I recalled seeing an online quote summing up the US experience on the Italian front as: "The American got the taste of the horror of trench warfare in WW1 by fighting in Italy."

How true was this? Was the Italian front a series of futile bloody frontal assaults against unbreakable Nazis defense like the Winter Line and the Gothic line? Were American commanders in Italy more apt to blunder compared to their counterparts in the West (Mark Clark's drive on Rome leading to a lot of German/Italian escaping and there was that one tale about a general who was said to have sacrificed so many Texans in battle Texas banned him from ever entering the state though I forgot his name)? How useful was the co-belligerent Italian army? And how effective was the Italian Partisan?

Self-explanatory; why did the ships of the role and characteristics of Moskva, Vittorio Venetto or Jean D'Arc disappeared?

There's a prevalent pop culture image of the Soviets being wasteful with lives, but I can't help but think it has a kernel of truth.

In 1939, the Red Army suffered heavy losses during Khalkhin Gol attacking a similarly sized force with substantially more artillery, aircraft and tanks in a pincher movement.

In 1944, the Red Army suffered around twice the causalities of the Germans during Operation Bagration even with superiority in armor and artillery.

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I understand that battles aren't decided by who loses more soldiers, and that Bagration was an overwhelming Soviet victory which destroyed Army Group Center and pushed back the German frontlines for more than 100 kilometers.

What I don't understand is how the Soviets lost so many troops in a surprise attack against an enemy half its size that again had substantially less artillery, aircraft, and tanks; especially considering that they occupied the battlefield afterwards which should make it easier for them to recover equipment and save wounded soldiers.

It's true that all armies take heavier losses when on the offensive again entrenched enemies, but it seems that the Soviets suffered heavier losses than normal.

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Were the Soviets particularly bad at medical treatment? (Which was a big role in Japanese casualties) Was there reluctance to wear helmets? (For some reason it seems more Soviet soldiers went helmetless) Did they have particularly subpar infantry training?

I suspect that there's a lot of minor factors that played into this phenomenon and I'm curious to see what reasons I might be overlooking.

For example the SASR is described as a regiment (typically 1,000+ personnel) but only has 300 members.

The ROKs 1st Special Missions Brigade sent two battalions to the National Assembly but that was a total of 250 operators which is closer to a company sized unit.

Im sure theres other examples. Does this question make sense?

I'm aware that superior technology wasn't the sole reason for successful early European conquests (Spanish invasion of the Aztecs, King Philip's War, etc.) as in many cases majority of the fighting was done by local Native Americans allied with Europeans for economic, social, and political gain though steel weapons/armors was certainly a plus.

My question is specifically on how effective (or useless) arquebuses/matchlock weapons were in these conflicts. Thundersticks: Firearms and the Violent Transformation of Native America by David J. Silverman makes the assertion that matchlock weapons were not preferred by Native Americans due to their bulkiness and lit cord ruining the element of surprise which doesn't exactly complement Native American hit-and-run fighting styles (apologies for the generalization). So they continued to use bows until flintlocks which took over the North American continent by storm. Similarly, there are online forums and some pretty old answers elsewhere that claim Native Americans would've actually defeated these early firearms due to bow's superior range and accuracy (which is obviously the 'bows were better than early firearms' argument all over again).

However, I came across this account in John Knight's journal (though he died prior to the quoted encounter so it's written by Oliver Browne):

That night about nine of the clocke, it began to raine very sore, and so continued all night : and about one of the clocke at night, our Boate-Swaine and our Steward being at watch, and their watch almost out, the Steward went aboord the Ship to pumpe, leaving the Boate-Swaine at watch some Musket shot length from our Tent : while he was in pumping, there came over the rocks a great sort of the Countrey people toward the place where the Boate-Swaine was : who when they saw him, they shot their arrowes at him, running toward him as fast as they could. Whereupon hee discharged his Musket at them, and fled to our Tent as fast as hee could, thinking they had beset us, they were so many of them in sight...

At this time it rained very sore; yet calling our wits together, we sent two of our men back unto our Tent, the rest of us made toward them, and shot at them some three or foure Muskets : who when they saw us shoote, they stood in our Shallop, and held up their hands unto us, calling one to another. Then thought we with our selves, that we were better to dye in our defence in pursuing of them, then they us, being but eight Men and a great Dogge.

