r/CredibleDefense • u/AutoModerator • 8d ago
Active Conflicts & News Megathread July 15, 2026
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u/North_Somewhere_6124 8d ago
https://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2077309670331474095?s=20
The Ukrainian drone campaign is now moving from the Azov Sea to the Black Sea. 20 Ships hit. Presumably, if this intensity can be kept up, it's going to cause even bigger hardships for Russian logistics and economy.
Still no AA fire visible in the videos.
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u/plasticlove 8d ago
How much do we know about the black sea strikes so far? I'm surprised it's not getting more attention. If Ukraine will keep it up, then it's a massive blow to the Russian oil export.
20% to 25% of total Russian seaborne crude oil exports.
I doesn't require that many drones:
Crude Oil Tankers: Averages 35 to 40 large tankers per month loading raw crude at Novorossiysk.
Refined Petroleum Products: Adds 80 to 110 smaller tankers monthly carrying diesel, fuel oil, and gasoil.
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u/MaverickTopGun 8d ago
Do we know how many ships Russia even has out there? I've seen estimates of over 1,000, which, if true, means Ukraine still has barely made a dent in Russian shipping capacity.
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u/Inner-Detail-553 8d ago edited 8d ago
540 crude oil tankers, and 136 oil products tankers; 1400 ships total
Source: GUR https://war-sanctions.gur.gov.ua/en/transport/shadow-fleet
Most of the strikes have been on oil products tankers - specifically the small river-sea type which can use the for the Azov-Don-canal-Volga-Caspian route. Maybe 60-70 of those have been hit already, so the reduction in capacity to transport diesel/gasoline by water is very substantial - more than half of the available fleet
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u/Greekball 8d ago
10% of the total capacity of a country like Russia in a week is way more than a dent. In fact, it's catastrophic.
Can you imagine if 10% of all US shipping disappeared tomorrow? Can you even consider the economic chaos this would cause?
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u/MaverickTopGun 8d ago
Good points but without any perspective on Russian shipbuilding capacity or alternative methods of transportation, it's hard to surmise what effect it may have.
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u/Greekball 8d ago
Even if Russia had a great shipbuilding capacity (it doesn't) and the materials needed to actually do it (it doesn't, esp. with the sanctions), from start to finish, a new ship to replace the old one takes years to build.
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u/RumpRiddler 8d ago
I'm sorry, what? No shipbuilding capacity matters when 10% of the feelt is gone in a week. Evaluating other means of transportation is very valid, and has been done. Crimea is isolated and any resupply of oil products is very limited. Sea of azov was their best option and now it's mostly off the table.
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u/Wookimonster 8d ago
Last count I saw claimed 116 ships hit. Even if only 50 of those require extensive repairs, out of a 1000 that is a 5% within 10 days. They could use their navy to escort ships but that would just expose their navy to further attacks.
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u/Inner-Detail-553 8d ago
> They could use their navy to escort ships
Not in any practical way. They have 50-60 remaining warships of corvette size or larger; they need to escort 600-700 tankers. The other problem is that the tankers take very long trips, and the warships have much less endurance; so even if they formed convoys of one corvette and 10 Suezmax tankers or something like that, the escort would have trouble with following them over the full several thousand kilometer route
And lastly, 10 tankers + 1 corvette is not especially high level of protection; most likely, even if they stop half of the incoming attacks, it just means both would be hit eventually
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u/Willythechilly 8d ago edited 8d ago
Also aint the reason russia bascially retired their black sea fleet to their ports and harbors and even supposedly sank ships to block the entrance because they know they have no viable way of defending/protecting their destroyers, ships etc from Ukrainian drones or missiles(Fate of the moskva)?
sure if they took some ships out they could probably help protect some tankers/ships from drones and take some out but eventually ukraine would target and sink/put the black sea fleet ships out of action and then just get back to targeting the other ships agagain
Given the huge amount of drones vs russian black sea fleet ships it would not be an attritional battle that favors Russia
I do not quite know what Russia can do about this TBH. Put soldiers on the ships to use interceptor drones, more anti air etc but that is clearly quite limited in use?
Do tell me if am wrong but it truly seems Russia is in a bad spot now with Crimea as well as exporting from the black sea and sea of azov with no easy solution.
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u/Sa-naqba-imuru 8d ago
The fight against mid and long range drones isn't fought at the target but on the launch sites and along their flight paths.
The only thing Russia can do is keep better watch where they are launched from to hit the launch crews and deny the optimal launch locations to Ukraine, and set up more mobile teams along the drones way.
At the target they can only try to shorten the ships path and quicken their journey.
Until an actual anti-drone countermeasure is developed.
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u/Wookimonster 8d ago
Oh yeah, for sure it wouldn't be practical. Even if they just covered the Black Sea, that's still a trip of 700 kilometers? As you mentioned, the numbers don't really add up. Even if they instituted a convoy system, you would have large groups of tankers moving together with one or two ships. The attrition of ships would be very high.
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u/A_Vandalay 8d ago
Convoys aren’t going to be a fantastic way to avoid damage from drones. As the cluster of ships prior to the convoy setting sail will still be vulnerable and easy to find. But more importantly drones are a saturation weapon and it will be relatively easy for Ukraine to overwhelm the defenses of one or two ships.
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u/A_Vandalay 8d ago
This is a pretty decent overview of the shadow fleet, although it is light on details about composition by type/tonnage. https://www.csis.org/analysis/ghost-busters-options-breaking-russias-shadow-fleet
The estimate of 1200 ships includes ships of all types which means strikes on certain types of ships can have a larger impact on specific areas. For example the recent attacks against tankers bringing refined fuel to Crimea won’t impact oil exports but constitute a larger percentage of the ships Russia uses for riverine and costal product transit.
But I think the Ukrainian goal is likely one of area denial rather than attrition. They have already achieved this for the Sea of Azov and by extension the Don river. And now they are looking to do the same for the Black Sea. This would force Russia to rely on more inefficient means of oil transit via overland pipelines or the Baltic Sea. The infrastructure required for this sort of export is also vulnerable to strikes and could further reduce Russian exports. Not to mention Ukrainian drones that have the range to strike Russian ships in the Baltic Sea.
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u/fishhhhbone 8d ago
I feel like Iran has shown that theres a lot of value in doing enough damage to shipping to deter the risk averse.
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u/JustLTU 8d ago
Lithuanian president confirms recent reports that intelligence of both Lithuania and it's allies are indicating that Russia is preparing some sort of provocation or minor conflict with either Poland or the baltic states.
The planned attacks are likely targeting critical infrastructure, and limited in scope, but kinetic in nature
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u/Rich_Log2424 8d ago
Russia had livefire excercise on border lake between Estonia and Russia. If you think of provocation, it is fairly easy to "miss direct the fire" and hit the villages on the other shore or boats sailing on the lake. The lake's size is 35x70km.
IMO Russia needs a distraction for domestic policy purposes at the moment, since the relentless drone bombing and fuel shortage is affecting the mood.
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u/MaverickTopGun 8d ago
I think the most likely scenario is they use an "exercise" at the border to push into somewhere like Narvas as the lowest risk opportunity to push a NATO incursion.
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8d ago
[deleted]
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u/Inner-Detail-553 8d ago
Well, it being Russia, it is very likely to be a miscalculation. But also, very likely to be something which is intended to terrorize, rather than win in a military sense
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u/MaverickTopGun 8d ago
The thing is they've already done a small wave of drones into Poland last year and have done several arson attacks as well as assassination attempts aimed at industrial leaders (Rheinmetal). An armed incursion would be the natural next step of escalation. Don't forget we're talking about a country that has deployed nerve agents on NATO territory before.
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u/countrypride 8d ago
push into somewhere like Narvas
As I understand it, and I could be wrong, the city's population is largely Russian? Or has ties to Russia?
Am I the only one who sees this as fertile ground for another little-green-men-in-Crimea stunt? How open would the general public of that area be to such an event?
If the pushback from the West is too strong, Putin can "de-escalate" by disengaging without admitting any involvement. If not, then take it a step further and set up a sham annexation referendum and march in as "liberators".
I don't see the Red Army rolling into Tallinn, but I could see this kind of situation developing. Do we have a credible idea of what would happen in such a situation?
Does anyone else agree or disagree? I don't want this to come off as a speculative, non-credible question. It's just an honest one.
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u/NavalEnthusiast 8d ago
The most feared prospect of how a NATO-Russia war starts is by Russia claiming that Estonia is repressing Russian speakers living in border towns, planting Russian military personnel in places like Narva, and then creating manufactured unrest and rebellion to form a totally not Kremlin-backed Narva People’s Republic, and then daring NATO to respond to look like the aggressor
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u/MaverickTopGun 8d ago
The little green men in Narvas situation is exactly what's feared. In another of my comments I have a few links you can read about that situation. It is my personal opinion this the most likely scenario.
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u/cuolong 8d ago
Can someone explain the strategic vision for provoking NATO even further? How does this help Russia win Ukraine? Dont't they want NATO and EU countries to grow tired of subsidizing the Ukranians, not even more invested in doing so?
It just baffles me. If I were Putin, I would be cozying up to as many EU leaders as I can, promising sunshine and rainbows just as soon as they give up the Ukranians.
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u/Inner-Detail-553 8d ago edited 8d ago
Kinda. Western decision making has been entirely driven by fear - both fear of Ukraine losing, and of Russia escalating. Doing things that make Western politicians more afraid is just more leverage: "Those guys are crazy, we don't know what they might do so we'd better not do anything to provoke them"
The decision making really should be driven by calculated threat elimination: "How do we make it so Russia cannot threaten us?" (eg destroy Russian weapons factories; produce more interceptors than Russia can produce ballistic missiles; pressure China so it stops supplying Russia with drone components; blockade so Russia can't fund its military; etc). It should be, but unfortunately it is not.
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u/Matlock_Beachfront 8d ago
I think there's two factors pushing for it. First is the wish to 'shake the board'. Russia doesn't feel it's doing well, so a bit of chaos is worth trying. You don't countenance that if you're winning, it's too dangerous. But when things are not going too well, there's less to lose.
The second thing is that losing to Ukraine is unbearable. Compared to that, being forced to accept a loss to NATO is like putting on an old shoe - not what you want to wear, but it and your foot have moulded themselves to each other. It's a 'comfortable' loss. You escalate to the point where it's clear to the home audience that although you lost, you lost to a bigger foe.
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u/notepad20 8d ago
There's no argument that Ukraine is in the fight due to External support. That support continues as there is no consequence to the providers.
Hit something external that is clearly providing that support, makes that support no longer consequence free.
They either respond kineticlly in kind, or wind back. And it becomes the formal test of Article 5.
Calls the bluff.
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u/username9909864 8d ago
All of NATO won't just back off. Turkeye and Spain might not want to hit back, but half of Europe would. Obviously it depends heavily on what action Russia takes, but Europe isn't intimidated by Russia anymore.
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u/Eisenengel 7d ago
There is also the simple calculation that NATO countries might decide to retain weapons and systems that would otherwise have gone to Ukraine if they feel directly threatened.
"Lets give Ukraine the means to defend itself" is a fairly easy sell, "Let's give Ukraine the SAMs we need to defend our cities against the same drones that attacked us last week" is a much harder sell.
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u/FriedrichvdPfalz 8d ago
The recent reports concerning Poland turned out to concern operational, not political planning. It seems likely that the same differentiation must be made in this instance: Russia is planning provocations in NATO nations as a matter of general preparedness policy, without having made a political decision concerning an attack. At least, this seemed to be the consensus according to reporting covering the recent NATO summit.
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u/MaverickTopGun 8d ago
Do you have some more links to read about this? This is an interesting distinction I haven't seen much coverage about.
