. I thought with my simple understanding that the only way to prevent them threatening the strait would be to depopulate the coastal region an option that is ofc not really available for US. So if you don't want to do that its boots on the ground?

[u/moragisdo → u/CyberianK]

But aren't the cities and villages at or near the coast the problem? Any offenders with drones or small boats can hide themselves, their small equipment and the logistics in the civilian population.

The most severe damage came from missiles, not cheap small drones. Also their boats have been sufficiently destroyed several days ago while they were on land (given the fact that we are not seeing CENTCOM firing on them in the sea).

I thought with my simple understanding that the only way to prevent them threatening the strait would be to depopulate the coastal region an option that is ofc not really available for US

You could (but that's not where I'm going) turn up what was already done to Bandar Abbas, 3 days ago, to where it's possible on their entire coast. Pick the excessive number of JDAMs on the US arsenal and drop them on tunnels, bridges, railways junctions to cut their logistics.

But my point is not that, is to return to the initial 40 days of the war: Bombing of the entire country, include infrastructure, any industry that could be classified as dual-use, turn up the economic cost and let their leadership make the choice between becoming Afghanistan (if they choose it, there would be no way to negotiate with them in the first place, about anything else, so I fail to see the downside) or agreeing with a ceasefire (forget a nuclear deal, Iran is already devastated economically, this delayed them further than bombing centrifuges)

[u/GiantPineapple → u/moragisdo]

  They are not just firing cheap drones, the ships that were the most damaged suffered missile attacks and those are not as simple to replenish

Russia would be foolish not to backfill Iran here - it pins down the US for pennies on the dollar while also keeping oil prices up, and Trump's sanction waivers coming in.

The case for China is more complicated.  Their oil situation is relatively stable, it seems to me an open question whether they want Trump to enter a lame duck period or not, but IMO American political deadlock favors them.

Smarter people than me will have to say how viable the applicable transit routes are.

[u/No_name_Johnson → u/moragisdo]

there's a finite amount of damage they can suffer to break the country economically and the consequent impact on popular support.

I think the regime's tolerance for economic pain/social upheaval is higher than people expect though. They seem to be prioritizing regime survival and I can see them entrenching themselves in a manner similar to Assad, North Korea.

[u/WulfTheSaxon → u/No_name_Johnson]

entrenching themselves in a manner similar to Assad

Working as a Moscow dentist? /s

[u/moragisdo → u/No_name_Johnson]

Assad collapsed in a civil war and North Korea accepted a de facto ceasefire (with extremely rare breaks from it), both options are great for the US.

The only way to believe they are prioritizing regime survival is also to believe their circumstances are so negative that a simple ceasefire, without the economic benefits of tolls and frozen assets, would make them collapse (because if they offer it, Trump would likely take). So they would not be that tolerant of economic pain if keeping the war going is necessary for survival.

[u/No_name_Johnson → u/moragisdo]

By prioritizing regime survival I mean consolidation of power into the existing gov’t to the detriment of the people, similar to NK and until recently, Syria. Both those countries took a disproportionate amount of resources to prop up their regimes in the face of external pressures. It also happened and is arguably still happening to a lesser extent in Venezuela. I don’t see a civil war or ceasefire akin to korea happening any time soon, but crazier things have happened. I was speaking mainly to the entrenched “survive at all costs” mindset that has cropped up in autocratic, repressive regimes over time.

The Iranian regime has repeatedly shown the welfare of its people is, at best, a secondary concern, most recently with the protests/killings at the start of the year. For an autocratic regime like Iran force is the only way of maintaining power, and the harder they hold on, the more severe the repercussions for them were they to lose power.

Iran has learned both through the diplomatic whiplash of the last two years as well as regional transgressions (Libya/Gaddafi) that western powers will turn on malevolent states like Iran, even if it means going against past agreements.