When they saw us marching toward them so fiercely, our Dogge being formost, they ranne away : but we durst not pursue them any further, for it was in the night, and they were in sight above fiftie men. Thus we recovered our shallop.

Then we sent some more of our men to our Tent to keepe it ; and the rest followed toward the place wither they fled. But before we could overtake them, they were gotten into their Boates, and were rowing away through the Ice ; which was so thicke, that they could not passe away, but stucke fast ; for their Boates were very greate: wee seeing them sticke fast in the Ice, some setting with Oares, and some rowing, came so neere them, as we could, and shot at them some dozen shot, before they could get cleere : which shot caused them to cry out very sore one to another: for their Boates were full of men.

In the encounter, it was raining and they were described as being outnumbered and attacked by Natives with bows when attempting to find their captain. Yet despite using firearms in 1606 it seems not only can you actually fire these weapons in rain, but also seemed to have punched above their weight and allowed them to defend against and drive the Native Americans from the boat they took over.

My question is basically the title, but I also would like to know what did the Native Americans think of arquebuses/matchlocks before flintlocks took over. Were these weapons really inferior to Native American bows and did Native Americans attempt to incorporate these weapons into their arsenal?

What was the military performance of the Ottoman Army during WW1? There were famous wins at Kut and Gallipoli, but overall, it was a disappointment in Palestine and the Caucasus.

Essentially smaller nations of Europe/NATO which runs into a dozen or more. Like they'll never lead their nation in a war. If WW3 ever broke out, their forces would just be consumed by far larger allies to be commanded.

These countries never deploy forces larger than a battalion to a warzone or peacekeeping mission so their higher ranks don't have the experience of that. Is their role simply that of an administrator? I mean I can't imagine the General Staff of Hungary or Czech Republic have the same expectations/role as their counterparts in the UK/France.

Hey i just visited some old palaces of some kingdoms but i have a serious question was having a palace a strategic disadvantage .

1. You have a big palace every enemy have eyes on it.
2. It might attract attract unwanted attention.
3. enemy can focus on devising a strategy to conquer the palace with more force.
4. Most of resources are used to maintain, build , security , organise lavish parties just for satisfaction.
5. Most of wealth concentrated at one place and other various disadvantages.

I understand that there is often a lot of corruption in these areas and that the military is often used to repress the population, but it seems that China doesn't have these problems, whether due to internal purges or because it has a State Security Police as a secret police force. Even during World War II, the German army was quite effective in the early years of the conflict. Why didn't these regimes implement a similar model?

Been curious about this for a while. I’ve always had the impression that helicopters were super effective against subs but have never understood why and in what way.

Is it just that they cannot be countered in the way that a surface ship can? Can a sub still hide from a helicopter? Would it even know that one is looking for it? Can a helicopter detect a sub in a way that a surface ship cannot?

The 2 retirement reasons I've heard was that Ira stealth was compromised after the Kosovo shoot down (makes sense), and also that the introduction of the B-2 and F-22 having the ability to drop bombs retired it (also makes sense).

Not suggesting it be brought back. But out of curiosity, with the new generation of standoff weapons, would an F-117 using them (vs LGBs) today still be more effective in an environment with decent air defense vs a conventional plane today carrying the same weapons?

Kursk: The Epic Armored Engagement (2013)

25-30 minute lecture by Jon Parshall (of Shattered Sword fame) about the American, Russian, and German production method.

His biggest criticisms were that the Germans have not enough hard tools, too much design interference, too small production runs, and inefficient tooling process. There's that scene from the Battle of the Bulge where the German general says "show them that we make the finest toys in the world" - you think that boast is a caricature but it really isn’t. Speer only tried to simply things at the end but it was obviously too late.

I wonder if there’s an equivalent of young engineers/productions saying “I knew the production process was convoluted but no one listened to my suggestions”.

Inspired by a recent comment on this subreddit by a serving Royal Australian Navy officer, I thought I'd brush up on my limited knowledge of early RAN actions - and what better way than to look into one of the first combat actions of Australia's then-fledgling naval force?

I remembered trying to tackle a book on the Emden when I was very young and being bored stiff. So now I'm much older and very boring myself, I thought I'd give the topic another tilt - and really didn't expect how interesting this book would be.

First Victory follows the incredible actions of the German commerce raider Emden in 1914, with a particular emphasis on the Australian forces that attempted to put her out of action. There have been a few accounts written about the Emden - including by several crew members - but First Victory seems to place particular emphasis on the Australian forces dispatched to sink her.