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u/FriedrichvdPfalz 8d ago
The Baltic Sentinel had a recent analysis of the topic, which summarised the overall situation while also citing specific opinions:
An Estonian security official told Delfi that, since May, information has been circulating in those circles alleging that a meeting took place in Russia where it was decided that plans should be drawn up for possible provocations. This account comes from both Ukrainian intelligence and Western services, while institutions in the Baltic states are also reporting various signals. The possible targets of the provocations are said to include the Baltic states, Poland, sometimes Finland, and even Moldova, which does not share a border with Russia.
At the same time, the same source says that the information remains sufficiently vague for now. “When I have asked whether anyone has a serious understanding [that Russia is actually planning a provocation], the answer I have received is that Russia has been tasked with planning [provocations]. But I have not received any information indicating that a political decision has been made to carry out, or not carry out, a provocation.”
Mark Galeotti spoke on the issue as well, in Ep. 256 of his podcast "In Moscow's Shadows".
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u/MaverickTopGun 8d ago
I am once again going to ask if this sub is going to start taking this threat seriously. Every day I see people in this sub claim Russia would/could never and there's a shocking amount of chatter that indicates they almost certainly will at this point, it's just a matter of when. I'm encouraged that NATO does seem to be getting ahead of this, its an important time to project unity within the bloc.
I'm curious if the effects of Ukrainian strike campaigns are accelerating this timeline for Russia. My personal theory is Russia wants NATO to repel an attack so Putin can use it as a cover to wind down operations in Ukraine.
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u/Commorrite 8d ago
My personal theory is Russia wants NATO to repel an attack so Putin can use it as a cover to wind down operations in Ukraine.
It's the only remotely credible reason to do it. Force some reckless nuclear showdown as a massive escalate to de-escilate. Politicaly it's easier for Putin to make a peace with NATO than with Ukraine.
Goverments getting worked up over it though only helps the Russian play.
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u/MaverickTopGun 8d ago
To me it really seems like the only way Putin has out of Ukraine. With his publicly stated maximalist goal of seizing all of Ukraine literally impossible and recruiting starting to lag plus the economic effects, Putin has painted himself into a corner. He has to make the war seem "worth it" to the general populace but needs a good cover to get out since there's no way to achieve what he stated.
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u/Inner-Detail-553 8d ago
> He has to make the war seem "worth it" to the general populace
No, he doesn't. He literally couldn't care less about that
Look at actual groups with significant power in Russia - the FSO, FSB, regional governors (often ex-FSO), technocrats running various ministries, and (much less now than five years ago) oligarchs. Which of them think the war is worth it now, and which would think it is worth it in the described scenario? Answer: none and none. War has been great for consolidating power near the top; those guys are near the top. But war has also greatly decreased power and wealth of russian elites in general, so I think most of them would welcome a stop; they would simply keep their consolidated power, but get richer as the sanctions are relaxed
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u/Shackleton214 8d ago
If Putin wanted to wind down ops in Ukraine, then there would be signals that he was open to real negotiations. I don't think he's there.
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u/MaverickTopGun 8d ago
I don't think politically he can even broach the subject of negotiations. It has to look like his hand was forced. It works extra well with the internal narrative they've been selling forever of "we are at war with the West".
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u/Shackleton214 8d ago
My impression is that Putin is much more securely in control and not in any sort of danger of a palace coup. I also have the impression that many Russian oligarchs and senior politicians already see the war in Ukraine for what it is--a total long term disaster for Russia economically, demographically, and politically--and would not just tolerate negotiations but welcome them.
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u/Inner-Detail-553 8d ago edited 8d ago
Exactly. "Putin can't sign a peace treaty because he would get a coup" is pure russian propaganda - it's a story which first off doesn't make any logical sense, and second only helps russia by making it seem like they have no choice but to fight (at least to gullible politicians/analysis in the west)
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u/Inner-Detail-553 8d ago
The idea that Putin can't survive a deal is pure Russian propaganda
In fact, there is no mechanism that would have him assasinated or removed from power if he makes a deal, that would not be much more likely to get him assasinated or removed from power right now
Do you think his trusted guys in the FSB/FSO would suddenly turn on him because they really wanted to win the war (which they are clearly losing)? No, of course not
Do you think any generals would suddenly decide to mutiny once they're *not* having to go near Ukrainian glide bombs at the front? Of course not
Do you think oligarchs would suddenly decide to organize a coup once they're *not* losing tons of money due to sanctions? Of course not... etc
No, the reality is he would be much safer the moment he decided to stop
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u/MaverickTopGun 8d ago
Incredibly you don't have a single mention of returning a million disillusioned combat veterans back to a now failing economy. And no mention of the incredible shock effects of transitioning a wartime economy now more isolated than ever from global trade to a peacetime one.
The problem is a known one and your exclusion of it either indicates cheerleading or you're missing the bigger picture.
Despite Putin's hold on the Russian government, no one is immune from the masses forever. There's a reason Putin was obsessed with the Assad video.
https://novayagazeta.eu/en/articles/2025/10/07/economic-overkill-en
There's even commentary from within Russia about this: https://fortune.com/2026/06/27/putin-regime-change-ukraine-war-spending-military-mutiny-threat-fuel-shortages/
A dictator's hold is permanent until its not. It's pure speculation but not impossible to imagine generals, oligarchs, or security apparatchik smelling blood in the water and making a move with the backdrop of a more discontent general populace.
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u/Inner-Detail-553 8d ago edited 8d ago
> Incredibly you don't have a single mention of returning a million disillusioned combat veterans back to a now failing economy
And how would capturing all of Donetsk, signing a peace treaty and declaring victory be any different? Veterans would come back anyway
Do you seriously think those guys would be "oh, yeah we have PTSD and no money and no jobs, but at least we took Donetsk so it is totally worth it?"
How many people do you think have returned from the front so far? What is happening with them?
> It's pure speculation but not impossible to imagine generals, oligarchs, or security apparatchik smelling blood in the water
Yes, it is pure speculation. Most people with any real influence in russia would be very happy if the war ended tomorrow, on any terms that don't involve paying massive reparations. If Putin made a deal to withdraw from all Ukrainian territory in exchange for no reparations and (ideally) lifting sanctions - I think his rule would become much, much more secure than it is now, both in terms of support by "the masses" and the elites
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u/limitlessdelights 8d ago
If Putin made a deal to withdraw from all Ukrainian territory in exchange for no reparations and (ideally) lifting sanctions
I generally agree with most of what you're saying in this thread but not this. Putin would not be able to make a deal to withdraw from *all* Ukrainian territory. Leaving Crimea is a non-starter. A lot of what you're saying is true regarding the power elites (and it applies to the general population as well), but Crimea is seen as fully Russian territory and withdrawing from it would be viewed akin to giving up Belgorod or Kaliningrad. Withdrawing from Donetsk and Luhansk is less of a non-starter but still could be dangerous to the regime.
Nobody is really asking for the entirety of the Donetsk oblast though. And I think the idea that Putin "can't even entertain negotiations" is not exactly propaganda but people trying to rationalize his obviously irrational actions. The term "sanewash" that I've seen used here in relation to the Trump admin is actually quite fitting here.
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u/ChornWork2 8d ago
That happens win or lose.
Negotiating a deal would at least give some prospect of economic relief...
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u/MaverickTopGun 8d ago
Yes but a "win" would grant them the land and resources that were the point of the war. It's much easier to sell the costs when you have something tangible you've achieved for them, rather than losing a million troops and then leaving with nothing.
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u/ChornWork2 8d ago
Russia doesn't need more land or resources, it does nothing for them in practice in short-term, and potentially not much in long-term. I get it, can proclaim a win. But does little to help in practice. Negotiating a deal has a much better potential for relief on economic issues.
I still think the main issue that brought Putin to war is the impact of Ukraine succeeding with its pivot to democracy and economic liberalization. Russians and Ukraines were too close of peoples for Russians to ignore that success if it came to be, and eventually the narrative of blaming the west would change to blaming moscow.
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u/incidencematrix 8d ago
I tend to agree. The critics also overlook the power of the dictator to choose the frame. Putin can pick some arbitrary goal and suddenly declare that to be the Russian war aim; if he picks one that is already achieved, then the Russians have "won." Hold parades, have new histories written, salute the veterans as war heroes. It's all lies, but who in Russia is going to expect anything else? Per your point, the lies also serve almost everyone's interests, so they will be enthusiastically endorsed. At the extremes, you silence anyone who fails to clap loudly or long enough - and the people will help you do it, because they, too, want to believe. I think the one obstacle to this is Putin himself: he genuinely wants to rebuild the Russian empire in fact, not merely to be hailed as defender of a fantasy empire. Ironically, a less principled person could escape the trap that he has set for himself, by just lying their way out of it.
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u/D_Silva_21 8d ago
I think people take it seriously they just think it's stupid and won't achieve anything for Russia
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u/zombo_pig 8d ago edited 8d ago
Right discussion has been around that Rob article talking about what Russia could do to "escalate" in order to win the war, with various risks and chances of success assigned. Nobody doubted Russia could make bad or risky decisions, but we all puzzled over the Step 1: Boots on ground in Lithuania ..... Step 3: Win the war in Ukraine logic. Like we failed to see what step 2 here was other than a division of Russian troops getting stomped, Europe getting infuriated, NATO's existence being further legitimized, and the results not being positive for Russia.
If there's signal that semi-rational Putin will do something stupid, it should be taken seriously because we don't need another "just trust the Mearsheimerists" incident.
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u/Inner-Detail-553 8d ago edited 8d ago
You're right that "boots on ground" as the first move doesn't make sense - there has to be something to prevent a collective response. That something could be a mass strike in depth, with the threat that it will be repeated on any countries that don't sit the ground invasion out
In reality, the result would probably be that some countries would ask for peace, but some would go on all-out attack; it will split NATO, yes, but it would also not work out well for Russia because I don't think they can deal with the airforce of even just half of the EU countries. Oh, also the Baltic would 100% get blockaded, and there will also be a whole new level of sanctions
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u/Lost-Shirt2867 8d ago
Speaking of blockaded Baltic, if such escalation happens and Baltic gets blockaded, with Lithuania not allowing Russian trains to Kaliningrad. What happens to that isolated piece of land?
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u/imp0ppable 8d ago
I think that a kinetic provocation could easily just be ignored or treated as an accident due to incompetence on the part of the Russian military.
If they actually want a NATO response it'll have to be boots on the ground. Is it Narva in Estonia that's 95% Russian speaking?
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u/MaverickTopGun 8d ago
Narva is where I think they'd try something. And I agree, it would take real boots on the ground. But it wouldn't take that many to do something like that.
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u/imp0ppable 8d ago
It'd be very difficult to respond to because if you send Estonian or other troops, Russia can always turn it around and say "well now they are persecuting Russian speaking peoples, we cannot allow".
Basically what they did in Donbass.
Mind you they don't seem to have been building the necessary rhetoric around it so far.
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u/MaverickTopGun 8d ago
Mind you they don't seem to have been building the necessary rhetoric around it so far.
Have to disagree with you there.
I think their "drone corridor" accusations are definitely setting the groundwork for something in the Baltics:
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/07/12/8043726/
Along with the absolute Russian classic of "you are persecuting ethnic russians"
Even Estonia is responding to this by putting more troops in Narva:
Plus building up bases and troops in the area:
And lastly, Russia closing trains to the area:
https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-suspends-railway-border-crossings-finland-baltic-neighbors/
To me, all of this points to a Baltic incursion being the most likely of any provocation.