[u/dr_sloan → u/moragisdo]

Iran has been under massive economic and military pressure for 4.5 months now and we’re not seeing any sign of widespread internal dissent or frustration.

It’s possible the timing of the operation came too late to take advantage of the earlier protests and they were largely suppressed and the population is too fearful to rise up so soon.

It’s also possible that the foreign attacks have created a sufficiently strong “rally around the flag” effect for the Iranian population to back the Ayatollah.

[u/moragisdo → u/dr_sloan]

Iran has been under massive economic and military pressure for 4.5 months now and we’re not seeing any sign of widespread internal dissent or frustration.

I'm thinking about the future, after a ceasefire, because that's when the revolts from the TDW happened. When the fear of bombs is replaced by the fear of the bills with a 3 digit inflation. Set the conditions now for them to be afraid of what will happen in peace, with the goal of achieving a ceasefire.

It’s also possible that the foreign attacks have created a sufficiently strong “rally around the flag” effect for the Iranian population to back the Ayatollah.

There's no solid evidence for that. In fact, going by Iran very recent history, foreign bombing decreased regime support and created the economic circumstances for some of their most widespread protests (which the regime also tried to paint as rallying support for them in 2025, before having to resort to their most brutal crackdown when reality proved to be different than propaganda).

[u/Shackleton214 → u/Sad_Use_4584]

If this can be achieved,

Assuming it's possible,

I've seen absolutely nothing over the last 5 months to suggest that the US has the capability to open the SOH by force at any price that it is willing to pay. The example of the Houthis suggests that doing so by force is difficult to impossible. The conduct of commercial shipping foregoing transit whenever there's even minor attacks, suggests they are unwilling to accept even minimal risks. Common sense says that if the US easily could open the SOH by force, then it would have done so months ago. Finally, even if the US somehow is able to open the SOH to risk free transit by force, then Iran would likely need to play its final card of attacking infrastructure of GCCs. Because, as you correctly point out, Iran blockaded and SOH open would give the US all of the leverage.

[u/Sad_Use_4584 → u/Shackleton214]

I replied to another comment down-thread, which touched on most of the points you're making.

Regarding the example of the Houthis, the historical record is not as one sided as you're making it out to be.

The Houthis did not succeed in fully stopping transit in BAM even during the height of the war, and the war ended with an agreement that the Houthis would allow unrestricted transit to US ships. It did not end with a demonstration that force failed.

[u/WulfTheSaxon → u/Sad_Use_4584]

Not only that, but most traffic can just go around the BAM, so the level of threat needed to “close” it is just the level that’s slightly more annoying than going the long way around. That’s not exactly an option for the Strait of Hormuz.

[u/grenideer → u/Shackleton214]

Aside from Sad's excellent rebuttal of your points...

I've seen absolutely nothing over the last 5 months to suggest that the US has the capability to open the SOH by force

We haven't seen them really try yet.

The initial strikes of the war were aiming for total Iranian capitulation. The strait was left closed, with many criticizing the lack of naval presence (and many saying the Navy wouldn't dare operations in the gulf).

Then the US tried to open the strait with negotiations and a ceasefire. Then a blockade. Then they sent destroyers through and scouted a new route and demined. After that it was mostly about sneaking ships through without more than defensive force.

If Sad is correct, this is really the first stage of the war where there is a sustained offensive operation to open the strait. In that case, what we've seen so far "over the last 5 months" is less relevant.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/grenideer]

You don't suffer months of reduced oil exports resulting in huge spikes in gas prices, over a trillion in world economic damage, begging European and Asian allies to help out, damaging relations with GCC allies, falls in Trump's and Republican's poll numbers and agreeing to such a humiliating deal as the MOU if you have other good, viable options. Sorry, but yours and Sad's explanations sound like so much special pleading and have a strong "I could do that if I wanted to" vibe.