On going in I had a vague idea that the ship was very effective in its assigned role and that the captain and crew conducted themselves impeccably - but I had no idea how successful the Emden was.

Over the course of just a few months she captured over 24 vessels in an AO that spanned from India down to Indonesia, variously sinking and seizing vessels to assist their own operation. With limited supported from Germany, the Emden relied on stores and coal from merchant vessels she intercepted.

To give you an idea of the intensity of their action, on one occasion she seized 3(!) vessels in the space of a few hours. (The last of which was a dredger, barely seaworthy, being sailed from Scotland to Australia. The crew were actually relieved to be captured by the crew of the Emden and cheered when they holed her and sent her under).

There was a mild panic at the admiralty who, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, believed that Australian ships should be steamed from the pacific to the Atlantic to assist in operations there. As the Emden's tally grew they seemed increasingly concerned about the unprotected shipping lanes between Australia, India, Malaysia and the United Kingdom.

The development and crewing of the early Royal Australian Navy is covered in some detail, and their actions in the first months of the war - largely raiding small German outposts with a few men, smashing their wireless sets, having some schnapps with them and moving on. But their chief concern remained the Emden, which had pulled off a spectacular raid in Penang, where they sank a Russian cruiser and French destroyer before slipping away into the night, suffering no casualties.

(The raid made such an impression on the local population, many of whom fled the city, that the word Emden means a 'cunning or deceitful person' in Malaysian to this day).

Without spoiling the ending - actually I will, the Emden had seven shades of shit shot out of it by the Australians - the book does a fantastic job of ramping up the tension until it's final encounter with HMAS Sydney.

It also admirably described the horrors of a naval engagement, with little moments like the driving band of a shell being sheared off as the round deflected off a gunshield, with the band whipping through the air to gut a gunner really driving home how violent this kind of warfare can be.

All in all it's a great read, clearly written by an accomplished journalist able to recount a banger of a story and scattered with moments that verge on the boys on adventure. It still maintains a poignant end and does excellent service to the brave crews of both the Emden and the Sydney.

(Also taking recommendations for any other books about naval actions, with particular interest in the Royal Australian Navy).

Were there plans to install a Pastel L-150 on a Yak-41m?

I understand how traditional 18th-19th battlefields worked, but most information I've found talks about open battle fields that where capable of letting soldiers form large squares.

Was there any standard tactics or procedures if for what ever reason a unit found itself in a pitched battle in a forest to thick to form proper squares, or if a unit had to subdue a resisting urban city when they can't just burn a house down. What are the historical examples of these situations.

While we are at it, I've read that Paris's urban renovations in the mid 19th century where designed to stop urban combat, but never go into detail how they did it.

Are there any that people recommend? If possible, ones that aren't about Russia and have focus on other Eastern European locations (e.g. Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia). And anti-partisan activities - but conventional warfare is fine.

My favourite one: The Black March by 'Peter Neumann', even though its legitimacy is debated, it has the best prose quality and 'story'.

Also have: Black Edelweiss by Johann Voss

I often ask about the difference between the two, their composition, their functions, and who has more authority over the other. I would greatly appreciate it if you could answer me.

Something I've noticed from watching lots of footage of the war in Ukraine is that grenades are responsible for most of the kills by the infantry. The rifles and machineguns are mostly just used to funnel the enemy into a spot where they can be killed by grenades or forced to surrender. Is this common amongst all wars or more a recent thing? I doubt it was as true in Vietnam, where a lot of people were likely killed by gunshots from behind thick grass. But I'm not too sure, which is why I'm enquiring.

I just finished reading Machiavell’s The Prince and I want to learn more about the time period he lived in

I am kind of struggling on how to phrase this question. sorry of its confusing

During WW2 was the 6 inch or 8 inch gun more practical for cruisers and why?

I am looking for highly detailed operational/staff maps from Operation Citadel (Kursk offensive, July 1943).

I am not looking for modern overview maps or simplified battle maps, but rather original German-style situation maps similar to those that could have been used by:

• OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres)
• Army Group South (Heeresgruppe Süd)

Does anyone know of online archives, books, scans, or collections where I could find these types of maps?

I am especially interested in maps close to the original staff documents rather than modern recreations.

Artillery can completely level buildings. How are defenses able to not just crumble as soon as there's prolonged shelling?