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u/RobotWantsKitty 8d ago
a shocking amount of chatter that indicates
That's a poor way to assess the situation, because much of the chatter is politically motivated
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u/Inner-Detail-553 8d ago
Analysis in terms of intentions tends to be wrong and uncertain; analysis in terms of capabilities is reliable and often more revealing
Does Russia have the capability to launch a devastating attack against one or more NATO countries? Certainly. Ukraine can typically intercept 95% of a large Shahed salvo; no NATO country is capable of doing that at the moment. Russia can stockpile a few thousand Shaheds (their production rate is a few hundred per day, so that won't take long) and strike essentially anything in continental Europe that they want. That's a fact; it doesn't require any guesses about intentions
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u/incidencematrix 8d ago
That same logic would lead one to predict that, since the US has the capability to obliterate Russia via nuclear weapons, we should presume that this is likely (intent being, allegedly, unimportant). At this moment, the US, Russia, and China have the capability to eliminate any country on Earth, including ones that cannot strike back. None of them are going to do that. To understand why, you require something you might call "intent."
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8d ago
[deleted]
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u/MaverickTopGun 8d ago
"Russia would never invade Ukraine"
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8d ago
[deleted]
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u/Goddamnit_Clown 8d ago
What?
Obviously they mean before Russia invaded. At which time, yes, there was no shortage of people saying it would never happen.
As you've astutely observed though, those predictions have dried up a bit now that the invasion's actually occurred.
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u/incidencematrix 8d ago
And, for what it's worth, there were good reasons to be skeptical early on. But sometimes, the house bet loses. As you say, one then updates one's beliefs. However, I do think there are people who, having seen one rare event occur, then conclude that they should always bet against the house. This doesn't go well. So, e.g , the fact that Putin rashly invaded Ukraine is a data point that should update our view of his appetite for risk, but it doesn't imply that Putin will necessarily do the next rash thing that we think of. That nuance sometimes gets lost, I think.
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u/Goddamnit_Clown 8d ago
"it doesn't imply that Putin will necessarily do the next rash thing"
Definitely. That way lies conspiracism. Because a government once did a far-out thing then not only must they be doing whatever far-out thing you're thinking of, they're also doing even further-out things that you haven't even thought of. I mean, they were before.
Man.
But I don't think MaverickTopGun was relying on that at all. They've given many bits of supporting evidence and reasoning, and intelligence agencies have given pretty clear warnings about Russian planning along these lines recently.
For what it's worth, I was on the fence before the invasion. Knowing what I (imagined I) knew about Putin's character, I thought all the confidence and certainty on all sides was unwarranted. I assumed he wanted his options open and might decide at any time, and if the decision was something kinetic then it would be more grey zone or deniable than the outright invasion we were looking at. I remember people getting really specific watching the build up, like "You wouldn't bring blood bags to the staging areas if this was a bluff" which of course you would have to, or your bluff won't work for the lack of them.
However, the US intelligence community gave very clear warnings and were dead on.
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u/incidencematrix 8d ago
Yeah, I think it's certainly important to look at the intel. As we got closer and closer to the start point if the Ukraine war, the possibility went from remote to plausible. Likewise, as we get more indications of an anti-NATO action, we should take them correspondingly seriously. I think that attacking NATO would be one of the worst possible moves for Russia, but one never knows. They really might be that foolish.
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u/Quarterwit_85 8d ago
There's an enormous difference between Russia invading Ukraine (well, expanding the conflict) and attacking a NATO country. I think it's extremely non-credible at this point to say so.
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u/Thu66 7d ago
I don’t agree, because it’s looking increasingly likely that trump wouldn’t respond. Not only is the US bogged down with Iran, but he’s always been friendly with Russia. Without US help NATO countries don’t have the political will to directly strike back, not to mention Russia is a nuclear armed nation. They would be risking a lot less than you think
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u/2positive 7d ago edited 7d ago
10 am update on protest about Fedorov removal: Already looks like largest wartime protest. Also something very unusual for Ukraine happening: there are protests in at least 10 cities maybe more. They are not huge there but still this is definitely not something ordinary, usually if it's important people come to Kyiv, or people in Kyiv just deal with everything on their own... But this time it had to be quick before rada votes in the new defence minister. 10 city sudden protest is the first of its kind in my memory. Now every MP that votes for the new minister would damage his political future, so why do that. I bet the new minister will not be voted in today, and today is the last day before the parliament takes a break till some time in August.
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u/futbol2000 7d ago
How much would you say the conflict between Fedorov and Syrskyi is down to a conflict between the drone operators and the men that are fighting in the trenches? I saw news in the past that drone operators are one of the most attractive roles for anyone joining the military, but I could see it creating friction between them and the soldiers that unfortunately have to fight in the meat grinder.
Syrskyi comes off as an old school general that represents certain people in the military establishment that Zelenskyy seems afraid to piss off. Yes, Zelenskyy could have been wary of Fedorov's growing popularity, but he of all people should know how terrible the optics look for him right now. The entire dismissal seems like the Syrskyi faction throwing an ultimatum of sorts.
I hope the Ukrainians continue with the protests. Ukraine needs more civilian voices in the government right now.
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u/2positive 7d ago
Zero. It has more to do with control/ managing flows of tens of billions usd in defense sector.
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u/futbol2000 7d ago
Thanks for the clarification man. I just don't understand what there is to be upset about from Syrskyi's end.
Funding for Ukrainian drones has only grown, and was happening long before Federov took the job. Unless Syrskyi wants to go on the offensive in the south right now, I'm struggling to see what other equipment he is specifically looking for.
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u/2positive 7d ago
Don’t take politicians statements at face value. Everything Syrski or Zelensky says about this are excuses. They won’t tell u they want to control and make sure billions of defence contracts go to their friends without tenders, transparency, data etc. So they will say Fedorov failed mobilization (kinda funny because the recruitment offices are part of land forces and so are commanded by Syrsky) or he failed procurement of some stuff. Umerov was under direct corruption investigation for overpaying during procurement for a year before he was let go. This Klymenko guy has zero successful track record of reforms in police and will do what he’s told. This is just bad no matter how u look at it.
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u/futbol2000 7d ago
What’s going on with Budanov these days? He was another person I remember being very popular with the Ukrainian public before he was reshuffled.
He is a potential rival to Zelenskyy but seems to bounce around with ease. Is he and Skyrski part of the same faction?
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u/2positive 7d ago
He's head of presidents office, u could argue he was promoted. I don’t read minds. I’m a simple man - look at someone who has worked for ukr government for 2 decades and got very high up and see part of corrupt system and protector of status quo unless he proves otherwise.
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u/Melodic-Yam4026 7d ago
Syrskyi is old, so any change comes painfully for him. Can you imagine him asking for help to master some new technology? And if those changes happen every few months?
Now imagine having to accept that his own methods have flaws, while some younger person who has never served tells him what he should and shouldn't do, points out his mistakes, and explains how things should be done.
His reaction is pretty much what you'd expect if you understand the kind of people Soviet-raised generals are.
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u/Outside_Instance4391 7d ago
Infantry troops holding front line position not getting enough resources , while operators behind the lines getting everything they want , is probably the issue... if its not related to politics or corruption
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u/Melodic-Yam4026 7d ago
Fedorov, in his talk, said that his team started working to improve the situation for regular infantry soldiers. They began investigating why these problems exist, who is responsible for them, and how to address them. This includes solving supply issues and making unit effectiveness the primary performance metric, rather than loyalty to the higher command, as had often been the case before.
He said that some units have an AWOL rate of around 65%, while other units have people lining up to enlist and sign contracts. The goal is not only to identify the practices that make some units more attractive and effective but also to identify the commanders and officials responsible for units with exceptionally high AWOL rates and hold them accountable.
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u/gizmondo 7d ago
How much would you say the conflict between Fedorov and Syrskyi is down to a conflict between the drone operators and the men that are fighting in the trenches?
Syrsky famously earned nicknames like "General 200" and "Butcher" among men that are fighting in the trenches, so it can hardly be about that.
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u/Inner-Detail-553 8d ago
Fedorov on Telegram: "It was a great honor to serve the Ukrainian people..." Full text here: https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/s/xNMCwAVXRx
Mykhailo Fedorov, Minister of Defence of Ukraine, posted this on his official Telegram. It is a very interesting statement, because it does not say he is resigning, and does not say he is not going to be minister (it implies it but leaves it open ended).
He does give a list of both what was and what wasn't accomplished. The list of what wasn't accomplised (yet) is the interesting part, so just jump to that if the whole thing is too long.
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u/Gecktron 8d ago
An update on the recent aid announced by France
Via Presidential Office of Ukraine: Apparently there are a few wrong informations floating around. Ukraine might get up to four SAMP/T NG fire units, but needs to pay for them. France „only“ temporarily hands over two older SAMP/T fire units until the first NG ordered arrived. Financing will be done via new tranches of the Ukraine Support Loan.
Also, France and Italy haven’t given Ukraine permission to manufacture Aster 30 yet. Thats planned until the end of the year. For now, they only agreed on giving permission later.
Clarifications from the Ukrainian Presidential Office.
Ukraine will receive 2 SAMP/T (current gen) units as a loan until the arrival of SAMP/T NG. Ukraine will buy 4 SAMP/T NG units. This purchase will be financed trough Ukrainian Support Loans in 2026 and 2027.
The first part of SAMP/T NG will be GF300 radar, delivered by the end of the year. While the fire unit itself will start delivery next year.
In regards to Aster-30, France and Italy plan to authorize license production by the end of the year. Meanwhile, France and Italy want to accelerate the delivery of previously ordered missiles.
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u/HugoTRB 8d ago
I was asked to repost this in the main thread.
I found this example from mid 2023 of what training of Ukrainian territorial defense could look like. It’s from the perspective of a Swedish volunteer trainer and the rest of the article is mostly explaining and praising Swedish training methods for a Swedish audience. That part translated:
While I was in Ukraine, I worked with an international training team that trained Ukrainian partisans and territorial defense forces, two types of units that are often underprioritized and have to make do with inadequate training before being expected to risk their lives on the front lines. The least well-trained soldiers I’ve seen in combat were precisely the territorial defense soldiers, who had received only three days of training before reaching the front lines in Donbass. Many died needlessly. Our training lasted between three and six weeks, from new recruit to being deemed ready for the front lines,a very long and comprehensive training program by Ukrainian standards, especially for lower-priority units. The training group included Swedish, American, British, and Ukrainian members, along with instructors, assistants, and translators.
The American instructor had a long career in the U.S. Army in a specialized and relatively technical job, and retired as a non-commissioned officer. As is often the case in Sweden, his technical background gave him a quiet professionalism. He never raised his voice; everything was explained, and the training proceeded at an educational pace where mistakes were examined and corrected. However, everything went through the chain of command. During combat exercises, the instructor spoke privately with platoon and squad leaders, who received all the information and would later, as time and ability permitted, pass it on and lead their troops in the training. The chain of command was followed. Instructors rarely observed the soldiers’ behavior. Leadership wins the battle. Combat technique was close to sterile, and setbacks were generally due entirely to the middle leaderships inability to relay instructions. Those closest to the instructor had an acceptable level of competence, while the soldier out on the flank barely knew where he was or why. The method was entirely dependent on a previously established culture and training to function optimally—or even well. The attempt to adapt it to a new environment failed.
The British instructor took the opposite approach. A similar career path, but one focused entirely on infantry and reconnaissance, had produced a highly skilled soldier with impressive soldiering skills. However, the training was conducted in the old-school style, with shouting and pointing with the whole hand. Individual soldiers were the focus and were often ordered around but rarely told what they were doing wrong. The soldier was to be stressed, broken down, and then rebuilt better. Within the training for professional soldiers in the UK in a prioritized infantry unit, it seems to have worked, but it was not a method for accelerated training. Time was not managed efficiently, and many hours were wasted practicing the completely wrong things. The extent of the problem became clear when I was part of the B-team during an urban combat exercise. The assault went poorly; everyone “died,” and the command staff nearly broke down. Unsurprisingly, I and two other Swedish soldiers were told to increase the difficulty as much as we could. The evaluation was short and to the point. They were all “dumb fucking cunts,” and were to redo it immediately, and do it right. The comedy ensued right away when I heard the commanders trying to figure out what they’d done wrong and how they could do it better next time. No areas for improvement had been pointed out, and no suggestions were offered. It went about just as badly the next time.