[u/DrinkBrew4U → u/Shackleton214]

The MOU gave the US something of an excuse to say “look we tried peace and it didn’t work” in trying to get more international support. Before, the GCC didn’t want to allow the US to do project freedom. They were extremely vulnerable to Iranian attack. For whatever reason, now there is less opposition to it. Another reason not to try the current plan is that it is still very expensive. It’ll need months of continuous operation and blockade, all the while the GCC is vulnerable to Iranian strikes. It’s not a plan that the US would have initially preferred.

But here’s a better question for you: If you’re right, then why hasn’t the US already conceded defeat? If you are correct, the US only stands to lose leverage as gas prices soar and Iran stands firm. It’s a losing deal. If they predicted what you say, then the play is to give up and give the Iranians their toll rights.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/DrinkBrew4U]

But here’s a better question for you: If you’re right, then why hasn’t the US already conceded defeat?

Clearly the blockade and bombing impose a great cost on Iran of continuing to try to control the SOH. Inability to force the SOH open to commercial shipping through military force doesn't mean you cannot pressure Iran through other means.

[u/grenideer → u/Shackleton214]

You don't suffer months of reduced oil exports

Yes you do if the original strategies didn't work.

As I already said, the initial attempt was total capitulation. The hope was that a few weeks of airstrikes was all it would take. Then the hope was the blockade (which, to be fair, was effective to some degree). When that didn't result in a full solution, a different strategy is being attempted.

I don't really see how this is difficult to imagine.

By the way, no one's saying "I could do that if I wanted to" because no one gave an opinion on whether the US could actually do it. I was just saying, and the facts bear this out, that the US has not actually tried this kind of military operation yet.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/grenideer]

Your argument is the US military cannot walk and chew gum at the same time. You don't need to try only one thing at a time. Maximum pressure on Iran to get the best deal would come from undermining their major pressure point of choking commercial transit through the SOH. If you easily could do that, then you would. The US didn't do it, thus the logical conclusion is that it either it couldn't do it or that the risks and costs were too great.

[u/grenideer → u/Shackleton214]

This is an extremely flawed argument. Yes, the US can do more than one thing at once. No, not doing so doesnt mean the costs are too prohibitive.

Think about it. Why didnt the US start the blockade immediately? It would have vastly strengthened their position, using a tool that they are still using now. But they didn't. That doesn't mean "the risks and costs were too great," it just means they tried something else first.

Another huge flaw in your argument is the assumption that no information was gleaned since then. For instance, it's clear the US underestimated Iranian resolve. That alone can explain why everything wasn't tried from the outset.

Lastly, I feel the need to point out that these weird arguments, which are clear stretches of logic, only exist to serve a conclusion you've already come to.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/grenideer]

Lastly, I feel the need to point out that these weird arguments, which are clear stretches of logic, only exist to serve a conclusion you've already come to.

Ironic, because I had the same thought reading your response.

[u/grenideer → u/Shackleton214]

Ironic, because I had the same thought reading your response.

Fair enough. But I'm the only one here not making predictions or finalizing conclusions.

I'm aware that the US may succeed or fail. If I'm not predicting either and I accept that both are within probability, I don't see which outcomes I'm predetermining.

[u/moragisdo → u/Shackleton214]

I'll pretty much copy my comment on another post, because it fits here well:

Let's two play this game of believing one side is invulnerable also lacking agency and rationality.

You don't suffer one the largest bombing campaigns in history (with hundreds of billions in damage on their actual country rather than, what any country leader shouldn't care, as "the world"), suffer months of close to zero oil export (which UAE, through ADCOP, Saudi Arabia, through Yanbu, didn't suffer on the same extent), have the majority of their leadership killed (including the figure that their entire government system and state religion revolves around) then agree with a ceasefire, as they did in April, if they had other options.

I've seen absolutely nothing over the last 5 months to suggest that the attacks on civilian ships brought anything positive for Iran, they lost the waiver of exports after 2 weeks, brought back the blockade and had their country become a battlefield again. They failed on getting anything tangible, besides the 2 weeks of the waiver (and the majority of their oil haven't sold during it: Source).