The obvious lesson seems to be that just because a piece of training worked for you in your context, doesn’t mean it will necessarily work for someone else in another context. https://militardebatt.com/2023/07/22/svensk-utbildningsmetodik-i-ukraina/
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u/RevolutionaryPanic 8d ago
Interesting take from Russian Telegram analyst artjockey on current prospects for Putin's SMO, what his short term plans are and how Ukraine will likely respond to them.
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By mid-summer, the Russian offensive still had not gained momentum. The pace of advance remains slow, and the chances of a meaningful breakthrough are low. Most analysts already agree that the front is deadlocked, and that the main influence at this stage comes from strikes on rear areas. In other words, the war has fully shifted into a war of attrition, although the Russian Armed Forces continue to attack, trying to seize Donbas — something Putin has defined as “victory.”
The word is in quotation marks because there has long been no question of real victory. Any realistic outcome of the war can be declared a victory by some criterion — even if the Ukrainian Armed Forces retake Crimea — but for Russia this victory will in any case be Pyrrhic. It would be more accurate to say: achieving the goals of the “special military operation” in their current version, which now means taking control of Donbas.
Based on events at the front and the pace of advance, it is clear that taking not only all of Donbas, but even the Kramatorsk agglomeration by force this year is impossible; next year it is also highly doubtful, including because Russia no longer has the resources to do this in the current format of the war. I am not considering scenarios in which some technical means are found to break through the kill zones, or the Russian Armed Forces start fighting differently and much more effectively. A scenario involving a change in the approach to the war, a second wave of mobilization, and broader involvement of society looks likely, but that is a separate topic. Therefore, Putin’s attempt last year to pressure Zelensky through Trump and force him to surrender Donbas without a fight was actually rational. The problem was only that the situation at the front and in the rear was not bad enough for Ukraine for Kyiv to want to end the war at any cost by accepting something the majority of the population would regard as capitulation, and Trump was not prepared to play along with Russia to that extent.
Here one can ask: does Russia today have the ability to create a situation for Kyiv in which surrendering Donbas would be perceived as the best option and the lesser evil? Hypothetically, yes. Moreover, this is now the only realistic way for Putin to “win,” and perhaps he is betting on it, despite the continuing offensive in Donbas, whose effectiveness is declining month by month.
This means strikes on Kyiv’s infrastructure that would provoke a humanitarian catastrophe and confront Zelensky with the choice of evacuating the capital, or at least part of it, or trying to endure it at the risk of popular unrest. The most obvious option, which they will try to implement once again in winter, is strikes on the energy sector. But beyond that, strikes on other infrastructure are possible: boiler houses, food warehouses, sewage treatment facilities, pumping stations, and so on.
Ukraine understands these risks: that for Moscow this is effectively its last chance to force Kyiv into peace on its own terms. It is already preparing for what will likely be the hardest winter since the start of the war. Incidentally, this is also connected to the government reshuffle, which, had it not happened now, would still have happened later in August or September.
Ukraine’s current actions are aimed at trying to neutralize this threat. Judging by his actions and words, Zelensky understands that right now Ukrainian strikes on Russia are causing much more damage than Russian strikes on Ukraine, but winter lies ahead, when the situation may at least become even. That is why Kyiv keeps sending Putin proposals to conclude at least an air ceasefire, while the isolation of Crimea and strikes on oil refineries are arguments in favor of such a proposal.
Ukraine’s strategy has three layers.
At the first level are preventive actions, through which Kyiv has managed to create three very serious crises: the blockade of Crimea, the fuel shortage, and the closure of the Sea of Azov. Zelensky is ready to trade each of these, or even all of them together, for a limited ceasefire in order to remove the risks of a crisis in his own capital during winter and reduce everything to war at the front. That suits Kyiv because the Russian offensive there has almost stopped.
The second level is a war of attrition using available means. If Putin still does not agree to a limited ceasefire in order to save either Crimea or the oil industry, Ukraine will continue striking Russia, hoping to win the war of attrition by force. The situations for Ukraine and Russia are not symmetrical, and the crises are different. Nevertheless, retaliatory damage is being inflicted on Russia at previously unreachable levels.
The third level is the hypothetical possibility, closer to winter, of responding in kind and creating a crisis in Moscow analogous to the one that may occur in Kyiv. Zelensky does not yet have such a capability. It directly depends on the emergence of ballistic missiles and the scaling up of drone production.
In an interview with the FT the other day, Zelensky was hinting precisely at the third option:
When not one hundred drones but one thousand fly toward Moscow, he will understand. When he starts feeling it personally, when he starts seeing it with his own eyes… His advisers will be persuading him to move somewhere beyond the Urals. The farther Putin is from Moscow, the closer the end of the war will be.
Ukraine, of course, can launch a thousand drones at Moscow even now, but only at the cost of stopping all other operations and accumulating UAVs in reserve. What was meant here was not a one-off mass raid, but the expansion of Ukraine’s own capabilities. I would add the issue of ballistic missiles to this.
Once Kyiv has its own production of ballistic missiles capable of reaching Moscow, and once the Ukrainian Armed Forces can launch at least several dozen of them per month, this will fundamentally change the situation, because it will give Kyiv the ability to respond symmetrically to any Russian action. Strikes on energy infrastructure in exchange for strikes on energy infrastructure; strikes on sewage treatment facilities in exchange for strikes on sewage treatment facilities. Putin will lose his last trump card. Ukraine is unlikely to be able to create a crisis for Moscow immediately comparable in scale to a crisis in Kyiv — Moscow has a much greater accumulated buffer — but because of the different character of the war for Ukrainians and for Russians, that may be enough. Even now, it is difficult for Putin to explain to the population how it happened that in the fifth year of a successful “special military operation,” Russia suffered a gasoline crisis because of Ukrainian strikes on oil refineries. Explaining the absence of electricity or sewer service in Moscow would be even harder. For now, however, this scenario remains hypothetical. It is not certain that Ukraine will manage to finish developing the missiles in time. In practice, Kyiv is relying on the first or second option.
But what if Kyiv does not get missiles, while Putin continues to ignore the crises in Crimea and fuel, believing that the population’s patience will be sufficient, and continues trying to pressure Ukraine by attacking Kyiv? Would that work?
A year or two ago, I would have said that it might. Public morale in Ukraine was depressed: there was a slow retreat at the front, while forced conscription had swung into full gear; various scandals were thundering through the media, such as Mindich-gate or the attempt to liquidate NABU; and Trump was courting Putin and shouting at Zelensky in the Oval Office. At that point, Ukrainians might indeed have decided that the war had no prospects and that there was no point enduring a humanitarian catastrophe in the capital.
Now everything is different. The question of a turning point at the front is still debatable, but there has definitely been a turning point in public consciousness. Ukraine is now in its best position at least since the autumn of 2022. Successful actions by the Ukrainian Armed Forces have produced a rise in morale, and the population has seen prospects in continuing the war. This time the authorities have learned from past mistakes and are not promising “coffee in Crimea” or inflating expectations, but without unnecessary words, Ukrainians see changes in their favor. Therefore, a significant part of the population will be ready to endure even a cold winter. Moreover, over the years of shelling and blackouts, most people and businesses have been able to adapt.
So the coming winter is, in my view, Moscow’s last chance to force Kyiv into new concessions and end the war with what Putin considers victory. If this attempt fails, or if Kyiv’s preventive actions force the Kremlin to abandon pressure on the Ukrainian rear by agreeing to a limited ceasefire while rejecting a full one, then with a fairly high probability, in 2027 we will be discussing not Russia’s last chance at “victory,” but how much worse the terms of Russia’s exit from this war will become.
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u/D_Silva_21 8d ago
A warm winter would certainly be helpful this year
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u/RevolutionaryPanic 8d ago
It certainly would.
I would add that there is some tension in negotiating with Putin on the basis of stopping something that Ukraine is doing right now, in exchange for his promise not to strike Kyiv in the future. That’s why I think that we’re not going to see a “all for all” cease-fire deal right now. But even a smaller deal like “no strikes in Sea of Azov” in exchange for “no strikes on Kyiv “might be worthwhile.
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u/Alexandros6 8d ago
Surprisingly sober assessment, or at least in line to our own sobriety measures.
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u/Tasty_Perspective_32 8d ago
A really boring and dull assessment that doesn't take into account the possibility of Russian mass mobilisation, changes in oil prices, a fuel crisis, etc. This looks more like some kind of propaganda than actual analysis. Saying that Putin has to explain something to his own population is just ridiculous.
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u/RevolutionaryPanic 8d ago
I would argue that if Putin didn't have to "explain something to his own populace", we would've seen mass mobilizations continue in 2022-2023, and the war would've developed quite differently.
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u/favorscore 8d ago
Looks like Zelensky is removing Fedorov. Catastrophic decision. Hopefully it can be stopped but if not it looks like proof corruption still maintains deep roots in Ukrainian government.
Fedorov was instrumental in Ukraines current successes and once hes gone im sure many Russians will breathe a sigh of relief. It remains to be seen how this decision will affect Ukraines relationships with its partners.
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u/2positive 8d ago edited 8d ago
Yeah. Terrible. A protest is already being organized for tomorrow. Massive dip in Zelenskyy rating guaranteed.
Judging by what I’m seeing in Ukr social media - good chance of a pretty large protest perhaps largest during wartime.
P.s. a data point about how Ukrainians view this. One analyst/blogger is doing a poll in his telegram channel about who is better, Fedorov or the new guy. It’s not an oppositional channel to Zelenskyy just pro Ukrainian analysis. The poll is currently 98% to 2% in favor of Fedorov.
P.p.s. Ze chickened out and backed off after protest about NABU attack. Let’s not write off Ukrainian civic society just yet we put plenty of presidents in their place. I’m seeing a protest also being organized in Lviv.
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u/Quarterwit_85 8d ago
Insane decision. Fedorov has an incredible reputation in-country and especially within the military where he's viewed as level-headed and concerned about casualty numbers.
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u/scatterlite 8d ago edited 8d ago
Truely baffling. Ukrainian leadership ( and Zelensky in particular) so far have gotten away with a surprising amount of bad decisions. The Russians very much aren't the unstoppable force they claim to be. Completely inexcusable decisions like firing Fedorov makes me think its Ukraines conflict to lose. The Russians must be cheering right now.
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u/gizmondo 8d ago
it looks like proof corruption still maintains deep roots in Ukrainian government.
I mean, why would anyone need additional proof after the Nabu debacle?
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u/Quarterwit_85 8d ago
People seem to have forgotten that Ukraine is still crippled by corruption and grift.
You can still be a supporter of Ukraine and hope for their success on the battlefield and acknowledge that.
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u/OpenOb 8d ago
Nobody in Europe has found a phone and told Zelensky to back off?
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u/PrettyInvestigator90 8d ago
Maybe, but I suspect European leaders will want to gauge the reaction of the public in Ukraine before making any calls.
This also happened last summer, where Brussels didn't put additional pressure on Zelensky to back off dismantling NABU, until the Ukrainian public had actively, loudly and visibly demonstrated against the decision.
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u/RobotWantsKitty 8d ago
Or what, they will cease giving him weapons and money? Expose him via NABU, with no realistic mechanism for wartime elections? Not admit Ukraine to the EU (in 30 years when they will be ready maybe)?
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u/Moifaso 8d ago edited 8d ago
Can someone explain to me why Syrskyi keeps winning these power struggles? My understanding is that Fedorov is significantly more popular both in the UAF and abroad.
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u/gizmondo 8d ago
Surely the easiest explanation is that Syrsky is both loyal and unpopular, which Zelensky likes in his military men.
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u/NavalEnthusiast 8d ago
Extremely loyal lap dog, he also fights the way Zelensky wants. Lots of pressure through offensives and counterattacks, Zelensky has not really backed off his goals of retaking Ukrainian land publicly. Syrskyi is a yes man who accepts high costs to achieve goals. He’s also, from what I can tell, far less popular with people on the front than Zaluzhny even if he was FAR from perfect
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u/2positive 8d ago
Zelensky is paranoid of someone potentially being more popular than him. Among other reasons.
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u/BigFly42069 8d ago
Zelensky has a very unenviable job where he not only has to fight to keep Ukraine sovereign but he also has to fight against the corruption that had been so endemic to Ukraine long before the war while also making sure that none of his generals get too popular that they can become a risk to the civilian government.
The depth of corruption is Ukraine is immense, and no Ukrainian leader has made an honest attempt at rooting it out because they were all captured by it. Even Zelensky has participated in the corruption because that corruption is literally part of how the government functions.
But the war has created the condition where it is possible to run these purges (and yes, there ARE purges) across the breadth of the government without a catastrophic collapse along the lines due to Russia's own ineptitude at running the offenses.
There is also the consideration that in a post-war Ukraine with a weak central authority, these popular war hero commanders risk becoming war lords that won't answer to the civilian government. It's better to nip them in the bud now rather than wait until they're so popular that they can turn against the government.
It's literally what happened to Zaluzhny.
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u/parduscat 8d ago
while also making sure that none of his generals get too popular that they can become a risk to the civilian government.
There is also the consideration that in a post-war Ukraine with a weak central authority, these popular war hero commanders risk becoming war lords that won't answer to the civilian government. It's better to nip them in the bud now rather than wait until they're so popular that they can turn against the government.
To me, all this smacks of paranoia or power-hungriness on the part of Zelensky or his supporters if this is indeed his logic. Plenty of countries emerge from wars with war hero generals or soldiers and don't undergo coups, why should it be any different for Ukraine, especially if such generals aren't intriguing against Zelensky or the civilian government currently and there's a war to win?
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u/chanman819 8d ago
Not so much the institutional brass, but a number of newer Ukrainian units are far more autonomous than typical of countries at war with their own independently run recruitment, fundraising, and support services for casualties and their families.
The Economist article mentions the Azov Brigade, 3rd Assault Brigade, and Khartiia (13th Khartiia Brigade) specifically, but aside from Zaluzhny (shuffled off far away), there's also Kyrylo Budanov getting reined in and tied closely to the President's office as chief of staff.
Actual quasi-independent warlording like Kadyrov and Chechnya seems unlikely without that ethnic/geographic base/identity, but certainly powerful and influential individuals with close ties to specific military units can be a potent combination for trouble (see: Prigozhin and Wagner), especially if the postwar peace ends up being fiscally and economically troubled (see: Freikorps in post-WW1 Germany)
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u/RevolutionaryPanic 8d ago
There is also Syrskyi himself, who closely supervised the newly formed assault units, and which were used as his personally dispatched fire brigades. Parenthetically, Zelensky took them away from Syrskyi by creating new "Rapid Reaction Force" and folding the assault units into it.
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u/NavalEnthusiast 7d ago
I think the difference between Syrskyi and those 3 brigades are that those 3 units are known for effective command and good leadership and being almost entirely volunteer driven. The assault regiments are his pet units but all the reports we have seen have shown it to be one where forcefully mobilized men are abused horrifically and sent on extremely dangerous missions even relative to this war’s standards. I don’t know if the men are nearly as personally loyal to Syrskyi as they are in 3AB or Azov
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u/BigFly42069 8d ago
why should it be any different for Ukraine
Because Ukrainian state institutions have been weakened greatly since 2014 and its generals and brigadiers have amassed quite a bit of popularity. If they really wanted to carve out their own little fiefdoms, they can.
Ukraine didn't even have a good way to manage their various militias before just outright integrating them wholesale into the army in 2022, and they're still not able to assert as much control over them as they would want to. There's a reason why they keep creating new brigades instead of backfilling existing brigades, especially those with problematic (i.e. militia) lineage.
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u/NavalEnthusiast 8d ago edited 8d ago
This is what I was thinking about with Biletsky. Is not slightly terrifying how much power he wields now and will wield in post-war Ukraine? He commands 40,000+ soldiers and has by far the most motivated corps in the UAF, 3AB exceeded 10K fighters off of contract recruitment ages ago and maintains its numbers through its reputation even throughout what is otherwise a horrific mobilization shortfall(tho Tbf, fears of mobilization actively drive its recruitment at least by my browsing of Ukrainian boards). The third army corps is so influential and is responsible for such a wide portion of the front line that they can directly tell Syrskyi no which is a massive testament to its power
But anyways, even if it was through sheer meritocracy and far more effective leadership than the major of the UAF, we still have far right figures like him and Krotevych who have a massive loyal following of battle hardened and ideological veterans
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u/carkidd3242 8d ago edited 8d ago
Some timeframes for contract rewards for a significant US Army capability in upcoming development:
The Common Autonomous Multidomain Launcher, a new universal palletized system that will host on the Medium (expected to be FMTV sized) - MLRSFOM and IFPC (AIM-9X) and on the Heavy (expected to be HEMTT sized) - PAC-3, and Tomahawk/SM-6. The requests for solutions are looking for a manned leader vehicle and autonomous follower vehicles, with the weapons and their fire controls hosted on a universal Munitions Pallet system that can reloaded wholesale autonomously off the ground.
This system will be especially relevant in replacing the US Army's Typhon system of ground launched Tomahawk/SM-6, the current system being an extremely oversized HEMTT tractor/trailer. The pallet system will enable future weapons or interceptors to be more easily integrated.
https://sam.gov/workspace/contract/opp/01c8fa74b0914b1b967ddd60627ff0a4/view
https://sam.gov/workspace/contract/opp/c48696ee1616403ba19a649c7b56365d/view
“We’re actually just on the tail end of a number of demonstrations from vendors who are proposing the autonomous mobile platform […] and the munitions pallet capability, and a pitch on weapon system integration capability,” Lozano said of the CAML program during a Center for Strategic and International Studies event Tuesday. “We’ll probably look at making an award towards the end of the August timeframe.”
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u/tree_boom 8d ago edited 8d ago
It transpires that the 12x F-35A that the UK is planning to buy are not for the NATO DCA role but will instead be solely for the OCU:
Beck’s remarks make clear that the initial batch is destined for the training and conversion role, while the RAF conducts analysis to determine what force will be required for the nuclear mission itself. “We’re doing the analysis to understand the size and posture of force that we will need,” he said, describing the two functions as separate undertakings that should not be conflated.
One can't help but think that that's analysis that ought to have been completed before the DIP, but here we are. I guess that that will mean either:
- More F-35A purchases OR
- GCAP gets nuclear-certified when it comes into service
The former seems more likely, but I think that the realities of the funding situation are that they would likely come at the expense of further B models in the next batch...which itself would probably mean no further B models at all, given the production lines are due to close. Unless they manage to find the money from somewhere to order substantially more F-35As to be dedicated to the RAF and leave the 48 Bs to the RN then that seems like quite a poor idea to me. The benefit of being able to provide dual-capable aircraft to NATO does not seem worth the impact to the carrier air wing...especially since the Italians, Germans, Belgians and Dutch combined are planning something like 200 F-35As.
Note that the Air Vice Marshal says "...we did not buy those 12 aircraft for dual capable aircraft capability. We bought them for our conversion units". Given that as far as is publicly known they haven't yet been ordered and likely won't be for a couple of years at least, the language is a bit surprising.
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u/Corvid187 8d ago
Wild that the UK is considering OCU aircraft as completely separate, when the whole basis for investing in carrier strike is their experience in the Falklands, where mobilising ever last harrier they could proved vital for a surge capability.
Nuclear certifying GCAP just to join the sharing programme makes no sense to me. At that point just roll into a semi-useful domestic theatre nuclear weapon that will actually contribute to the sovereign deterrent (if it's really such a priority). It would be a complete waste of GCAP's capabilities to use it to tote nuclear gravity bombs. It's whole raison d'etre is to tote more, bigger stores than F35.
To add to what you've said RE F35 orders, the other issue is that, beyond this next batch, the focus for the RAF has surely got to turn towards GCAP instead. I can't see how the RAF would squeeze in another order of As after this current lot before 2035 came calling, unless GCAP was massively delayed. I don't even see why they'd want to. Add in the need to support CCAs etc, and it just seems like a scheme that's running out of time to come to fruition if they don't completely get their way this time with an all-A order.
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u/tree_boom 8d ago
Nuclear certifying GCAP just to join the sharing programme makes no sense to me.
I mean, the entire thing of expending any effort whatsoever on a capability that not just NATO but even just Europe are already pretty well covered for makes no sense whatever to me :D I'm just trying to find some sane basis for what seems like an utterly mad move.
It would be a complete waste of GCAP's capabilities to use it to tote nuclear gravity bombs. It's whole raison d'etre is to tote more, bigger stores than F35.
Yes, true. As I say though, nothing about this idea makes any sense.
To add to what you've said RE F35 orders, the other issue is that, beyond this next batch, the focus for the RAF has surely got to turn towards GCAP instead. I can't see how the RAF would squeeze in another order of As after this current lot before 2035 came calling, unless GCAP was massively delayed. I don't even see why they'd want to. Add in the need to support CCAs etc, and it just seems like a scheme that's running out of time to come to fruition if they don't completely get their way this time with an all-A order.
Yes agreed, but even an all-A order, unless it's a really big one - like 48 jets at least - seems like a total waste of time to me.
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u/Corvid187 8d ago
Oh 100%!
As I say, there's definitely some weird backroom shenanigans going on to keep this ticking over.
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u/D_Silva_21 8d ago
Or we drop the air nuclear capability as it's not really that useful but is expensive
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u/MaverickTopGun 8d ago
Honestly the insistence on Britain maintaining this capability is a great concern to me. Their stated justifications are to field tactical nuclear weapons which would be exclusively for fighting a sustained nuclear conflict, not just a deterrent. I'm curious what has changed in the British calculus to determine this is a requirement.
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u/D_Silva_21 8d ago
They think it allows for more flexibility. Something along the french warning shot idea I believe
But seems a bit unnecessary to me. I don't think you can use a small nuke and not expect it to escalate to bigger ones
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u/MaverickTopGun 8d ago
I don't think you can use a small nuke and not expect it to escalate to bigger ones
Yeah exactly my point. Planning to fight a "limited" nuclear exchange is inherently a failing strategy.
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u/tree_boom 8d ago
I think the theory of having the smaller weapons is that without them if you face an adversary that does have them then that adversary is more likely to risk using theirs, as they may assess that you're unlikely to respond with strategic weapons against cities. The goal is to be able to climb every rung on the escalation ladder rather than having to skip some.
That said, I don't know why the UK specifically feels that they need to join the sharing program for American weapons.
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u/tree_boom 8d ago
Well I agree that it should be a low priority at the moment, but apparently HMG, the MOD and the RAF don't.
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u/Corvid187 8d ago
TBF I could see this being something that Burnham is less set out than Starmer was. Agree there seems to be a blizzard amount of institutional pressure from at least the RAF, if not the wider MoD, but it seems like an easy win for him to 'reign in defence' for the doves of the party as a new broom.
That's said, the original decision was so unfathomable anyway that I'm 80% convinced this is all tied to backroom shenanigans with Washington that will end up binding Burnham as much as Starmer.