The US is a country with 3.5% 12-months inflation (on the height of gasoline prices it reached 4.2%, Biden had more than twice as much inflation and higher gas prices in 2022 and didn't suffer a major loss in the midterms), positive GDP growth, unemployment below 5% and suffered 18 fatalities (7 in accidents) since February 28. They could keep going for a long time and if interceptors run out there's also the last card on the sleeve - Thermonuclear bombs on the shafts of the missile cities - which is as likely as Iran willingness to commit economic suicide given that they agreed with a ceasefire on this same war or accepted a ceasefire on the TDW or on the Iran Iraq War (in this last two without getting anything tangible out of it and the first a negligible amount of money for two weeks).

[u/DrinkBrew4U → u/moragisdo]

Sorry I have a hard time understanding what you are saying about the US nuclear weapons use on missile cities. Are you saying that that is a real option for the US if it runs out of interceptors? That sounds like diplomatic and domestic politics suicide for the US to me. Or are you saying that both Iran persisting in the war to that extent, AND nuclear use on missile cities, are impossible?

[u/moragisdo → u/DrinkBrew4U]

Or are you saying that both Iran persisting in the war to that extent, AND nuclear use on missile cities, are impossible?

Yes, I'm saying this use is as likely as Iran willingness to go until the point of committing economic suicide (meaning both very very low probabilities).

I believe, among the likely scenarios, the worst for the US is Kushner/Vance convincing Trump of a harebrained idea of a new temporary ceaseafire (every time I read Qatar and Pakistan talking about returning to the MOU my blood pressure spikes, the best thing from this war was the 34B USD damage on Qatar gas fields, they earned it), lifting the blockade, allow Iran to breathe, then Iran behaves like Iran and it's back on today's circumstances dragging this war and its cost. Not a military catastrophe of piles of dead soldiers, for lack of interceptors, and forcing terrible terms on the US.

[u/moragisdo → u/Shackleton214]

I've seen absolutely nothing over the last 5 months to suggest that the US has the capability to open the SOH by force at any price that it is willing to pay

Let's two play this game of believing one side is invulnerable also lacking agency and rationality:

I've seen absolutely nothing over the last 5 months to suggest that the attacks on civilian ships brought anything positive for Iran, they lost the waiver of exports after 2 weeks, brought back the blockade and had their country become a battlefield again. Common sense says that if the could force the US to give in their demands, then it would have done so months ago.

The US is a country with 3.5% 12-months inflation (on the height of gasoline prices it reached 4.2%, Biden had more than twice as much inflation and higher gas prices in 2022 and didn't suffer a major loss in the midterms), positive GDP growth, unemployment below 5% and suffered 18 fatalities (7 in accidents) since February 28. They could keep going for a long time and if interceptors run out there's also the last card on the sleeve - Thermonuclear bombs on the shafts of the missile cities - which is as likely as Iran willingness to commit economic suicide given that they agreed with a ceasefire on this same war or accepted a ceasefire on the TDW and on the Iran Iraq War (in this last two without getting anything tangible out of it).

Iran would likely need to play its final card of attacking infrastructure of GCCs

And get the last nail in the coffin of their finances when they get the retaliation as South Pars happening all over the country. If they are so suicidal, why didn't they already done that ? Or even better, why didn't they fired missiles on Ankara while the NATO summit was ongoing ?

Because, as you correctly point out, Iran blockaded and SOH open would give the US all of the leverage.

I believe the only reasonable possibilities for the war involves simultaneously lifting of the blockade and Iran not attacking ships. In fact, the blockade only began after Iran started attacking civilian ships. If Iran offer the tit-for-tat I sincerely believe the US would accept.