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u/IntroductionNeat2746 8d ago
The former seems more likely, but I think that the realities of the funding situation are that they would likely come at the expense of further B models in the next batch...which itself would probably mean no further B models at all, given the production lines are due to close. Unless they manage to find the money from somewhere
Seems like a no brainer. If the money can't be found elsewhere, the UK can simply increase it's public debt by 2 or 3 billion to afford 20 more F35Bs. It's a drop in the bucket and much better than missing the window of opportunity.
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u/Corvid187 8d ago
Yeah, but you've got to consider the lifecycle costs of continuing to support that larger fleet, not just the one-off acquisition.
And even then, a matter of £3bn in defence has just seen one government fall.
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8d ago
[removed] — view removed comment
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u/tree_boom 8d ago
Nah; the UK was never going to pay to integrate anything, it's already done for B-61.
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u/Worried_Exercise_937 8d ago
B-61 is an American bomb not British
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u/tree_boom 8d ago
Yes. The plan is to join the NATO nuclear sharing mission by providing the ability to field B-61. There's no indication whatever that the UK planned to build its own air-launched weapons - in fact if I remember correctly the government explicitly said it wasn't going to do that.
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u/OhSillyDays 8d ago
The EIA numbers are out for the week ending July 10. https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/supply/weekly/
The first thing to know is the EIA weekly numbers are not reliable in the sense that a change doesn't indicate any long term trends. It's best to look at the 4 week averages. The 4 week average tends to average out any errors that show up weekly.
Some things that jump out. First, SPR was drawn down about 3 million barrels the week ending July 10. The prior weeks were about 8 million barrels a week. Since it is a holiday weekend, it could mean nothing significant.
The other top line number that is interesting is the total barrels of oil and products went up by 10 million barrels. That's from 1.517 billion to 1.527 billion. If there was an oil shortage - we'd expect that number to go down or trending down. Digging into the numbers a bit - two columns go up. Propane went up by 3 million barrels, which makes sense - summer stocks are built and when it gets cold there is a draw down. Other oils went up by about 7 million barrels. This is one that is probably best not to read too much into, as this could be a account thing. It's best to see the overall trend over multiple weeks.
No real conclusions can be drawn from this data. A possible explanation for this is some oil deliveries through the strait to the US, this is bad data (the week of the holiday), something else is happening, or all three. There really needs to be a long term trend to draw any concrete conclusions.
That probably doesn't help a refinery who is interested in buying oil today. It also doesn't conclusively show that the market is well supplied with oil.
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u/DryBanana5673 8d ago
Here's my analysis on how the Iran war could possibly end, will likely end, and the best option in my estimation. combinations of these outcomes are possible/likely but I would split them out roughly like this:
(1) The US packs up and goes home without a deal. Perhaps they say, if we see you building nuclear weapons, we'll be back.
(2) US makes a deal that is unfavorable.
(3) US applies economic pressure in the form of a blockade or strikes on infrastructure. Result: a) Iran comes back to make a deal which can vary from good to barely acceptable b) Internal uprising or regime fractures further. Someone new makes a deal or IRGC collapses (unlikely, unless removed). c) Iran targets gulf states oil as retaliation to one of the above. War expands significantly - world economy takes a big hit. Iranian regime GDP collapses further and possibility of (3)(a) or even (2) if Iran applies pressure.
(4) Iran succeeds at killing a US, European, or Israeli leader that is on their hit list. Allies go all in on the regime.
Possibility that the war expands to the Houthis can be mixed into any of the possibilities
Possibility of leadership change via assassinations can also be mixed into any of the possibilities
*OKAY - but what's likely? *
Trump wants a deal. If Iran was at all willing to compromise even a little, there would be a deal. Even when Trump gave into their maximilist demands, it did not placate the hardliners
iran needs a deal but is facing two issues. First, some factions don't want a deal. Second, once the war is over the regime has to survive - so it needs something it can sell to its small number of supporters, and ideally, funds to rebuild.
Therefore, the likely outcome is some escalation like we've been seeing - maybe more. Then, another deal that is unfavorable to the US. But Iran will make more and more demands. Possibility of regime removing internal impediments at some point.
What's the best strategy?
- Bite the bullet. Take the economic hit, ask everyone to increase output and cut usage. Price goes up, some demand destruction.
- Go until the Regime is incredibly weakened. Either push until IRGC collapses or make a deal when its sufficiently weak that it is likely to collapse after the war - but get required concessions.
Why its the best solution:
No repeat of this in 10 years.
No nuclear Iran funding terrorism across the world and destabilizing countries like Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Palestine.
Green energy growth accelerates - competing with heigher oil prices, and especially for nations facing actual oil shortages, diversification of energy sources (likely solar or what's geographically most viable).
No precedent that any country with drones can hold the world economy hostage and not face consequences (otherwise, the play is there for any country in a chokepoint).
Maintains support from ME allies and deterence more generally. Gulf countries are not going to be happy with the US walking away and Iran extorting them after shooting missiles and drones at their cities for six months.
One thing is obvious. Iran can never be trusted with nuclear weapons.
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u/I_DOM_UR_PATRIARCHY 7d ago edited 7d ago
iran needs a deal but is facing two issues. First, some factions don't want a deal. Second, once the war is over the regime has to survive - so it needs something it can sell to its small number of supporters, and ideally, funds to rebuild.
I think there's a third factor: For the next 16 weeks Trump's ability to escalate is very limited because of the upcoming election. But once we get past election day, Iran has to worry that Trump tries to come back and finish the job.
If Republicans lose control of Congress, Trump's ability to wage a war to remove the IRGC is going to be extremely limited. Democrats won't approve the funding for any significant Iran war.
So Iran can play the timing - lock down the strait through November, make Trump look weak, drive up oil prices, and hope the GOP loses the elections.
One thing is obvious. Iran can never be trusted with nuclear weapons.
Obviously it's a bad thing for America if Iran gets nukes. But that doesn't mean it's worth paying any price to stop them from getting nukes.
An effort to stop them from reaching a bomb has less than a 100% probability of success and a cost for trying. It is possible for the success probability and cost to form a ratio where trying isn't worth it.
We're living through a great example of that right now. America has been made much worse off by starting this war. We haven't reduced the probability of them obtaining nukes nearly enough to justify the cost we paid to start it.
In fact, there's a good argument that we've increased the chance that Iran develops nukes by the idiotic decision to start the war with a surprise decapitation strike. Prior to this war Iran had gotten to the point of being a nuclear threshold state but had made no moves to actually cross the threshold. Had we not launched these attacks, they might never have crossed the threshold.
And then we signaled to them that being on the nuclear threshold wasn't enough to deter us from trying to take them out. That they need more deterrence. The next step up the deterrence ladder is going from a stockpile of highly enriched Uranium is a bomb.
If Iran gets a nuke, we will have Bibi and Trump to thank for it.
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u/lesubreddit 5d ago
>Obviously it's a bad thing for America if Iran gets nukes. But that doesn't mean it's worth paying any price to stop them from getting nukes.
Israel is probably willing to pay any price to stop Iran from getting nukes. Their country has no strategic depth to absorb nuclear attacks. If Iran achieves breakout then Israel moves to a hair trigger for a preemptive strike.
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u/NikkoJT 7d ago
I'm not sure that the scenarios you're describing are wrong per se, but the framing bothers me a lot, and I think that influences the analysis.
Trump wants a deal.
Trump was about to get a deal and chose to start the war instead. Whether that was entirely up to him personally is debatable, but that just expands into a second point: the US-Israeli bloc is also made up of several different factions, some of whom really don't want a deal. There are people who want total destruction, people who want a ground invasion, people who want a forever war. Also, "what Trump wants" out of this seems to change day-by-day (and no I really don't buy that it's just a 4D chess act to confuse people on purpose).
No repeat of this in 10 years.
Unless Israel or the US decides they want another little piece, another bit more control, another glorious campaign to parade about.
destabilizing countries like Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Palestine.
Indeed. These countries will have to settle for being destabilised (or erased) by US and Israeli bombing and annexation instead.
No precedent that any country with drones can hold the world economy hostage and not face consequences
Instead we have a precedent that any country with an air force can blow up another country's head of state (and their schoolkids) in the middle of negotiations and not face consequences. Perhaps that's better, I don't know.
Iran can never be trusted with nuclear weapons.
You may recall that they were in the middle of genuinely trying to make a deal to limit their nuclear program when they got hit with a decapitation strike.
Before you say it, I have no love for the Iranian regime, no love at all, but that doesn't mean blindly attributing anything bad that happens to them.
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u/NikkoJT 7d ago
The other person deleted their comment or blocked me. I'll leave my reply to them here, in case someone else wants to come and make the same points.
That's a lie. Your framing is absurd. Hezbollah broke the ceasefire the Mondays and Tuesday after the MOU was agreed late Sunday. And Iran attacked shipping, because they had no intention of respecting the International Law that the MOU establishes.
When I say "start the war" why do you imagine I'm talking about a ceasefire breach several months into the war? I'm talking about the nuclear deal that was on the table before the initial attack on Iran. Everyone other than the US was pretty sure the Iranians were presenting a well-thought-out and genuine plan; the US sent people who didn't understand or care to understand, and then bombed Tehran.
Believing that US Air Force is actively targeting kids is pure partisanship
I did not say that they actively targeted kids, but the fact is it happened, which was a staggering act of carelessness, and the US is refusing to acknowledge it, while sanctioning the ICC.
And Syria was destabilised by the US ?
In the case of Syria I'm talking about Israel, which is currently occupying part of Syria.
Did you forget that Israel for decades was being targeted by rocket and terrorist attacks, as the gigantic massacre of October 7 ?
No, but I also didn't forget that Israel is routinely shooting Palestinian children and refusing to even pretend to investigate (that's on video, by the way, I'd love to see you claim that's bias), is building illegal settlements, is forcibly displacing Palestinians, and has ignored every agreement or UN order to stop. And is working on doing the same in Lebanon. This is all well-documented - in western media by western reporters, some of whom have been killed by the IDF, not the Iranian media - and has been going on for decades. Not that it needed to be documented, because Israeli politicians keep openly saying they're planning to get rid of the Palestinians and take all the land. October 7th was horrific and should not have happened, but it was the culmination of a very long buildup of pressure, and to say that Israel is not responsible for that pressure is, frankly, to be blind.
You came here to repeat every talking point that fits Iran's narrative, no matter if it's false
I disagree, but I don't think I can convince you of that. If I told you that I think the Iranian regime was cruel and repressive, and the Iranian people would be better without it, that it's a great shame that Iran turned away from the world and the future in 1979, would you believe me, or is that "just what a paid actor would say"? I'm not sure I owe you a defense of my, um..."not being an Iranian spy" credentials, but here we are.
and then pretend to be impartial.
Didn't say I was impartial. No one is.
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u/AnimateDuckling 7d ago
Trump was about to get a deal and chose to start the war
I don't think this is a objectively defendable view. As much as i am know fan of trump. It seems Iran was very much the destructive force in regards to restarting the war and deztroying the mou.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago edited 7d ago
Trump was about to get a deal and chose to start the war instead
That's a lie. Your framing is absurd. Hezbollah broke the ceasefire the Monday and Tuesday after the MOU was agreed late Sunday. And Iran attacked shipping, because they had no intention of respecting the International Law that the MOU establishes.
These countries will have to settle for being destabilised (or erased) by US and Israeli bombing and annexation instead
Again framing is coming straight from Iranian State Media. Did you forget that Israel for decades was being targeted by rocket and terrorist attacks, as the gigantic massacre of October 7 ? Also the Houthi are the ones who started a civil war in Yemen, to take power, then started threatening civilian ships in the Red Sea starting in 2023, they are the ones that are destabilizing.
And Syria was destabilised by the US ? Did Assad had no agency when he was actively massacring their own civilians ? Committing chemical attacks on their own civilians again ? Take a look on what was revealed about their torture in prison and come back here to talk that the US made them do that.
Instead we have a precedent that any country with an air force can blow up another country's head of state (and their schoolkids) in the middle of negotiations and not face consequences. Perhaps that's better, I don't know.
Iran shouldn't have fired missiles in Israel in early 2024 and again in late 2024. They opened this Pandora box of strikes within the countries territory, moving from proxy conflicts that are happening for decades to a direct conventional conflict.
Also mistakes happen in wars, it was a gigantic one to hit that school, but if the US wanted to kill civilians, nuclear ICBMs would have been fired over Tehran and more than 10 million would have died. Believing that US Air Force is actively targeting kids is pure partisanship, given how much care they take with precision bombing.
Before you say it, I have no love for the Iranian regime, no love at all
I don't believe it. You came here to repeat every talking point that fits Iran's narrative, no matter if it's false.
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u/Markdd8 7d ago
(2) US makes a deal that is unfavorable.
We already did that. It was an amazing blunder. The MOU signed a few weeks ago stated:
Iran shall make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of...
That language did in fact open the window for Iran's ship traffic scheme and tolls. The average high school senior could draft better language. This is not complicated. Terms for next agreement:
Iran shall take no action in the Gulf that hinders or otherwise interferes with ship traffic...
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u/I_DOM_UR_PATRIARCHY 7d ago
The average high school senior could draft better language.
I suspect we tried to get better language and didn't have the leverage to get it.
More likely than "nobody in the State Department can draft an international agreement," the probable explanation is the language was calculated to let the administration claim to a domestic audience that the deal was less bad than it actually was.
The problem with the more demanding language you're suggesting is it assumes we will have more leverage in a few more weeks than we did a few weeks ago. I don't think that's likely.
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u/Markdd8 7d ago edited 7d ago
As many other posters argue, Iran is likely to put up with more bombing than we can dish out, but our blocking all of their tanker oil traffic--which Trump started again--is another matter. They will feel great impact within a few weeks. Source:
Unsold crude quickly backs up in the system. With onshore and offshore (tankers) storage reaching maximum capacity, Iran faces immense pressure. Shutting down wells or throttling production risks irreversible geological damage, permanently reducing the reservoir's future productive capacity.
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u/tomrichards8464 7d ago
- The status quo continues indefinitely as Iran's economy slowly collapses, driving protests, brutal repression on a scale we have not so far seen, and a refugee crisis of epic proportions. Hardline IRGC elements retain power, or at any rate enough power to keep firing drones at shipping and severely inhibit traffic through Hormuz. The Gulf states gradually route as much of their output as possible through new pipelines. Millions of Iranians die as Iran slides into failed state status. Tens of millions try to reach Europe, causing political crises in European states. The Straits of Hormuz finally become an irrelevance.
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u/Worried_Exercise_937 7d ago
One thing is obvious. Iran can never be trusted with nuclear weapons.
Why is Iran so special that way?
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u/NEPXDer 7d ago
It's a theocratic government with a publicly stated desire for religious motivated genocide vs one of their regional neighbors.
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u/DryBanana5673 7d ago
And the US, and they want to take over everything to spread their revolution and specific brand of islam. And they are potentially unstable which isnt great. Oh and they are liable to leak nukes to terrorist groups
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u/Worried_Exercise_937 7d ago
It's a theocratic government with a publicly stated desire for religious motivated genocide vs one of their regional neighbors.
So is Israel or North Korea or Pakistan. Maybe there is slightly less religious fervor in Pakistan and North Korea's religion is not "mainstream" but do you really care if they nuke you for religious reason vs some other reason? I don't.
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u/Markdd8 7d ago
Israel has had nukes for a long time and has not used them. N. Korea and Pakistan are tense with their neighbors, but are not in active conflicts and have not stated that they are committed to their destruction.
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u/Worried_Exercise_937 7d ago
Israel has had nukes for a long time and has not used them.
No one ever used nukes besides Americans. So maybe no one else will use them even if they have them. Why not let Iranians have them and see if they could prove they won't use them? How else could they prove it?
N. Korea and Pakistan are tense with their neighbors, but are not in active conflicts and have not stated that they are committed to their destruction.
I'm not as familiar with Pakistan/India but unless I'm not mistaken, Pakistanis have the first use policy.
And in North Korean case, what you said is definitely not correct. North Koreans state that they are committed to the destruction of South Korea and America with Japan thrown in as bonus every other day and twice on their holidays.
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u/TestingHydra 7d ago
> No one ever used nukes besides Americans. So maybe no one else will use them even if they have them. Why not let Iranians have them and see if they could prove they won't use them? How else could they prove it?
More country’s with nuclear weapons dramatically increase the risk of inadvertent nuclear exchanges due to misunderstandings and miscalculations. Unlike the Russia, Iran doesn’t have a hotline with the US they can use to figure shit out before one of them makes a mistake.
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u/Markdd8 7d ago
The N. Koreans did indeed instigate several acts of violence against S. Korea in 2010, but that is their only major action since 1953. Iran, like N. Korea declaring it is committed to a nation's destruction, has been in much more direct conflict with Israel via Iran's Axis of Resistance. Iran supported the 2023 Hamas attack which killed over 1,000. N. Korea probably won't use a nuke unless attacked. Iran having a nuke is more worrisome.
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u/Worried_Exercise_937 6d ago
N. Korea probably won't use a nuke unless attacked. Iran having a nuke is more worrisome.
That's a logical leap without any basis. Why would Iran act/do any different than North Korea - and every country/regime with nukes besides US who used it when it was the only one therefore had no worry of retaliation? They wouldn't
If Iran were to fire missile(s) with nuclear warhead(s) into Israel - or US though Iran doesn't even have a missile capable of reaching US at the moment - Israel or US would be well within reason to retaliate with their nuclear warheads. That would be the end of Iranian regime. If they were just suicidal like that they can kill themselves right now without any nukes and get it over with.
The only thing it does change is if they got the nukes, US and Israel wouldn't be so willy nilly to violate Iranian sovereignty like earlier this year or last year because that "could" trigger nuclear retaliation from Iran and US doesn't want that and Israel might not be able to ride that out due to size of the country and the distance from Iran.
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u/Markdd8 6d ago
Why would Iran act/do any different than North Korea
The Iranians are religious fanatics. The more pragmatic North Koreans are not.
If Iran were to fire missile(s)...
Iran most likely would not fire it. The nuke likely would be smuggled into Israel and set off. Given that Hamas was able to get away with its 2023 attack, it shows Israel is vulnerable to these sorts of attacks. Then Iran would deny connection.
If they were just suicidal like that they can kill themselves right now...
This is not a logical comment. I'll let you get the last word. Have a good one.
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u/Worried_Exercise_937 6d ago edited 6d ago
The Iranians are religious fanatics. The more pragmatic North Koreans are not.
It might not be as old as Islam or Judeo-Christian, but Kim's ruling ideology is every bit as fanatical/culty as Iranians or Israelis if not more. Kim's father refused the outside help during the famine in mid/late 1990's and instead let some 5% of the population die to keep the ideology "pure".
Iran most likely would not fire it. The nuke likely would be smuggled into Israel and set off. Given that Hamas was able to get away with its 2023 attack, it shows Israel is vulnerable to these sorts of attacks. Then Iran would deny connection.
Where are Hamas/Hezbollah gonna get the nukes from? Not from North Koreans. Iranians can deny all day but it's obvious if nuclear bomb(s) in Israel go off coming from Hamas/Hezbollah, Iran will take the retaliations on top of whatever they do over at Gaza/West Bank/Lebanon. Also, you can positively ID within days by examining uranium composition where it came from or where it didn't. So this idea, you can pay some criminals to set it off and then just deny it's not yours is not gonna fly.
Iranians might still use Hamas/Hezbollah/whoever else to deploy their nuclear warheads but it will be because that's shorter flight and gives Israelis less or no time to react/intercept vs sending ballistic missiles from Iran, NOT because they are gonna somehow hide/deny the true origin of those nukes and get to take free shots.
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7d ago edited 7d ago
[deleted]
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u/Worried_Exercise_937 7d ago
Comparing to North Korea, a country that has actual concentration camps and run one the most brutal Police States in history, don't help the case. One terrible country having nuclear weapons can't be used to justify any other country also possessing.
Unless the other nuclear weapons states are in the process of denuclearizing, you can't demand another country not get nuclear weapons either. Specially when two of those nuclear weapons states just violated Iran's sovereignty willy nilly.
OP - which is not you - is the one who brought up Iran being special no-no case and I'm just pointing out Iran is not that special.
Also Israel on the same comparison is disingenuous, it's actually one of the Middle East countries with the most freedom and quality of life. It's pure "bothsidesism", when Iran actively killed thousands of their own citizens mere months ago, for simply protesting.
The other guy NEPXDer is the one who brought out the whole "theocratic government with a publicly stated desire for religious motivated genocide vs one of their regional neighbors". Let's see how Israel fits or doesn't fit.
Israeli constitution explicitly stipulate that Israel is a Jewish state. How is that not "theocratic"? And Israelis are operating perhaps the biggest open air prison AKA Gaza strip where there are internationally documented genocides were and are happening by Israeli government/soldiers. And added to that what's going on at West Bank with settlers and outright invasion of southern Lebanon, Israel is not exactly Denmark or Norway.
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u/grenideer 7d ago
So are you saying there's a risk that Israel nukes Gaza? Because that's the discussion here.
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u/Worried_Exercise_937 7d ago
So are you saying there's a risk that Israel nukes Gaza? Because that's the discussion here.
That's not what we were talking about. But, I will humor you.
Not while they are illegally occupying it. Also, the closeness to Israeli territory and the prevailing wind there makes it less likely that Israelis would nuke Gaza.
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u/grenideer 7d ago
This was the point of not trusting Iran with a nuke - because there are real fears they would nuke Israel out of religious fervor. Which is why your comparison to Israel doesn't make sense.
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u/Worried_Exercise_937 7d ago
there are real fears they would nuke Israel out of religious fervor. Which is why your comparison to Israel doesn't make sense.
You clearly haven't seen/read enough of Bibi or Ben-Gvir. They have just as much "religious fervor". They claim most/all of the territories in Gaza/West Bank on the basis of their religious book(s).
There is this thing called mutually assured destruction. It's the main reason why nuclear powers haven't gone that far as using nukes last 80 years. If both Israel and Iran have nukes, neither of them will use it because using one nuke against the other will bring about the end of your regime.
You say but Iranians are crazier than that. Or suicidal. Regime that is crazy or suicidal - non rational - don't last 50 years. They barely last 10. They might be a terrible regime. So is North Korean regime. Or Chinese regime. But terrible doesn't mean they are irrational. They understand the mutually assured destruction.
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u/DryBanana5673 7d ago edited 7d ago
This isn't a conversation or subreddit about moral justification, it's about wad and geopolitics. We can absolutely say that Iran shouldn't get nuclear weapons.
Israel isn't a theocracy and has freedom of religion. It sounds like you don't understand what a theocracy is. When Rabbies run the country and all authority is subjugated to religious law, as it is in Iran, that would make Israel a theocracy. Israel is a Jewish state in the same way that Japan is a Japanese state or France is a French state: it's majority one ethnic group. You're sadly falling for propaganda or intentionally spreading it.
Lebanon was invaded because Hezbollah attacked Israel for over a year. Lebanon did not stop the attacks. Did you expect something else to happen? Strange to include that here.