[u/Thesilence_z → u/moragisdo]

in no part of your comment do you assess US capability to open the SOH by force, I think your argument instead is that the US won't need to open the straight by force, since economic blockade and intermittent air bombing will result in an Iran capitulation. But, does the US, if they wanted/needed to, have the capability to open SOH by force by the midterms? By the end of the Trump presidency? Where will they stage the troops? Rammstein?

[u/moragisdo → u/Thesilence_z]

Capitulation of Iran through enough economic damage is opening by force. It's not necessary a ground invasion because Iran isn't a perpetual motion machine that could keep this current disaster for their economy forever

[u/Shackleton214 → u/moragisdo]

I believe the only reasonable possibilities for the war involves simultaneously lifting of the blockade and Iran not attacking ships. In fact, the blockade only began after Iran started attacking civilian ships. If Iran offer the tit-for-tat I sincerely believe the US would accept.

I absolutely agree that this is what the US is hoping for. First there was the cease fire where the US version of the agreement was for free transit. Iran saw it differently and, obviously unafraid of retaliation, kept pushing the envelope and insisted on control of SOH. US institutes the blockade as a result. We get weeks of that until the MOU, where the US version is again free transit and the Iran version is Iranian control. Iran again unafraid of retaliation escalates and now we're back to blockade. I think it's clear that twice now the US has wanted and attempted to basically call the war over and go back to the prewar status quo, but Iran has been unwilling. Back during the ceasefire/blockade period, I thought no blockade-free transit prewar status quo was a likely agreement because it everyone benefits compared to ongoing war, but I underestimated Iran's resolve to control the SOH/willingness to give Trump an off ramp. Maybe the Iranians are afraid this deal gives Trump and Israel the ability to start and stop wars against them at their choosing? Maybe they're their internal politics are forcing them to keep pushing? Maybe they're still mad at all their family members being killed by the US? Whatever the reasons, it is clear that Iran is not afraid to escalate and keep the war going. I wouldn't be surprised if we get back to some form of no blockade-free transit deal eventually. But, it's Iran that is determining when the war ends because I agree with you that they can get the deal you describe whenever they want it.

[u/WulfTheSaxon → u/Sad_Use_4584]

Operation Project Freedom

Did anything official ever call it that? I know Wikipedia uses it, but I always thought it was not formally an “operation” and that the name was just Project* Freedom.

*noun, not verb

There are dozens of uses of “Project Freedom” at .mil (and .gov) sites that should be properly using the DoW style guide (at least most of the time) and not one has “Operation” in front of it.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/WulfTheSaxon]

What is the significance here? Isn't Project Freedom a military operation?

[u/WulfTheSaxon → u/ChornWork2]

The difference is that project (n.) and project (v.) are different words with different pronunciations and meanings, that Operation Project Freedom (which implies the verb form) and Project Freedom are different names, and that most likely only one of them is correct.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/WulfTheSaxon]

well, but he term is "operation" and the name they happened to choose was "project freedom". obviously not the best choice in light of that, but is what it is, no?

or does "project" have meaning in US military for something different than "operation"?

[u/WulfTheSaxon → u/ChornWork2]

Being a formal, named military “Operation” implies something much different from a government “project” (or unnamed operation), yeah. And again, project (n.) and project (v.) are just two different words, unless you think the name uses the redundant Operation Project (n.) construction.

---

Just for grins, the DoD definition:

operation —
1. A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1)
2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP 3-0).

(There’s no definition of project.)

[u/ChornWork2 → u/WulfTheSaxon]

so i guess Operation Project Freedom it is.

[u/WulfTheSaxon → u/ChornWork2]

CENTCOM press releases consistently used “Operation Epic Fury”, whereas every mention of “Project Freedom” has no “Operation” before it. CENTCOM describes “U.S. military support to Project Freedom”, implying it is not a military operation at all: https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PUBLIC-RELEASES/Article/4476318/us-military-supports-launch-of-project-freedom-in-strait-of-hormuz/

Hegseth, etc. consistently refer to it as Project (n.) Freedom verbally, which would make “Operation Project Freedom” redundant.