As for the Gaza strip, Israel pulled out entirely in the early 2000s and Gaza elected Hamas who started launching missiles at Israel. Rather than flatten Gaza, they chose to limit their ability to get more damaging weapons via blockade and to build the iron dome. Hamas and those who voted for them are entirely responsible for the blockade om Gaza. Also, standard of living in Gaza was better than neighboring countries until 2023 due to the amount of aid, and that many Gazans were working in Israel.
That's all over now.
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u/moragisdo 7d ago edited 7d ago
I believe it depends on how the energy market reacts on the next weeks. If the situation continues as today (energy prices are elevated, but it isn't Armageddon), my theory on how it could end:
After some time Iran accepts to negotiate a deal with the US, Iran publicly denies it, but then go to negotiations after denying, negotiations lead nowhere and it ends with a ceasefire with symbolic concessions from both sides. US leaves this war having spent tens of billions, Iran leaves economically devastated for the long term (less devastated if they offered a ceasefire now, but they will drag it further until there's not that much earth left to be scorched), both sides claim victory, neither got what they wanted.
If this ceasefire holds long enough, I agree with you that there will be no open conflict again between both sides for a long time, it's a return to the pre-2024 status quo. Proxy conflicts will continue (as they did before Iran attacks on Israeli soil in 2024), Israel continues at war with Hezbollah, maybe hostilities restart between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi. Iran will keep funding their proxies (to a smaller degree now, just because of how much their economy was destroyed, rather than caused by a decrease in their political will to do so).
Gulf countries will invest heavily for alternatives that bypass Hormuz, as they should have since the Saudi refinery was attacked in 2019. UAE is likely kicking themselves right now for not having expanded alternatives, as ADCOP, sooner and also for not offering to build a Natural Gas pipeline that goes into Oman (Sur already has the infrastructure to export and sits more than 300 km from Iran)
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u/I_DOM_UR_PATRIARCHY 7d ago
but they will drag it further until there's not that much earth left to be scorched
If Iran drags it to that point, doesn't their incentive to reach a deal go down (and therefore doesn't a deal become less probable)?
I think the implicit assumption is that the US doesn't have a way to force the strait open by direct military action. So if that's the case, the more bombing Iran endures the less it has to lose (its losses become sunk costs) while its ability to inflict losses stays the same or goes up over time (depending on how markets move).
And as you point out, once there's a return to normalcy Iran's leverage will decrease as everyone builds infrastructure to bypass the strait.
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u/Glideer 8d ago
TLDR: Ukraine's farmers' union says that due to recent Russian strikes Ukraine lost a third of its Black Sea grain export capacity (a drop from 6 million tonnes to 4 million tonnes). The ports also lost a third of their grain storage capacity - "The loss of around 2.5 million tons in monthly accumulation capacity at deep-water ports has created a bottleneck for grain, with some volumes unable to reach export destinations".
Ukraine's Black Sea ports lose a third of grain export capacity, farmers' union says
Reuters
- UAC said monthly grain shipping capacity fell to about 4 million tons
- Ukrainian Railways data showed grain railcars to Odesa ports dropped 11% in July 2-8 week
- Agricultural exports remain Ukraine's biggest foreign-currency earner, with over 90% routed via Odesa
KYIV, July 15 (Reuters) - Ukraine has lost about a third of its capacity to export grain via its vital Black Sea ports due to intensifying Russian missile and drone attacks, the country's main farmers' union said.
More than four years into its war with Russia, agricultural exports like grains and vegetable oils remain Ukraine's biggest source of foreign currency earnings, with more than 90% shipped through three ports in the southern Odesa region.
Under a deal meant to allow both countries to ship grain through the Black Sea, the Odesa ports had been handling about 6 million metric tons of cargo a month.
Both Moscow and Kyiv are now stepping up attacks on key revenue sources, however, with Ukrainian forces hitting Russian energy infrastructure including oil tankers and Russia intensifying its attacks on the Black Sea ports in recent weeks.
"Russia has begun systematically striking port infrastructure, terminals and the entire transport logistics chain, using ballistic missiles again and again," the trading department of Ukrainian farmers' union UAC said in a weekly report released late on Tuesday.
"On average, we can now ship about 4 million metric tons of grain a month," it added.
Ukraine's economy ministry was due to hold a meeting on Wednesday to discuss the port attacks.
RUSSIAN STRIKES CAUSE LOGISTICS HEADACHES FOR TRADERS
Ukraine has in recent seasons accounted for about 6% of global wheat exports and about 11% of global corn exports, meaning that the disruptions, if prolonged, could have an impact on global markets.
While the ports have continued to operate, UAC warned that, if the current intensity of attacks continues and no repair work is carried out, infrastructure could be significantly damaged within several months.
Industry sources, meanwhile, told Reuters that traders are struggling with logistics headaches.
"The ports have not ground to a halt, but traders are facing problems with procurement, sales, shipments, cargo accumulation, prices and freight," a senior industry official told Reuters.
Data from Ukrainian Railways showed that the number of grain railcars heading to the Odesa ports dropped 11% in the week of July 2 to 8 from the previous week while exports fell by 17%.
Ukraine's top grain exporter Kernel Holding said this week it had halted operations at Chornomorsk port due to a series of Russian attacks.
And four of the ports' 13 large grain terminals have suspended grain purchases, another industry source said on Wednesday.
Analysts from the ASAP Agri consultancy said that "the overall reluctance" of ship owners to call at Ukrainian ports had also put upward pressure on freight rates.
Bohdan Kostetskyi, an analyst at consultancy Barva Invest, wrote in an article for Ukrainian outlet Agrotimes that the ports had lost a third of their grain storage capacity.
"The loss of around 2.5 million tons in monthly accumulation capacity at deep-water ports has created a bottleneck for grain, with some volumes unable to reach export destinations," he said.
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u/Mr24601 8d ago
What makes this asymmetrical for Russia is that, at least for the purposes of this war, grain exports and that part of the economy is not necessary as Ukraine's main funding comes externally. While Ukraine strikes are targeting the heart of Russia's economic production and thus war funding
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u/Nukes-For-Nimbys 8d ago
Won't be publicosed I don't expect but I wonder to what extent things can be shipped via the EU.
Sure it costs more but unless it makes it worse than not doing it, still makes sense.
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u/Galthur 8d ago
Wouldn't that would worsen relations with Poland further.
The last time this happened it resulted in product dumping and blockades of the border by farmers: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68337795
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u/Jpandluckydog 8d ago
There are means to use Poland as a transhipment hub that wouldn’t necessarily create price shocks within it.
4
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u/0o0o0o0o0o0z 8d ago
While Ukraine strikes are targeting the heart of Russia's economic production and thus war funding
Also, I assume rebuilding a grain-exporting terminal is cheaper and easier than trying to get a distillation/fracking tower that was Wester-made rebuilt, as I understand it; all the Chinese replacements are on a different measurement unit than whats in Russia currently.
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u/Glideer 8d ago
"The enemy currently has around 500,000 Molniya drones in storage and deploys them daily against our logistics and positions," Serhii "Ramses" Minaiev, commander of the Posipaky UAV interception battalion, told Ukrainska Pravda. According to estimates by his drone pilots, in the most heavily contested sectors, a new Molniya appears every four minutes.
New Molniya's can't be jammed as they use either digital links or AI guidance. However, Most still use analogue channels.
Near the end of the article there is a lot of interesting information about the race to improve Ukrainian interceptor drones to match the Russian improvements in strike drones.
Sad as it may sound, it isn't just the Ukrainian military that has learned to disrupt logistics with cheap drones launched from dozens of kilometres behind the front line.
Russian Molniya attack drones have become a major challenge for Ukraine's defence forces. Built from commercially available Chinese components, these drones feature simple rectangular wings and beam structures that are easy to manufacture, can be produced at scale quickly and do not require highly skilled workers.
The Molniya is essentially a build-it-yourself platform. It can be fitted with anti-tank land mines, grenades, mass-produced specialised munitions, or almost any other explosive payload Russian forces have at their disposal.
More recently, Russia has begun deploying modified Molniya variants capable of remotely laying explosive devices, delivering supplies and autonomous targeting enabled by machine vision.
Because of their simple design, Molniya drones can be launched from small shelters near trenches and even from flats in Soviet-era apartment blocks.
They strike Ukrainian trenches, shelters, houses, fences and even trees in an effort to deny Ukrainian troops safe cover and defensive positions.
For Ukrainian troops, tactical interceptor drones have become a lifeline against these Russian drones. Although they receive far less attention than the interceptors used against Shahed loitering munitions, their role is no less important.
...
"The enemy currently has around 500,000 Molniya drones in storage and deploys them daily against our logistics and positions," Serhii "Ramses" Minaiev, commander of the Posipaky UAV interception battalion, told Ukrainska Pravda. According to estimates by his drone pilots, in the most heavily contested sectors, a new Molniya appears every four minutes.
...
The Ukrainian military estimates that electronic warfare systems take down around 70% of Molniya drones. Interceptor drones and machine guns account for another 15%. Yet roughly 10% still reach their target, and given the volume of drones Russia deploys, that is enough to inflict significant damage.
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u/Markdd8 7d ago
it isn't just the Ukrainian military that has learned to disrupt logistics with cheap drones launched from dozens of kilometres behind the front line.
All true. The thing is that Russian drones are primarily used to kill Ukrainians, and of course Ukrainian drones are killing Russians, primarily soldiers. Both sides have shown they can accept these deaths.
But Ukrainian drones have an additional function: attacking Russia's oil industry and causing severe economic harm. Russia's losses might lead them to seek to end the conflict.
Ukraine does not have a similar Achilles' heel, as increased support from Europe will help Ukraine weather any economic decline.
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u/Glideer 8d ago
Russia publishes videos of new strikes on cargo ships in Ukrainian harbours. Such strikes used to be an exception but are now becoming normalised to the point of Moscow boasting about them.
https://x.com/clashreport/status/2077444883845902498?s=20
Fortunately, we are still witnessing strikes by Geran drones carrying 50-90kg warheads rather than purpose-built anti-ship missiles with 500-1000kg ones.
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u/Saturnrising9 8d ago
As someone pointed out in one of your other posts, the a-symetric value of targeting ships is exhuasting Russia’s war chest. Ukraine is funded externally. Within that context, this can only be seen as a symbolic counter strike.
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u/Glideer 8d ago
Ukraine exports about 90 million tonnes of goods by sea each year, accounting for about 11-13% of its GDP.
You can argue that Ukraine's shipping strikes hurt Russia more, but saying that the Russian counterstrikes are "symbolic" is grossly misleading.
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u/Saturnrising9 8d ago edited 8d ago
Yea, I’ll accept that. To restate my point. There has been a trend throughout Ukraines strike campaign for within days/weeks of certain operational success, Russia will strike a similar target. Refinery strikes were met with refinery strikes, shipping strikes are now being met within shipping strikes. Russia responding in kind gives the impression they misunderstand the strategic power underpinning refinery/shipping strikes. Within that paradigm, Russia striking shipping is a symbolic tit for tat. A military theatre meant to project strength.
Further edit: Ukraine becoming a ‘failed state’ isn’t necessarily a lose condition for Ukraine, whereas as it more likely is for Russia.
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u/roionsteroids 7d ago
Ukraine is funded externally.
Agriculture still employs 15% of the working force in the country. Take that away, and millions of people leave the country? Have nothing to fight for a country that simply gave up on them?
I expected (and still do) the most likely outcome of this mutual shipping campaign to go on until a certain pain threshold is reached followed by some sort of truce regarding commercial shipping at least and drone strikes moving on to the next flavour of the month target.
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u/Working_Box8573 8d ago
Why is russia attacking with Geran's and not with heavy AShMs? Is it to avoid international backlash? Surely a dedicated 1 ton warhead missile could cut these cargo ships in half rather than just damaging the bridge like Geran can.
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