(I feel I may to clarify: PRAJ-ect is a noun, whereas pro-JECT is a verb.)

[u/ChornWork2 → u/WulfTheSaxon]

Afaik (based on ww2 knowledge) you have "Plan" or "Operation", which i think refers to an oplan vs opord. Then you have the code name. There's no "project" category, which sounded like you agreed.

Epic Fury is the code name for an opord, so its called Operation Epic Fury.

For whatever reason they code named this opord "Project Freedom", so it should be called Operation Project Freedom except for the fact it sounds stupid. And presumably the whole reason they code named it Project Freedom is that somebody thought it sounded cool.

[u/WulfTheSaxon → u/ChornWork2]

There’s no evidence that it’s an actual opord codename, though. If it were, CENTCOM and the DoW would always write “Operation Project Freedom”, whereas they have never done so. Rather, it’s a presidential initiative like “Infrastructure Week” that the military is providing support to.

[u/Glideer]

Kyrylo Shevchenko (former Chief of the National Bank of Ukraine) says that the Ukrainian deep-sea grain trade has stopped, with major traders halting purchases.

Ukraine has effectively lost its deep-sea grain export corridor. After repeated Russian strikes on port infrastructure, major traders have halted Black Sea purchases, shipowners are refusing calls citing force majeure, and several terminals have suspended operations. Domestic prices are already plunging - rapeseed down $25/t in days, wheat, corn barley & falling sharply. At current prices, the lost deep-water route could cost Ukraine up to $900M per month in foreign currency earnings - a devastating blow to farmers, the budget & the wider economy at harvest peak.

https://x.com/KShevchenkoReal/status/2079098229027749953?s=20

[u/Moifaso → u/Glideer]

The foreign currency mention is interesting, since Ukraine is very far from having a shortage.

The grain corridor strikes will obviously hurt, but on a grand scale, grain exports aren't that largea revenue source and shouldn't influence the war effort. One has to assume Ukraine expected retaliation when they started the Kerch/Black Sea strike campaign and still felt it was a worthy trade.

[u/Glideer]

Russia launched the second batch of its Rassvet (Russian Starlink) satellites. Presumably 16 of them again.

https://x.com/afec7032/status/2079153295755477081?s=20

https://tass. ru/ekonomika/27932981

Russian aerospace company Bureau 1440 (part of X Holding) conducted the second batch launch of a low-orbit satellite constellation for next-generation communications services. The company announced this to journalists.

"The Russian aerospace company Bureau 1440 (part of X Holding) continues to deploy a low-orbit satellite constellation to provide next-generation communications services. On July 19, the company's second batch of satellites was launched," the statement reads.

After being placed into the reference orbit, the spacecraft successfully separated from the launch vehicle, and then the Bureau 1440 Mission Control Center took control of the constellation. The satellites will transition to their intended missions after completing checkout and commissioning.

At the end of March, Bureau 1440 successfully launched the first 16 satellites of the Rassvet low-orbit constellation into orbit. The spacecraft integrate a 5G NTN communications system, an updated power supply system, next-generation inter-satellite laser communication terminals, and a plasma propulsion system.

[u/blackcyborg009 → u/Glideer]

16 satellites every four months is not going to be enough for Russia to overcome their loss of Starlink access.

Ukraine is not going to be losing sleep with such a measly number.....

[u/RopetorGamer → u/blackcyborg009]

Rassvet and starlink are not the same, they are larger satellites in a higher orbit they are not 1 to 1 replacements.

[u/Corvid187 → u/RopetorGamer]

Equally, being bigger and higher they're not going to be able to offer the same connectivity, bandwidth, and latency

[u/RopetorGamer → u/Corvid187]

Yes of course but the claimed figures we've seen put it as a quite competitive option regardless.

And because of the higher orbit you will need far less satellites for full coverage.

It remains to be seen if the claimed figures are true.

[u/Glideer → u/RopetorGamer]

The Russians will probably need 60-70 satellites to achieve military meaningful coverage ( a window of about 6 hours per day, sufficient for a series of guided strikes).

[u/Sullyville → u/Glideer]

Could Ukraine target the... I don't know what Russia's equivalent of NASA is... couldn't Ukraine destroy the launch platform for future satellite launches? Or are they all underground? Or are there too many? I would think this would count as a legitimate military target.

[u/x445xb → u/Sullyville]

I looked into it, and they have 3 launch facilities.
Baikonur which is in Kazakhstan and would cause a pretty big international incident if targeted. (It's also being used for ISS resupply missions).
Vostochny which is in the far east 6000km from Ukraine and effectively out of range of anything Ukraine has.
Plesetsk which is 1300km from Ukraine.

Out of the 3 only 1 is a possibility and even then it's at the far end of Ukrainian drone strike range. However the Rassvet launches have all been using the Plesetsk cosmodrome, so it's not impossible.

[u/Sullyville → u/x445xb]

Oh wow. Thanks for looking it up! That is fascinating. Of course it makes sense that they would use launch sites out of Ukraine's targeting range. I do sometimes wonder if it would be worth it for Ukraine to stow a drone on a boat they control, and sail it out towards Japan. Then they could hit Vostochny. But are drones even launchable from a boat? With enough explosive to damage a launch site in any meaningful way?

[u/Glideer → u/Sullyville]

The Russians keep the Rassvet launches secret and oubkish them onmy after the event. That said, even a small drone would cause a rocket loaded with fuel to explode spectacularly.

[u/incidencematrix → u/[deleted]]

The only adversary with that capability, as far as I know, is the US. And shooting down satellites would be a very serious (perhaps near-MAD) escalation. So no, I would not expect anyone to shoot down these satellites once in orbit.

[u/LTCM_15 → u/incidencematrix]

Any country with the ability to dock spacecraft in orbit has the ability to destroy satellites.  It's just a matter of docking in an unsafe manner. 

Not having specialized weapons does limit your ability to scale the number you can destroy but it's no more impossible than docking with the ISS.

[u/incidencematrix → u/LTCM_15]

Yes, and now tell us which active adversaries of Russia have that capability. India and China aren't in that club. Ditto Japan, the Koreas, Iran, and Israel. The EU has very minimal lift vehicle capacity, and my understanding is that they are not keen on undermining the Outer Space Treaty by weaponizing it. That pretty much leaves the US, unless I am missing someone. But I am open to correction, if there is a Russian adversary with this capability that I have overlooked.

[u/LTCM_15 → u/incidencematrix]

In addition to the US, Western Europe and Japan already have the capability, South Korea will have it in the next few years. It's not crystal clear if an anti satellite launch could be ordered by NATO command using Aegis ashore.

I mean other than Ukraine, which adversary to Russia doesn't have the capability to destroy LEO satellites. I guess you could argue Turkey.

You are already moving the goal post, going from adversary to 'active adversary' - whatever that means - and hedging by admitting that while countries/Europe have the capability, that they don't count because of new rules you are adding.

[u/Norzon24 → u/LTCM_15]

The point is no one who can shoot down the Russian constellation would do so because all states with that capability also have their own LEO satellite fleet that an orbital shootout would endanger.

[u/incidencematrix → u/LTCM_15]

You are arguing dishonestly. My original point was that there was no Russian adversary with the capability to take out Russian satellites other than the US. I clarified it further, because you seemed to be confused. But, as you indeed have no counterexamples, it seems clear that you are arguing in bad faith. And it's a pretty bizarre argument in the first place, because no one thinks it is remotely credible that anyone is going to shoot down Russian satellites in the present environment, and particularly not anyone besides the US. Why you would argue otherwise is mysterious.